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Abstract 
New Zealand was the first country in the OECD to adopt a ‘light-handed’ approach to 
telecommunications regulation when, in 1987, it eschewed industry-specific regulation for a 
generic competition law-based approach.  The ‘light-handed’ regulatory environment 
prevailed throughout the 1990s, during the privatisation of the incumbent provider, the entry 
of competitive fixed-line infrastructure and services suppliers,  the establishment and growth 
of mobile market competition, the expansion of the commercial internet and the consequent 
emergence of the ‘information economy’.   Over this period, New Zealand emerged as one of 
the earliest-adopting and highest-utilising OECD countries, with its ADSL services amongst 
the earliest, highest quality, most widely-available and lowest-priced in the OECD.   
 
Since 2000, however, there has been a sea-change in the New Zealand approach to 
telecommunications regulation.   Following a Ministerial Inquiry into the industry in 2000, 
industry-specific regulation was introduced in 2001, limited bitstream unbundling was 
imposed in 2004, full unbundling and the ability to undertake standard terms determinations 
were mandated in 2006 and in 2007, operational separation, overseen by the Minister and not 
the regulator, was imposed.  Regulated mobile termination was also rejected in 2007, in 
favour of ministerially-brokered agreements.     
 
By tracing the economic performance of the New Zealand telecommunications sector during 
the periods of regulatory change in terms of productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency, 
this paper finds that there is little evidence to suggest that the ‘light-handed’ regime 
performed any worse than comparable industry-specific regimes over the same period.  
Rather, the return to industry-specific regulation and each successive increasing of regulatory 
pressure appears to have been associated with reduced economic performance and reductions 
in competition relative to the regime replaced.  Increased regulatory tension has also been 
associated with replacement of pursuit of economic efficiency as the sector objective with 
pursuit of competition, in isolation from the efficiency consequences of this policy change.   It 
is therefore unlikely that the latest changes, including direct political control, will deliver 
greater welfare to the New Zealand market.  
 
The paper suggests that an unjustified focus upon the incumbent’s dominance as the 
underlying cause of poor competition metrics has resulted in policy-makers overlooking the 
role of the contribution of different regulations to the competition metrics observed.  In 
particular, the only regulations forming part of the light-handed regime which have not been 
overturned, a universal service obligation and a mandatory tariff requiring no charges be 
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levied for residential local telephony calls, are materially connected with all of the poor 
performance indicators which have been used to justify increased sector regulation.   These 
requirements, persisted with because of political, rather than economic efficiency imperatives, 
provide a more plausible explanation for practically all of the positive and negative 
efficiency, competition and strategic interaction observations observed in the New Zealand 
sector over the past 20 years than the alternative hypotheses that competition law has failed 
and the incumbent has exercised its dominant position unduly.   
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Introduction 
New Zealand was the first country in the OECD to adopt a ‘light-handed’ approach to 
telecommunications regulation when, in 1987, it eschewed industry-specific regulation, 
“relying instead on the potential for entry to discipline behaviour within the context of a 
business environment for which the competitive practices of all firms are subject to a single 
Commerce Act” (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996:24). The Telecommunications Act 1987 
marked the end of combined state sector ownership and political control of the 
telecommunications sector that had characterised the New Zealand industry’s first hundred 
years (Wilson, 1994).  The reforms resulted in the removal of all regulatory restrictions on the 
supply of telecommunications equipment from mid 1988, the creation of a stand-alone 
telecommunications State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) on 1 April 1989, and the simultaneous 
removal of all statutory monopoly provisions protecting the state-owned enterprise from 
competition in any of its activities.    
 
The ‘light-handed’ regulatory environment established under the Commerce Act 1986 and the 
Telecommunications Act 1987 prevailed throughout the 1990s, during the privatisation of the 
incumbent provider (Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited, hereafter Telecom) in 
1990, the entry of competitive fixed-line infrastructure and services suppliers from 19911, the 
establishment and growth of mobile market competition from 19942, the expansion of the 
commercial internet from 1996 and the consequent emergence of the ‘information economy’ 
(Howell & Obren, 2003). Contemporaneously, New Zealand emerged as one of the earliest-
adopting and highest-utilising OECD countries in respect of most of the demand-side 
indicators typically used to assess improved economic performance arising from the Internet, 
such as the number of individuals connected, the number of hours spent online, the number of 
secure servers per capita, the number of transactions per secure server and the number and use 
of autonomous and routed IP addresses per capita (Howell & Marriott, 2004; Howell, 2006; 
2007).  Furthermore, on the supply side, New Zealand’s ADSL services were initially 
amongst the earliest, highest quality, most widely-available and lowest-priced in the OECD.  
Nonetheless, the country’s broadband uptake has been low by OECD standards (Howell, 
2003; 2006).   
                                                     
1 Clear Corporation, held by majority owners MCI International and Bell Canada Enterprises, with minor partners New Zealand 
Railways, Television New Zealand, and Todd Corporation (Boles de Boer and Evans, 1996), entered the market using the then 
New Zealand Railways fixed fibre-optic cable to bypass the Telecom network.  Clear invested in the provision of local 
infrastructures servicing the business districts in most New Zealand cities, as well as the domestic and international long-distance 
markets (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996). In 1991, Saturn Communications was established on the Kapiti Coast, 
near Wellington, providing telephony and television services via fibre-optic cable.  Telstra Corporation (Australia) established 
Telstra New Zealand in 1996.  Telstra New Zealand purchased Saturn in 1999 and Clear in 2001, forming TelstraClear Ltd on 
December 15 2001 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/history.cfm.  
2 BellSouth started its GSM cellphone service in 1994 (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece, 1996). Vodafone purchased 
BellSouth in November 1998, forming Vodafone New Zealand http://www.vodafone.co.nz/personal/about/company-information/  
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 Since 2000, however, there has been a sea-change in the New Zealand approach to 
telecommunications regulation.   Following a Ministerial Inquiry into the industry in 20003, a 
Telecommunications Commissioner was established in 2002 to oversee industry activity4, an 
inquiry was held in 2003 on the merits of unbundling the local loop5, limited bitstream access 
was granted in 20046, full unbundling and the ability to undertake standard terms 
determinations were mandated in 20067 and in 2007, the Telecommunications Minister 
announced his intention to instruct Telecom to operationally separate its network activities 
from its wholesale and retail activities8 and that he, rather than the Telecommunications 
Commissioner, would take the lead in overseeing the separation process9.  A return to direct 
political control of sector strategy is further evidenced by the decision of the Minister of 
Economic Development to directly broker a fixed-to-mobile termination agreement with the 
two mobile network operators after the Minister of Communications twice rejected the 
Commissioner’s recommendations to regulate prices and terms in this market10.    
 
The swing of New Zealand’s regulatory pendulum from political control to light-handed 
regulation to increasingly more stringent industry-specific regulation and finally back to 
significant political direction of sector strategy and activity in the space of only twenty years 
poses some interesting questions.  The radical changes suggest demonstrable failure of the 
‘light-handed’ regime to deliver the desired objectives in the New Zealand context, begging 
answers to two important questions:   
• what were the objectives for the ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime, and what evidence 
supports a finding of failure sufficient to justify such wide-sweeping change in 
regulatory direction?; and   
• how have the return to industry-specific regulation and the incremental changes to the 
new regulatory regime since its inception in 2001 addressed these shortcomings, and 
what have been the drawbacks?   
 
The most recent changes imposing operational separation and a return to significant direct 
political control beg answers to further questions, not least because they deviate significantly 
                                                     
3 Ministerial Inquiry Into Telecommunications http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/StandardSummary____16318.aspx  
4 Commerce Commission http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Overview.aspx  
5 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/Overview.aspx  
6http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/Unbundling-
BitstreamServices/correspondenceandrelateddocuments.aspx  
7 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____20266.aspx  
8 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/ContentTopicSummary____26310.aspx  
9 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29595
10 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29126
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from the regulatory best practice principles promulgated by both the OECD and the ITU and 
proceed in a direction diametrically opposed to that pursued in most other OECD countries: 
• why has New Zealand embarked upon some of the most stringent regulatory actions 
possible at a time when other countries are debating the merits of reduced reliance 
upon ex ante industry-specific regulation and greater emphasis upon competition law 
to govern industry interaction (e.g. the members of the European Union) or are 
actively dismantling sector-specific regulation (e.g. Canada11 and the United States)?; 
and 
• why is operational separation being pursued at a time when the industry in most other 
countries is strongly characterised by consolidation amongst existing players and 
vertical integration of content, service and transport providers in order to justify the 
business case for investment in next-generation technologies12? 
Furthermore: 
• what can be learned from the New Zealand experience to inform the debate in other 
countries?; and 
• what are the likely consequences for the future of the New Zealand industry as a 
result of the regulatory choices that have been made?   
 
This paper traces the evolution of the New Zealand regulatory framework and sector 
performance in order to provide some insight and possible answers to these questions.   
Section one details the origin of the ‘light-handed’ regime, competitive interaction from 1987 
to 2000, and the concerns raised about the efficacy of the New Zealand approach.  Section 
two examines the return to industry-specific regulation between 2000 and 2006.  Section three 
discusses the politicisation of telecommunications regulation and the resumption of direct 
Ministerial intervention between 2005 and 2007.  Section four draws out and discusses the 
prevailing trends.  In each of these four sections, the relative performance of the relevant 
regime is discussed, in the dimensions of static and dynamic efficiency, the extent to which 
gains and losses are shared between producers and consumers, and the effect of the regime on 
the strategic interactions between sector participants (that is, the nature and extent of 
competitive interaction).  Section five concludes by directly addressing the questions posed 
above. 
 
                                                     
11 http://www.telegeography.com/cu/article.php?article_id=19089&email=html  
12 See, for example, Ford, Koutsky and Spiwak (2007) for a discussion on the different approaches to competition policy 
necessary to support investment in a market characterised by inter-platform competition.   
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1. ‘Light-Handed’ Regulation: 1987-2000 
New Zealand’s light-handed telecommunications regulatory regime formed part of an 
economy-wide move away from extensive government ownership and industry-specific 
control of a very substantial amount of commercial activity towards reliance predominantly 
upon the provisions of the Commerce Act 1986 to govern all commercial interactions.  This 
move began in 1984, when a constitutional and foreign exchange crisis propelled the newly-
elected Labour government into “one of the most notable episodes of liberalization that 
history has to offer” (Henderson, 1995 cited in Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996: 
1856).  A consensus of politicians and government officials agreed that “whatever the source 
of New Zealand’s economic difficulties, the solution to its critical structural problems must be 
sought in far-reaching structural reform and liberalization” (p 1862).    
 
The package of policies settled upon was based on “stable, credible and mutually consistent 
macroeconomic policies which would assist in the efficient allocation of resources” and a 
microeconomic policy “achieving, wherever possible, a competitive environment in which 
markets can operate relatively free from subsequent intervention by government” (p 1863).   
The pursuit of economic efficiency (across all of its productive, allocative and dynamic 
dimensions) thus became the guiding principle for the economic restructuring that occurred 
largely unchanged between 1984 and 1999.  Economic theory holds that the appropriate 
performance standard is social welfare (the sum of consumer and producer welfare).  
However, when the impacts on consumer and social welfare differ, such as when competition 
leads to increases consumer welfare but decreases in total welfare, the effects on total welfare 
(efficiency) should prevail13.  Competition thus became the principal, but not necessarily the 
exclusive, means towards achieving the end of increased economic efficiency in New 
Zealand’s regulatory regime.  
 
1.1 The New Zealand Economic Context 
A specific efficiency challenge in designing the New Zealand liberalization principles lay in 
characteristics of the New Zealand economy: its small size, small population, low population 
density, geographical isolation, challenging terrain, thin capital markets and historically 
highly-concentrated industries.  The high per-capita and per-account costs of regulatory 
regimes in small economies had to be considered, along with the challenges of providing 
                                                     
13 Tensions between total welfare and consumer welfare are characteristic in many industries.  For example, Gaynor (2006) 
discusses the tension with respect to the effects of increased competition in the United States healthcare markets.  The Kaldor-
Hicks criterion holds that pursuit of total welfare is preferred, as society is better-off under this condition.  If total welfare is 
greater as a consequence of a policy change, then the gains to the ‘winners’ will exceed the losses incurred by the ‘losers’, 
meaning the change is a net benefit to society, even if the gains are not actually shared with the losers (e.g. via taxes and 
redistribution).  
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incentives to investors given the higher risks and higher costs of capital associated with 
smaller markets.  Even in the face of free entry and negligible other barriers to competitive 
interaction, as firms pursue efficiencies of scale, small economies tend to be characterised by 
industries with a small number of firms with considerable individual or joint market power, 
(Arnold, Boles de Boer & Evans, 2003).  Furthermore, vertical integration and entry into 
adjacent markets to take advantage of economies of scope can also result in large firms with 
the potential to exert considerable influence in shaping interactions across large sections of 
the economy.   
 
The predominant competition issue in small markets is not the elimination of market power 
per se, as the pursuit of efficient scale and scope makes this objective very rarely obtainable.  
The relevant issue is rather trading-off the risks and costs of possible, but uncertain future 
exertion of a dominant position against the certain high per-unit costs of ex ante regulation, 
the risks of regulatory distortion of investment incentives in highly concentrated industries 
with thin capital markets, and the consequences of natural, as well as regulatory, barriers to 
the accrual of economies of scale and scope.  Removal of legislative entry barriers enables 
threat of entry to discipline behaviour, but this is insufficient where structural barriers (e.g. 
natural monopoly) remain.  Competition and regulation frameworks in such a context must 
permit dominant firms to invest and trade (for without their presence, a missing market for 
investment in and production of their products and services will emerge), whilst cost-
effectively disincentivising the exercise of further dominance, monitoring any exertion of a 
dominant position, and enabling cost-effective punitive and remedial action to be taken when 
necessary (Arnold, Boles de Boer & Evans, 2003).    
 
1.2 The New Zealand ‘Light-Handed’ Approach 
The New Zealand policies of the 1980s, relying upon generic competition law, with its 
emphasis on allowing dominance to exist, but punishing its exertion, were born from a 
pragmatic need to promote efficient commercial activity, given the country’s economic 
constraints.   The use of a single court-based mechanism to arbitrate disputes offered 
economies of scope in the use of precedents determined in respect of one industry across all 
commercial activities (most of which were simultaneously facing changes to their competitive 
environments as part of the economy-wide deregulation), at the same time as it facilitated the 
‘depoliticization’ and ‘commercialization’ of decision-making in the industries historically 
used as instruments for delivering political objectives at the expense of economic efficiency14.    
                                                     
14 For example, employment in New Zealand government departments had historically been used extensively as a substitute for 
welfare (unemployment) benefits, and it was not uncommon for the timing of infrastructure investment in specific industries or 
geographic locations (e.g. upgrading of a local telephone exchange) to be correlated with electoral cycles, the degree of influence 
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 The purpose statement of the Commerce Act 1986 required the promotion of competition in 
markets “for the long-term benefit of consumers within New Zealand”.   The pivotal clause 
was Section 36, requiring that “no person who has a dominant position in a market shall use 
that position for the purpose of restricting entry or preventing competitive conduct in any 
market, or eliminating any person from any market”.   It carried heavy financial penalties for 
non-compliance.  Section 27 sought to constrain the opportunities for two or more firms to 
jointly exercise their dominant position via explicit or implicit contractual co-operation.   
Section 47 specified the terms under which firms can legally merge.   
 
However, contrary to claims that the New Zealand ‘light-handed’ reforms relied upon 
competition law alone to govern activity (e.g. Spiller & Cardilli, 1997), vertically integrated 
natural monopolies created from historic government operation (subsequently corporatized 
and in some instances privatized) faced obligations over and above the requirements the 
Commerce Act placed on other firms.  The corporatized and privatized former government-
owned firms were further bound by either statute or contract with the Crown to undertake 
“specific information disclosure to make transparent the performances of businesses with 
market power; this facilitates both negotiations with these businesses and recourse to the 
provisions of the Commerce Act” and faced “the threat of further regulation (such as the 
introduction of price controls under part IV of the Commerce Act) if market dominance is 
abused” (MoC/Treasury, 1995:2).   
 
It is the bundle of legislative, contractual and regulatory obligations on, along with the 
removal of all statutory protections for, the former government businesses that has come to be 
known as “New Zealand’s ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime” (ibid), and which distinguishes 
the markets for services such as telecommunications, electricity, post, railways, air transport, 
banking and gas, where elements of natural monopoly prevail, from other markets such as 
supermarkets, medical services, dairy and petroleum products15.   
 
1.3 The Road to Privatization: 1987-91 
Telecommunications in New Zealand was historically a government monopoly, bundled with 
postal services and a trading bank.  In 1987, it was characterised by substantial productive 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the local politician in national decision-making, and the closeness of competition between political parties in marginal 
electorates (ISCR, 1999; 2000). 
15 These industries have all been subject to high-profile determinations under the Commerce Act regarding either the extent of 
competition in the event of a merger (supermarkets, dairy products), or the exertion) of market power by a party with a dominant 
position (medical  services and petroleum products).   
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inefficiencies (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996), poor service quality, obsolete equipment16 and 
long queues for both connections and call placement (McTigue, 1998).  Liberalization began 
with the Telecommunications Act 1987, which allowed for separation of telecommunications 
from postal and banking services (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996).   The ‘light-handed’ 
legislative and contractual restrictions imposed upon separation derived principally from the 
need to ensure the new firm was limited in its ability to exert its dominance, and a political 
imperative that the tariff structure developed under government ownership, with its attendant 
socially- and politically-motivated wealth transfers effected via telecommunications pricing, 
was substantially unaltered with respect to residential (i.e. voting) customers.     
 
1.3.1 Regulation and the Government’s Provision Monopoly  
Initial investment in the New Zealand telecommunications sector was undertaken by an 
assortment of provincial government and military interests, who built telegraph service 
facilities in response to the local economic or strategic necessity to transmit messages 
quickly17.   Newspaper owners were ardent advocates for increased civic and government 
investment in telegraph facilities (notably refraining from investing themselves18), and 
became important non-government customers when the services were made available.  
Development of telegraphy, like that of the postal service, was rapid, driven by both 
commercial imperatives and political aspirations to provide nationwide telegraph 
connection19 and to encourage settlement in New Zealand’s interior20.  As telegraph services 
developed contemporaneously with rail and postal services (indeed, telegraph lines improved 
co-ordination, thereby making railway construction more efficient, just as railways improved 
the reliability of the postal services), problems of scale and geography combined with 
common ownership to result in joint post/rail/telegraph offices in many locations.   
 
The pattern of telegraph regulation closely followed the pattern established with postal 
services.  The inauguration of colonial self-governance in 1856 resulted in central government 
                                                     
16 McTigue (1998) states that in 1984, while large amounts of fibre-optic cable had been laid, subscriber details continued to be 
recorded and maintained manually, and “telephones could be purchased from only one supplier: the government, and the choice 
was black or white, both with a round dial on the front” (p 35). State-of-the-art equipment such as faxes had to be purchased from 
the government, whose competing interests meant that sourcing equipment that would allow New Zealand companies to remain 
competitive was not a high priority.  He contends that this resulted in major disincentives to foreign investors, and compromised 
the financial returns of New Zealand’s export-focused firms who relied on timely communication for their competitiveness in 
world markets.  
17 The first telegraph was commissioned by the Canterbury Provincial Council in 1858, although it did not become operational 
until 1862, due to lack of funds, technical difficulties and litigation with the original contractor (Wilson, 1994:25-28).  The 
second was commissioned by British military forces in Auckland province from the Royal Engineers in anticipation of attack by 
Waikato Maori.  Following the defeat of the Waikato Kingite movement, the military asked central government to take over the 
economically profitable line, which it did in 1866 for £2,276  (Wilson, 1994: 29-30).   
18 Wilson (1994:26) notes that William Reeves (father of Prime Minister William Pember Reeves) and Crosbie Ward, owners of 
the Lyttleton Times, used their newspaper to successfully advocate for government investment in a telegraph from Lyttleton to 
Christchurch.   
19 Postmaster-General, in the Department’s Annual Report 1863 (Wilson, 1994:26).  
20 Wilson (1994:22) notes an intention of the Local Posts Act 1856 was to “establish a system commensurate with the rapid 
increase of population nationwide … and to encourage and facilitate settlement of the interior”.  
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assuming responsibility for regulating standard, nationwide postal tariffs to replace a plethora 
of inconsistent and confusing locally-established inter-provincial tariffs (Wilson, 1994:20).  
By 1864, central government had assumed overall regulatory responsibility for the developing 
telegraph as well as postal services, with both services operating under the umbrella of the 
Post Office, initially in Christchurch where the first telegraph service began operation in 1862 
and subsequently in Wellington (Wilson, 1994:28).  In 1876, following the disestablishment 
of provincial government, central government assumed ownership of all provincial 
government telegraphy assets.  Combined with its existing ownership of the former military 
telegraph in Auckland, central government thus became both regulator and predominant 
owner and operator of telegraph services from 1876.     
 
Following an approach in 1878-9 by the privately-owned Melbourne Telephone Exchange 
Company about starting a New Zealand service, the administrative head of the Post Office 
telegraph service urged the Commissioner of Telegraphs (politician) to amend the Electric 
Telegraph Act to prevent anyone other than the government from operating a telephone 
service without the consent of the Governor in Council (Wilson, 1994:63)21.  The amendment 
was passed in 1880.  The legislation enabled consent to be given under a contract system for 
some private lines (equipment, wire and installation funded by the owner, but laid and 
operated by the government service)22 and exchanges23 to operate in (especially rural) areas 
where the government had no intention of investing itself24.  Most of these contracts involved 
the stipulation of high sureties to cover any operating losses incurred by the government and 
the right for the government to take over the privately-funded assets in the event of default on 
any government charges.  Granting of such consents was centralised in Wellington and 
undoubtedly subject to political influence25.  The government was thus able to exercise 
effective monopoly control over investment and service provision without having to 
underwrite the full capital and operating cost (especially in rural areas), via the combination 
of its and regulatory powers and ownership of the key  facilities.      
 
                                                     
21 Wilson suggests the administrative head’s strong advocacy for government ownership and restrictions against private sector 
competition be a consequence of his desire to expand the ambit of his personal level of bureaucratic control.  The new 
technology provided an opportunity to achieve this objective.   
22 From 1899, the government required that individuals seeking private contracts be part of a group comprising six ‘reputable 
people’.   
23 These were often run as co-operatives, were small in number and generally had very short lifespans before being subsumed 
into government ownership (Wilson, 1994:70).   
24 Wilson (1994:71) notes that from the 1880s to 1900s, “the state met the demands of rural telephony only when called upon to 
do so through the contract and petition system”.  From 1912, the Country Telephones Act enabled local bodies to supply wires 
and connect residents to the government-owned exchanges, thereby replacing much private funding of many rural connections 
with ratepayer funding.  Adjacent local bodies were also enabled by this Act to pool resources and raise loans for the purpose of 
telephone service provision.  
25 Wilson notes that local authority support was routinely provided for ‘petitioners’ seeking to enter into such contracts, which 
were granted in limited numbers according to strict bureaucratic procedures, including the political sanction required under the 
legislation in order to receive the Governor’s consent.  
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The pattern of nationwide tariffs set independently of costs, established in postal and 
telegraph services, was carried over to telephony.  Although initially based upon a 
complicated set of factors including the length of the wire to the exchange, the duration of 
subscription and order of connection to a new rather than existing exchange, national line 
rental tariffs were simplified and standardised  in 1883 (£12 per annum for the first year and 
£10 per annum thereafter), albeit with official and business consumers being prioritised over 
household consumers in connection order as a consequence of an administrative and political 
perception that telephones were a luxury item (Wilson, 1994:66).   From the start of service 
provision in 1879, local per-call charges between individuals connected to the same exchange 
were eschewed by both administrators, who deemed them “complex and onerous for 
exchange staff who would have to log the calls” and politicians who considered them to be 
“politically unpopular”.  Whilst line rentals altered over time as economies of scale 
accumulated and politicians adjusted tariffs for political purposes26, the principles of 
universal rentals and free local calling prevailed.  
 
Whilst centralised control of investment may have been theoretically efficient in the New 
Zealand market initially, it appears to have arisen not as a consequence of a conscious pursuit 
of efficiency, but as a consequence of the pursuit of centralised control for largely 
bureaucratic purposes.  The ensuing government ownership ensured that political 
considerations and bureaucratic convenience governed ongoing investment, service operation 
and tariff-setting27.  Concomitant development and joint management of both postal and 
telephony services, whilst initially born of an economy of scope, persisted despite growing 
evidence that increasing specialisation meant that the two services and their third partner, 
banking, would be more efficiently operated separately.   Reluctance to separate them was 
underpinned principally by arguments of historic, political and bureaucratic preference.  
 
1.3.2 New Zealand’s Light-handed Telecommunications Regulation Approach 
By 1987, the individual post, telephone and banking services operating under the Post Office 
umbrella were managed essentially as separate, although quite inefficient, businesses.   
Irrespective of the issue of ownership, there was a growing awareness under the post-1984 
policy paradigm of the efficiency gains available from separating the businesses, not just 
                                                     
26 Wilson (1994:66) notes that Vogel, as Postmaster General in 1884, criticised the 1883 reductions by the previous Ministry as 
premature, and then reduced the tariffs to£9 (new subscribers) and £8 (renewing subscribers) in 1885.  Ward criticised Vogel’s 
tariffs in the house in 1888, and in due course reduced them to £6 and £5 in 1891 when he became Postmaster General in the new 
Liberal government.   
27 Wilson (1994:151-3) describes the politicisation of ‘free local calling’ areas and differential rentals for areas with different 
populations covered by ‘free local calling’ as consolidation of exchanges occurred with improvements in technology.  Whereas 
‘free local calling began as an efficiency consideration (transaction cost-reducing, as it saved exchange staff the bother of logging 
calls), it rapidly became a distributional issue subject to arbitrary political decision-making that resulted in ‘free calling’ areas 
expanding.  These decisions resulted in costs from toll revenues foregone 
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operationally, but also by separating their operation from their regulation (Wilson, 
1994:chapter 10). The first step towards regulatory separation was to establish a 
telecommunications regulatory regime independent of the operation of the business, via the 
passing of the Telecommunications Act in 1987.  The Act allowed for the establishment of a 
corporate entity subject to the Commerce Act, but eschewed an industry-specific regulatory 
body.   
 
Whilst the policy analysis backing the Telecommunications Act 1987 included an evaluation 
of the relative efficiency-based merits of the introduction of an industry-specific regulator (as 
in Australia) and structural separation of access from downstream services (as in the United 
States), the government of the day recognised “the theoretical and practical drawbacks of 
extensive regulatory intervention” (MoC/Treasury, 1995:2) and opted instead for the ‘light-
handed’ option.  The Government policy statement for the telecommunications sector in 1991 
proclaimed “the Government sees competition as the best regulator of telecommunications 
markets”.  However, the possibility of more extensive regulation via Part IV of the Commerce 
Act should the need arise was explicit.   
 
Consistent with the requirements of ‘light-handed’ regulation, the Telecommunications Act 
1987 removed all regulatory barriers to the supply of equipment immediately, and paved the 
way for the creation on 1 April 1989 of a stand-alone corporation facing no regulatory 
protections.  The Act required the separated telecommunications entity to disclose 
retrospectively the terms and conditions of any contracts with discounts in excess of 10 per 
cent of listed prices, and to provide regular reports on specific activities to the Ministry of 
Commerce (subsequently the Ministry of Economic Development).  
 
1.3.3 Privatisation and the ‘Kiwi Share’ 
Telecom was sold to a consortium led by Bell Atlantic and Ameritech on 12 September 1990 
for NZ$4.25 billion.  The sale terms required the purchasers to sell a majority of the shares to 
private investors.  On 19 July 1991, the consortium complied with this requirement, selling 
724.5 million shares (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996).  From its inception, the privatised 
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited has been the largest firm listed on the New 
Zealand stock exchange (NZX), and one of the most influential actors in the New Zealand 
economy.  It is exceeded in commercial size only by the farmer-owned dairy co-operative 
Fonterra28 and the government itself.  Over its lifetime, it  has consistently comprised 
                                                     
28 With over 13,000 farmer-members (96 % of the country’s dairy farmers), Fonterra is the world’s sixth-largest dairy company 
and is the largest company in Australasia.  Its formation in 2001 reflects the pragmatic New Zealand approach towards the 
acceptance of large firms with market power in order to capitalise on scale economies. 
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between 20% and 25% of the total capitalisation of the approximately 200 NZX-listed 
companies.  Its dominance of the NZX means that it comprises a substantial proportion of the 
holdings of a large number of New Zealand’s managed and indexed investment funds, 
including the Government’s own superannuation fund.   
 
Upon privatization, all reporting obligations of the predecessor State-Owned Enterprise were 
transferred to the new owners.  In addition, the terms of sale included specific undertakings 
known as the ‘Kiwi Share’29.   The Kiwi Share bound Telecom to an agreement whereby the 
price of residential telephone rentals would not rise faster than the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) unless profits were unreasonably impaired (the ‘price cap’ obligation), rural residential 
rental prices would not exceed urban residential rentals (the ‘universal service’ obligation) 
and residential customers would continue to be offered a tariff with no charges for local30 
calls (the ‘free local calling’ obligation) (Boles de Boer & Evans, 1996).   The ‘Kiwi Share’ in 
effect bound the new entity to maintain the tariff structure prevailing since the inception of 
telephony in New Zealand, with all of its inherent redistributive and political implications.  
Despite the fact that competitive entry was anticipated under a liberalized regime, it does not 
appear that the likely effects of the social and political obligations upon the development of 
competition in the market (as per Farrell, 1996) were explicitly addressed at the time of 
privatization31.   
 
1.3.4 A ‘Lightly-Regulated’, but not Unregulated, Market 
The New Zealand telecommunications market post-1990 was thus ‘lightly regulated’ but far 
from ‘unregulated’.   The monitoring and policy advisory duties typically undertaken by 
industry-specific regulatory bodies were undertaken by the Ministry of Commerce/Ministry 
of Economic Development, whilst the courts, rather than an industry-specific regulator, made 
determinations in respect of the actions of any participant in the sector.   The Commerce 
Commission, as guardian of the public interest under the Commerce Act, had the power to 
bring to court cases of alleged exertion of market power, as did any aggrieved potential or 
active market participant.   Arguably, these arrangements offered most of the informational 
monitoring protections of a regime with an industry-specific regulator, albeit with the 
attendant risks of free-riding on each other’s monitoring efforts, but without the overheads of 
maintaining a separate regulatory institution and industry-specific regulations.   Obligations 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.fonterra.com/wps/wcm/connect/fonterracom/fonterra.com/Our+Business/Fonterra+at+a+Glance/About+Us/Our+Hist
ory.  
29 Subsequently the Telecommunications Service Order or TSO.  
30 NZIER (2005) notes that the local calling areas in New Zealand, where the ‘free calls’ are made, are amongst the largest in the 
OECD.  
31 It is noted that the New Zealand approach to retail tariff regulations differs substantially from the retail tariff changes in many 
other OECD regimes, where there has been substantial rebalancing of tariffs, both between customers of different types 
(residential and business), and between the line rental and calling charge components (OECD, 2007).   
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which in other jurisdictions were the subject of regulations, such as price controls and 
universal service obligations, were instead agreed contractually between the government and 
Telecom.    
 
The bundle of obligations was theoretically well-suited to the operation of a market where 
pursuit of economic efficiency was the primary objective and achievement of economic scale 
was problematic.  However, as New Zealand was the first country to pursue such 
deregulation, the regime lacked any legal or operational precedents to guide participants’ 
behaviour.  The result was some uncertainty as to how all of the parties concerned – 
politicians, government officials, Telecom, actual and potential entrants, and customers – 
would interact in the new environment.   
 
1.4 Entry, Competition and Litigation: Clear v Telecom 1991-4 
Market liberalization and the removal of entry barriers rapidly led to competition for the 
newly-privatized Telecom.  Clear Communications Ltd (hereinafter Clear) held by majority 
owners MCI International and Bell Canada Enterprises, with minor partners New Zealand 
Railways, Television New Zealand, and Todd Corporation, entered the market in 1991, using 
the then New Zealand Railways fixed fibre-optic cable to bypass the Telecom network (Boles 
de Boer & Evans, 1996).  Clear subsequently invested in the provision of local infrastructures 
servicing the business districts in most New Zealand cities, as well as the domestic and 
international long-distance markets (Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson & Teece, 1996). 
 
Clear initially appeared to have little difficulty in negotiating a satisfactory long-distance 
interconnection agreement (ICA) with Telecom.  McTigue (1998:36) reports Clear acquired a 
20% market share in national long distance and 23% market share in international calling in 
its first five years of operation.  However, the negotiations for a local calling ICA quickly 
became contentious.  The ensuing litigation remains to date the only completed action 
brought by a competitor against Telecom under Section 36 of the Commerce Act32, but its 
consequences have become the principal foundations for accusations of ‘failure’ levelled at 
the ‘light-handed’ regime in telecommunications in particular, and the New Zealand economy 
in general, and therefore became the ‘springboard’ from which subsequent reforms were 
launched.     
 
                                                     
32 There is an action currently under consideration, brought by the Commerce Commission, citing the public interest, regarding 
Telecom’s separation of data from voice traffic on the PSTN via the use of an special 0867 calling prefix .  This is discussed 
subsequently.   
11/15/2007 -17- 17
1.4.1 Three Decisions on a Pricing Rule 
At the core of the case brought by Clear in August 1991 was the use by Telecom of the 
Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) in its local calling ICA with Clear.  Telecom 
argued that this pricing mechanism allowed it to recover profits foregone, thereby enabling 
continuing cross-subsidy of unprofitable residential services that it was obliged to provide 
under the ‘Kiwi Share’.  The ECPR offers the advantage of discouraging inefficient entry 
when an incumbent is required to deliver social obligations, but under some circumstances it 
may also discourage efficient entry (Economides & White, 1995).   The ECPR was found not 
to violate Section 36 by the New Zealand High Court in 199233.   The court ruled that Section 
36 prevents monopoly pricing only when used with the intent of restricting, preventing or 
eliminating competition in a market; it deemed that monopoly pricing to recover ‘Kiwi Share’ 
costs does not if itself constitute restriction, prevention or elimination of competition.  
However, the Court of Appeal34 found in 1993 that Telecom could not lawfully charge an 
interconnection price that included a component of monopoly rent (i.e. cost-based prices, 
excluding the Kiwi Share costs, must be charged)35.   
 
Telecom then appealed to the final arbiter, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council of 
Great Britain36.  The case was heard in 1994.  The Privy Council decision argued that Clear’s 
Section 36 case rested upon showing that Telecom had used its dominant position for the 
purpose of preventing, deterring or excluding competitive conduct.  As Telecom had set its 
prices for Clear on the basis of opportunity cost, it was deemed to be behaving exactly as 
would any firm in a competitive market, so the appeal was upheld.   Further, it was held that 
the application of the ECPR would put Clear in a position to compete out over time any 
monopoly profits obtained by Telecom, and that, if they were not competed out, the 
Government had the ability to introduce price controls under Part IV of the Commerce Act.   
Moreover, the Privy Council found that Clear had not demonstrated that Telecom’s prices 
                                                     
33 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR 166 (HC) 25, 27, 35, 103 
34 Clear Communications v Telecom Corporation (1993) 5 TCLR413 (CA) 25 
35 It is noted that the opportunity costs used by Telecom in calculating its income foregone were based upon the retail prices 
charged little more than a year earlier by the government owner, and were subject to the ‘Kiwi Share’ ‘price cap’ obligation.  By 
extension, if the prices based on opportunity cost used by Telecom for the Clear contract included monopoly rents, then so too 
did the retail prices charged by the government-owned corporation only a year earlier.  The implication of the Court of Appeal 
decision is the (apparently implausible) conclusion that the government-owned Telecom Corporation was charging prices that 
knowingly included market rents, and that the government sold the company subject to an agreement that allowed the purchaser 
to continue to accrue these rents (adjusted for inflation) indefinitely in the event of no competitive entry ensuing.  It is difficult to 
argue that the retail prices at the time of sale reflected substantial unknown productive inefficiencies that might be converted into 
rents immediately by private owners.  Boles de Boer & Evans (2006) cite substantial productivity improvements that had already 
occurred in the period 1987-1990. The government owners could not have been unaware of the costs and potential productivity 
improvements on offer at the time of sale. If the bulk of potential improvements given current technologies had already been 
achieved, then a sale price with cpi-x (x=0) price controls is plausible, given that future competitive entry will provide the 
incentive for ongoing productivity improvements.  If the current prices did include identified production inefficiencies that could 
be converted into rents, then given it would take time for competition to ensue, a price cap of cpi-x (x>0) would have been 
anticipated.  The lack of a positive value for x in the price cap suggests that either the government believed the 1990 prices to be 
efficient, or that it was negligent in selling Telecom under the terms that it did.  
36 Telecom Corporation v Clear Communications [1994] 5 NZBLC 103, 552 (PC); [1995] 1 NZLR 385 (PC) passim 
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included monopoly rent, above that necessary to meet the social obligations of the ‘Kiwi 
Share’.   
 
The Privy Council determination raised some concerns about the New Zealand ‘light-handed’ 
regulation.  These concerns challenged both the processes of light-handed regulation, and the 
roles and responsibilities of the institutional structures overseeing competition law in order to 
pursue increased economic efficiency.    
 
1.4.2 Procedural Implications 
From the procedural perspective, the key issues were the length of time taken to reach a 
settlement and conflicting court decisions highlighting differing positions on who should bear 
the costs of the Kiwi Share obligations (Blanchard, 1994a; 1994b; 1995).   The three years 
taken to settle the case resulted in ongoing uncertainties that militated against further entry, as 
other potential entrants delayed their entry decisions until the case was concluded.   
 
The decision also resulted in residual disquiet amongst potential and actual entrants and in the 
political arena about who should bear the cost of the Kiwi Share obligations, and, if they were 
to be shared amongst entrants, how they should be determined and levied.  Telecom’s 
competitors and opponents to privatisation supported the contention that Telecom’s 
shareholders alone should bear the costs, whereas others, including Telecom shareholders and 
management, and advocacy groups such as the Business Roundtable, supported the view that 
the costs of regulation were legitimate costs to be recovered from both retail and commercial 
customers via retail and ICA charges.  The High Court and Privy Council decisions supported 
the Telecom view, whereas the Court of Appeal ruling supported the alternative.  The 
philosophical differences about who should fund the losses arising from the social obligations 
subsequently provided an ongoing platform for political lobbying for legislative force to be 
given to the Court of Appeal’s ruling.   
 
Irrespective of the differing views about redistribution, the supremacy of the Privy Council 
decision meant that legally, the Kiwi Share costs could be shared amongst all market 
participants.  In order to make reasoned decisions about both entry and pricing, it was now 
material for all actual and potential market participants to know what their likely Kiwi Share 
obligations would be.  Yet, the existing disclosure requirements did not make Kiwi Share 
costs transparent.  Both competitors and the Commerce Commission were in a poor position 
to assess whether Telecom’s prices were reasonable, thereby making the cost-benefit trade-off 
about whether to enter the market or to bring an action under Section 36 of the Commerce Act 
problematic.   As the costs of court action were high, especially given the strong likelihood of 
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going through one trial and two appeals, there was a legitimate fear that Telecom could 
exploit the information asymmetry by charging prices substantially in excess of cost, and face 
little risk of punishment, especially if new entrants lacked the financial backing to undertake 
the lengthy litigation process. 
 
1.4.3 Institutional Implications 
From the institutional structure perspective, the key concerns raised were the inability for the 
courts to examine alternative proposals without the parties having to resort to separate 
actions, the court’s narrow interpretation of Section 36 in relation to what can be considered 
in defining use of a dominant position, and the enshrining in legal precedent of a particular 
pricing methodology that may not lead to the most efficient outcome (Blanchard, 1994a; 
1994b; 1995).  The last issue was especially cogent in light of the principal motivation for the 
‘light-handed’ regime being the pursuit of increased efficiency.     
 
Blanchard posits that the Privy Council decision created a potentially irresolvable tension 
between courts setting precedents and enforcing legislation related to a specific incidence of 
behaviour of only one party to the contract, which may or may not be anti-competitive, and 
the pursuit of efficient outcomes, which may or may not be furthered by the dominant firm’s 
specific action adjudged to be an acceptable competitive behaviour.   The inability of the 
court process to consider other alternatives (i.e. the court cannot adjudicate on any other 
efficiency-related aspects, such as alternative offers made by the competitor) was an apparent 
weakness in the structure of the light-handed regime and the institutional processes charged 
with overseeing and enforcing it.  That is, a definition of competition specified in statute 
narrowly and literally interpreted and enforced by the courts potentially compromises the 
objective of the pursuit of efficiency.  
 
1.4.4 Pursuit of ‘Competition’ Not Always Efficiency-Enhancing 
Blanchard’s observation highlights the classic tension in economics between static 
assessments and dynamic outcomes.  It also highlights the fact that there are many different 
forms of competitive interaction, all of which have different effects upon long-term 
efficiency, depending upon specific circumstances in which they are applied.  For example, 
drawing upon the principles of perfect competition, cost-based pricing leads to maximum 
efficiency in a static market, but impedes investment in the development and implementation 
of successor technologies – i.e. in the long run, dynamic efficiency is reduced as the 
development or investment does not occur, depriving consumers of the even greater benefits 
of the new technologies (Carlton & Perloff, 2000; chapter 16).   Likewise, drawing upon the 
principles of monopolistic competition, in the presence of fixed and sunk costs and where 
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customer preferences for different product attributes differ, welfare can be reduced by over-
investment in variety when the firm’s fixed costs are relatively low and firms do not take into 
account their effect upon rivals’ profits, or under-investment in variety when fixed costs are 
relatively high and firms paying the full social cost are unable to recoup the full social benefit 
(ibid, chapter 7).   
 
The risk of a precedent-based court system is that a set of assumptions about competitive 
behaviour used for one assessment of a set of case facts locks in place that set of criteria to be 
used for all other future cases (unless or until the decision is successfully replaced).  Industry 
participants will now shape their behaviour according to the currently acceptable set of 
legally-enforced criteria, even though it may be more efficient given the underlying economic 
circumstances to behave in a different manner.  The precedent thus potentially induces less 
efficient outcomes if circumstances necessitate the adoption of a different set of competitive 
interactions to maximise efficiency.  The pursuit of a predetermined form of the competition 
process thus comes to dominate pursuit of the efficiency-maximising outcome because 
reliance upon competition law systematically and indiscriminately proxies the competition 
process means for the efficiency end.   
 
For example, under the Court of Appeal’s interpretation, only prices that contain no element 
of monopoly rent (i.e. perfectly competitive prices) would become enshrined as the legitimate 
pricing principle.  In an industry characterised by high fixed costs and therefore governed by 
principles of monopolistically competitive interaction, the only legitimate form of pricing 
available to the incumbent would induce inefficient over-entry in the current technology 
whilst simultaneously reducing the incumbent’s ability to invest in new networks (dynamic 
efficiency). Likewise, whereas the High Court’s acceptance of ECPR as a legitimate pricing 
methodology recognises the dynamic effects of subsidy obligations, thereby preventing 
inefficient over-entry of duplicate networks (one risk in monopolistically-competitive 
markets), it risks locking in place a set of pricing principles that, although legitimate under a 
specific set of assumptions, militate against efficiency-raising entry by a competitor with 
lower production costs than the incumbent in a complementary product that relies upon the 
contested input (i.e. leads to lower product variety -  another of the risks of monopolistic 
competition) (Economides & White, 1995).    
 
It is not immediately obvious how this dilemma can be resolved under a court-based process.  
Neither is it apparent that industry-specific regulation would be any better at resolving the 
tension.  Blanchard (1995:474) notes “heavy-handed regulator-based regulation is not the 
answer” because “across the world this style of regulation has proven itself to be inflexible, 
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overly bureaucratic and very costly to administer” – that is, its inherent inefficiencies may 
outweigh any benefits.   The challenge, as Blanchard saw it, was to design a process that sat 
under the Commerce Act and the courts (e.g. an arbitration process) that enabled swifter 
resolution of disputes and wider consideration of participant interactions, thereby preserving 
the efficiency principles of the ‘light-handed’ regime without imposing the negative 
consequences of ex-ante industry-specific regulation.    
 
1.5 Review: 1995-6 
The government responded to the Privy Council finding by commissioning an inquiry by the 
New Zealand Treasury and Ministry of Commerce37.   The inquiry reported back on August 
15, 1995.   
 
Taking as its guiding principle the policy objective to “maximise the contribution of this 
sector to the overall growth of the economy through the promotion of economic efficiency”38, 
and “trading off the risks of market failure against the risks of regulatory failure” (ibid), the 
inquiry concluded that there was “no conclusive evidence that the existing regime has failed”, 
even though the Privy Council finding had “give(n) rise to a few concerns” (MoC/Treasury, 
1995:9).  These concerns were: the uncertainty associated with the regime; the efficacy of the 
ECPR; and the dilemma of how to efficiently reimburse Telecom for the ‘Kiwi Share’ costs in 
a market where Telecom would undoubtedly be losing market share to new entrants.    
 
Notably, the limitations of the court-enforced competition process in the pursuit of greater 
efficiency were neither identified nor addressed.  Rather, the review focused upon structural 
issues within the operation of the telecommunications sector.  Several options were proposed 
and evaluated in dimensions of Telecom’s ownership, ranging from state ownership of an 
integrated firm via structural separation with state and private owners to the status quo of a 
private integrated firm, and regulation, defined via the degree of external control over 
prices39.    The preferred policy was for no restraints on ownership, price restraints on the 
essential input (i.e. interconnection), and government recourse to price controls on the final 
product under Part IV of the Commerce Act if necessary.   The relevant criterion for selecting 
a pricing rule would be “economic efficiency (i.e. productive, allocative and dynamic 
efficiency)” (para 209), but no preferred pricing rule was suggested.    
 
                                                     
37 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4560.aspx
38 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4563.aspx 
39 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4571.aspx 
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1.5.1 Industry Response 
Following the 1995 review, Telecom offered Clear a contract based upon the Court of Appeal 
judgement (which had been accepted by Clear), including a separately-identified contribution 
to the ‘Kiwi Share’ costs which enabled cost-based pricing of interconnection, a varying scale 
of interconnection price discounts decreasing over time, and provision for an audit by a 
jointly-approved independent auditor of both the interconnection and ‘Kiwi Share’ cost 
calculations.   Clear rejected the offer, claiming it did not recognise network reciprocity or 
take differences in call volumes into account, and counter-offered with a contract equalizing 
the per minute charge between the networks (Blanchard, 1995).  In the face of contractual 
break-down, the Minister threatened to invoke his regulatory powers if the parties did not 
arrive at a satisfactory agreement in a timely manner (Webb & Taylor, 1998).  
 
Telecom and Clear eventually signed a five-year ICA in March 1996 (Evans & Quigley, 
2000).  This agreement had Clear paying Telecom 2c per minute for calls terminating on 
Telecom’s network, Telecom paying Clear a fee scaling from 1c per minute to 2c per minute 
over the term of the contract, all of these charges being discounted by 75% for off-peak calls 
and Clear paying a further (undiscounted) charge of 1c per minute, recognising the ‘Kiwi 
Share’ obligations and a contribution towards the fixed and common costs of the Telecom 
local network (Karel, 2003).  Contemporaneously, Clear and Telecom “completed a 
settlement agreement, expressed to have the effect of settling all disputes, claims, arbitration 
or litigation between the parties outstanding as at 4 September 1995” (Dammery, 1999:2).   
 
1.5.2 Government Affirmation 
In June 1996 the Government “reaffirmed its reliance on general competition law to achieve 
its objectives in telecommunications and stated its expectation that interconnection would be 
provided based on terms that would promote efficiency and deliver the benefits of 
competition to consumers. The Minister made it clear that there would be no changes to the 
existing arrangements”40.   
 
1.6 The Competitive Era: 1996-1997 
The greater certainty offered by apparently mutual agreement between Telecom and Clear 
and the Minister’s endorsement of continuation of the ‘light-handed’ regime resulted in a rush 
of new entrants into the market.  The Telecom-Clear ICA became the basis for similar 
agreements struck between Telecom and Telstra (November 1996), Saturn (June 1997) and 
Compass (September 1998) (Karel, 2003).  The Clear-Telecom disputes, however, continued.  
                                                     
40 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4802.aspx#P132_7990  
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 1.6.1 Back to Court 
In August 1996, Clear wrote to Telecom requesting a variation to the ICA, citing duress as a 
consequence of Telecom’s capped-price retail long distance call offers, which were becoming 
common in the market41.  Given the history of litigation with Clear, that the ICA was only 
five months into a five year term and that capped-price offers had been trialled by Telecom 
prior to the ICA being signed, Telecom declined the request.  Telecom claimed Clear should 
have had knowledge of the possible use of capped-price calls (Dammery, 1999).  Moreover, 
both companies had access to extensive expert advice before signing, so should have been 
aware of both industry trends and the risks associated with the contract (Evans & Quigley, 
2000).   
 
From February 1997, Clear began withholding a proportion of interconnection revenues due 
to Telecom42.  Telecom had the ability under the ICA to suspend its dealings with Clear.  
However, as such an action might be construed to be unduly aggressive, and therefore 
potentially invoke a further accusation of exertion of dominance under Section 36, the firm 
instead commenced legal proceedings in May 1997 to recover the debt (Dammery, 1999).  
Clear counterclaimed, citing Telecom’s retail offers as breaches of Sections 27 and 36 of the 
Commerce Act.  At both the High Court43 and the Court of Appeal44, it was found that Clear 
could legally withhold payments, pending a substantive determination on the alleged 
Commerce Act breaches.   
 
1.6.2 Implications 
The 1997 court decisions threw the market back into a new milieu of uncertainty.  Telecom 
was now required to supply services to Clear for an indeterminate period without any 
certainty that it would be compensated for them. “Clear has defaulted on its contractual 
obligations, but may, with court sanction, fund its operations using monies withheld from 
Telecom pending trial” (Dammery, 1999:5).  The new uncertainties materially affected 
Telecom’s incentives to invest in new infrastructures and services: “this risk of illegality and 
threat of non-payment equally overhangs the introduction of all new interconnection services 
                                                     
41 These offers, made by both Telecom and Clear, characteristically offered unlimited national calls for a fixed price (e.g. $5 for 
all calls made in a given time – e.g. a weekend).   
42 By mid 1999, the amount withheld was approximately 20 million dollars, and by October 2000 it was alleged to have reached 
30 million (Karel, 2003).  
43 Telecom New Zealand Limited v Clear Communications Limited (High Court, CL 20/97, 18 July 1997, unreported). 
44 Telecom New Zealand Ltd v Clear Communications Ltd (Court of Appeal, CA 206/97, 9 December 1997, unreported) 
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to Clear and impacts on a number of key forward-looking investment decisions by Telecom” 
(ibid)45, thereby threatening pursuit of dynamic efficiency.  
 
Moreover, the decision was apparently contrary to a contemporaneous finding in the gas 
industry, where unilateral rejection of contractual arrangements, even when those 
arrangements were subsequently challenged (successfully) under the Commerce Act, was 
found to be "totally unjustified unless and until the plaintiffs achieved a resolution of [the] 
litigation which invalidated or varied the Kapuni gas contract with retrospective effect"46.  
The Telecom decision contributed to a further eroding of confidence in the ability of the 
court-adjudicated competition law process to prioritise the pursuit of efficiency.  Furthermore, 
concerns arose that the principles of court-based ‘light-handed’ regulation were being applied 
inconsistently across industries as generalist courts struggled to come to grips with complex, 
industry-specific issues (Dammery, 1999).  
 
1.6.3 Further Tension Between Competition and the Pursuit of Efficiency 
The 1997 litigation further illustrates the tension between the effect of court-based 
interpretations of legitimate competitive actions and the pursuit of efficiency.  It also raises 
questions of judicial activism, as the court’s decision to make Telecom carry the cost was 
justified by its assessment of Telecom’s ability to obtain debt in the interim to cover any cash 
flow shortfalls caused by Clear’s withholding of payments, rather than the terms of the 
contract which bound Clear to pay for agreed delivery of service (Dammery, 1999).  The 
decision appears to suggest that, until such time as a decision could be made on the 
substantive matter of the alleged Section 36 breach, as the dominant firm Telecom was 
effectively presumed to be ‘guilty until proven innocent’, and should therefore be required to 
bear the interim financial cost of the competitor’s unilateral actions, even though it was the 
competitor who had breached a mutually-agreed contract by withholding payments.   
 
Despite the High Court and Court of Appeal determinations, there has to date been no judicial 
ruling on Telecom’s potential exertion of market power via its residential capped-price call 
offers.  Clear did not proceed with Commerce Act litigation.  Instead, the contentious 
agreement ran its full course of five years, with the parties agreeing to a new ‘bill and keep’ 
agreement in 2001.  In large part, the need for a ruling was overtaken by the emergence of the 
internet, and the effect that changes in calling patterns had on the cash flows between the two 
companies as a consequence of the ICA.  Ironically, the consequences of dynamic efficiency 
                                                     
45 Evans and Quigley (2000) discuss how the decision grants strategic options to entrants that may lead them to under-invest in 
pre-contractual research about likely outcomes of the contract as they, but not the incumbent, have the option of recourse to 
action under the Commerce Act if, after signing, they gain new information that changes the payoffs from the contract 
46 27 Shell (Petroleum Mining) Co Ltd v Kapuni Gas Contracts Ltd  (High Court, CL5/94, 4 June 1996, unreported) at 146. 
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(technological innovation, and commercial responses by both incumbent and entrant) 
competed away the need to make a decision on the competitive implications of the capped-
price call offers. 
  
1.7 Vigorous Competition: 1997-2000 
The early emergence and very rapid growth in uptake and usage of dial-up internet services in 
New Zealand was greatly facilitated by the residential ‘free local calling’ obligation in the 
‘Kiwi Share’ (OECD, 2000; Howell, 2007).  For residential consumers, Telecom was obliged 
to provide the telephony component of dial-up internet calls at no charge. Internet calls 
quickly came to exceed voice calls on the network (Figure 1), reaching a peak in 2003, when 
data traffic comprised more than two thirds of the traffic on the local loop, and the owners of 
New Zealand’s 850,000 dial-up internet accounts averaged over 35 hours per month each 
online (Howell & Obren, 2003).    
 
The terms of the Telecom ICAs offered substantial strategic advantages to competitors such 
as Clear, Telstra and Saturn.  Due to Telecom’s large market share in the PSTN market, most 
calls to ISPs would originate on the Telecom network.  Because internet calls substantially 
exceeded voice calls in length, if they crossed between networks they would create much 
larger ICA liabilities than voice calls.  Telecom’s competitors faced a strong incentive to sign 
up ISPs, where the data calls would terminate, as network customers.  If proportionately more 
of the data calls were to non-Telecom ISPs, then there would be a net flow of ICA cash from 
Telecom to its rivals.  Clear entered into several agreements where ISPs were given 
substantial shares of the interconnection revenues in exchange for becoming Clear customers 
(Karel, 2003).   It is highly likely that all other entrants did likewise.    
 
1.7.1 The ‘ISP Wars’: 1997-1999 
Arbitrage on ICA revenues led to the emergence of aggressive price discounting as ISPs 
aligned to carriers other than Telecom passed on the benefits of the termination revenues to 
customers in order to induce a financially favourable pattern of calls to competing networks.    
Karel (2003) terms this interaction the ‘ISP Wars’.  Ironically, the ICA alleged 
‘uncompetitive’ by an entrant, and potentially ruled out by a court had it been tested, led to a 
substantial increase in consumer welfare.  Enright (2000) reports a reduction in the average 
ISP cost for a mid-range user from $150 per month in 1996 to $30 in 1999.  The strategic 
interaction induced by the ICA terms undoubtedly contributed to New Zealand’s rapid and 
early emergence as a prolific internet-using country (Howell, 2007), and its demonstrated 
significant out-performance of Australia in ISP competition metrics in this period. New 
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Zealand had 13% more internet users per capita than Australia in 1999, with prices on 
average 30% lower, despite having a very much smaller number of ISPs per capita (i.e. a ‘less 
competitive’ market measured by entrant numbers and market share)  (Boles de Boer, Enright 
& Evans, 2000).   
 
However, the ‘ISP wars’ had profound effects upon Telecom.  Firstly, the increase in internet 
customer numbers and demand resulted in huge increases in traffic on the PSTN that had to 
be managed.  Secondly, in little more than a year following the 1997 court cases, Telecom’s 
financial viability had become critically dependent upon stemming the ICA cash flows to 
competitors.   Karel (2003) identifies that a single dial-up ISP customer on line 700 hours in a 
month (that is, nearly full-time) to an ISP on the Clear network would generate a monthly 
termination liability for Telecom in excess of $840.  The average monthly residential line 
rental at the time was around $30.  Even an ‘average’ user online for an hour per day at peak 
times to a non-Telecom ISP in June 1999 would generate a monthly termination liability of 
around $3647.   
 
In theory, Telecom had two possible strategic options open to it: change contract terms and 
conditions in the dial-up ISP market to stem the cash flows; or divert internet traffic away 
from the PSTN altogether, thereby neutralising the effect of the ICAs upon its financial 
viability.  Any action taken in the PSTN market was likely to be subject to further accusations 
of exertion of dominance, especially as the company also held a strong position in the ISP 
market via its vertically-integrated ISP subsidiary Xtra, which had approximately 50% market 
share.  In practice, Telecom pursued both strategies simultaneously.   
 
1.7.2 The ‘0867 Package’: 1999-2000 
Xtra entered the ‘price wars’ and in 1999 began aggressively marketing flat-rate ISP packages 
in order to increase its appeal to both new and existing customers (iHug had introduced flat-
rate plans in 1996).  However, Xtra’s efforts were insufficient to stop the flow of new internet 
customers and ICA cash flows to rival networks.  Despite aggressive pricing, Xtra’s market 
share in the rapidly burgeoning market remained consistently around 50% (Enright, 2000).  
Dial-up ISP usage per account by both existing and new customers was increasing, 
compounding the cash-flow problem.  Moreover, competing ISPs backed by Clear responded 
to Telecom’s flat-rate pricing with announcements of plans to aggressively market ‘free’ 
services to customers (Karel, 2003).  
 
                                                     
47 Derived from figures in Howell & Obren (2003).  
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In September 1999, Telecom resorted to a network-based solution, which came to be known 
as the ‘0867 package’ after the calling prefix used.  On the pretext that it needed to separate 
data and voice calls on the PSTN to better manage voice service quality, Telecom announced 
that from November 1, only dial-up internet calls made to numbers on the Telecom network 
with an 0867 prefix would qualify for unlimited uncharged dial-up internet telephony access.   
Data calls made to any other numbers would be charged to the caller at 2c per minute (the 
cost to Telecom of calls terminating on other networks) after 10 hours per month of 
uncharged access had been accrued.  This plan would still leave Telecom with a $12 ICA cost 
per line per month for each customer using a non-Telecom ISP (on average, 400,000 dial-up 
internet account users were consuming 27 hours each per month in July 1999 – Howell & 
Obren, 2003).  Voice calls terminating on non-Telecom networks would continue to be 
uncharged.   
 
Faced with the threatened loss of their high-volume, high ICA revenue-generating customers 
to Xtra and other Telecom-aligned ISPs with 0867 numbers, the non-Telecom ISPs were 
obliged to enter into agreements with Telecom to buy access to 0867 accounts.   The net 
effect was to cancel out Telecom’s losses on the ICA induced by the internet-related changes 
in PSTN demand and utilisation.   
 
Whilst the government announced its satisfaction with the 0867 package, as long as 
customers faced no charges for data calls made to 0867 numbers and voice service quality 
was maintained48, the Commerce Commission announced in August 2000 that it would 
prosecute Telecom under Section 36.  The Commission alleged that “in introducing 0867 
Telecom sought to prevent or deter competitive conduct by other telecommunications 
network operators and Internet service providers” (MED, 2001).  At the time of writing, some 
seven years later, a ruling on this case has still not been made.   
 
The eventual outcome of the Commerce Commission case will be of considerable interest, as 
it is a moot point whether, given the change in the effective operation of the market from pure 
voice telephony provision to an information exchange market, it can be argued that the 
relevant market for the decision is the mature market for voice interconnection, as in the 
1991-4 litigation, where Telecom had dominance, or the embryonic market for information 
exchange, where despite its large market share it is debatable whether Telecom had market 
power given the nature of the prevailing ICAs and the fact that the internet market was still 
emerging.  A finding against Telecom would suggest that under the Commerce Act, a 
                                                     
48 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4850.aspx  
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dominant firm may not even take actions to preserve its own future financial viability if in 
doing so it affects another market participant’s short-term ability to compete.   Yet, if the 
dominant firm fails, the competitor is also harmed, as it relies on inputs supplied by the 
dominant firm.  It is also difficult to see how such an outcome could be in the long-term 
interests of consumers.  In this respect, the inability of courts to take account of the actions of 
firms other than the incumbent when determining Section 36 cases is likely to be further 
exposed, providing additional support for concerns about possible inconsistencies between the 
pursuit of competition and the delivery of efficient outcomes under the ‘light-handed 
arrangements as interpreted and enforced by the New Zealand courts.  
 
With the end of the 1996 ICA looming, in October 2000 Telecom and Clear announced a 
relationship package “incorporating interconnection agreements and committing both sides to 
a more open and commercial relationship”49.   A ‘bill and keep’ ICA was struck in 2001.   
 
1.7.3 Dynamic Efficiency Gains via the ADSL Roll-Out: 1998-2003 
Given the history of Section 36 litigation, Telecom could not be certain that the 0867 package 
would be either legal or sustainable as a solution to the problems caused by either ICA cash 
transfers or its dominance in the PSTN market.  A sustainable long-term solution was to 
migrate data traffic away from the PSTN altogether, thereby eliminating the need for 
interconnection agreements in relation to the burgeoning internet data traffic.  ADSL 
broadband technology offered a potential solution.   
 
New Zealand’s first broadband services were provided on Ethernet LAN by CityLink in 
Wellington50 in 1995.  IHug began offering satellite services in 1998, and Saturn had 
committed to having a cable broadband system operating throughout Wellington from 1999 
(Howell & Obren, 2003).  There was already broadband infrastructure competition in the 
form of the iHug and Saturn services, and it was not at all clear at the time which of the 
technologies would gain either technological superiority or customer preference.  Whilst Xtra, 
with 50% market share, was the largest ISP in the market, in the fixed-line market Telecom’s 
market share nationally exceeded 95% but was very substantially less in the areas served by 
Saturn51.   
 
                                                     
49 Ibid.  
50 Wellington, New Zealand’s second-largest city is the national capital.  It was at the time also the centre of the country’s 
banking, insurance and finance industries, the location of the NZX, and had the most highly-educated and wealthiest population.  
It was thus the location where the most prolific exchange of information for business purposes would exist, and had a highly-
educated population with greater levels of disposable income, providing further opportunities for the development of residential 
use.   
51 Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some localities, Saturn’s share was as high as 75%.  Other estimations place it at around 
25% in the Wellington region.  Unfortunately, reliable contemporaneous reports of these shares are difficult to find.   
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If it was presumed that dial-up internet access customers would eventually substitute to 
broadband connections52, a strategic solution was for Telecom to roll out high-quality, low-
price ADSL nationwide early and rapidly, in order to bring forward the time at which the 
substitution would occur.  If similar patterns of linked valuation of connection and the value 
of use derived from the connection applied to internet connection and use as occurs in voice 
telephony connection and use, low-price53, high-speed ADSL would appeal most to the high-
volume dial-up users who were causing most of the ICA cost liabilities.  Traffic growth on the 
PSTN would be constrained and total volumes eventually reduced.  Moreover, ADSL would 
generate new incoming cash flows to offset the ICA liabilities and other costs related to those 
internet users continuing to use dial-up access.  The latter issue was not trivial, as the 
emergence of the internet had caused substantial costs for Telecom and generated no 
additional residential revenue as, unlike other countries, the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations meant 
Telecom received no income for either residential dial-up internet calls placed (as in 
Australia) or residential minutes of use (most of the OECD).  
 
Whilst the timing of the decision to proceed with the ADSL roll-out is unknown, it was most 
probably made in early-to-mid made in 1998, well over a year before the 0867 ‘solution’ was 
introduced, and was therefore almost certainly causally linked to the consequences of the 
1996 ICA.  The spillovers from this contract were therefore material in the timing of new 
technology introduction (dynamic efficiency).  When Telecom first offered commercial 
ADSL services in Wellington in January 1999, New Zealand became only the third country in 
the OECD (after the United States and Canada) to do so (Howell & Obren, 2003)54.   The 
initial product offered was a 2Mbps service, although 128kbps was added in 2001 and 
256kbps in 2003, largely in response to consumer demand for an intermediate product and the 
Government’s specifications for subsidised rural access (Howell, 2003).   Rollout was rapid, 
with 85% of customer lines being ADSL-capable by 200355.  The residential packages were 
the 2nd and 3rd-lowest priced in the OECD in 200156, and have continued to rank amongst the 
most competitive in the OECD given the speeds offered and average volume of data 
consumed (Howell, 2003; Network Strategies, 2006; OECD, 2007; de Ridder, 2007).  
                                                     
52 Vintage-to-frontier technology substitution, as per Greenwood and Yorukoglu (1997), Greenwood & Jovanovic (1998) and 
Cummins & Violante (2002).   
53 For a discussion of pricing strategies in telecommunication markets, see Laffont & Tirole (2002).   
54 Howell (2003) notes that New Zealand’s ADSL deployment preceded Australia’s by 18 months.  Initially 256kbps and 
512kbps were the only residential products offered in Australia, with higher-speed 1.5Mbps being restricted to business users.   
55 The United States had ADSL available to 65% if lines and the United States 67% at the same time (Howell, 2003).  At the 
current point in time (August 2007), approximately 94% of lines are DSL-capable.  The remaining 6% are rural lines facing 
technological impediments to the deployment of DSL.  The predominant download speed purchased by customers in 2007 is 
between 2 and 10 Mbps.   
http://www.stats.govt.nz/NR/rdonlyres/3492D2CA-177E-4759-9F9F-
90C0C8EE45AF/0/internetserviceprovidersurveymar07mr.pdf  
56 OECD (2001), recognising that the data cap pricing structure applied is principally a function of the data charges for transfer 
across the monopoly Southern Cross cable.  Over 95% of data transferred in New Zealand comes via the United States over this 
cable (Howell, 2003).   
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 ADSL was clearly positioned to be competing in the ISP, rather than telephony, market.  
Telecom faced competition nationwide in this market from iHug’s satellite service.  
Competitive pressure and prevailing pricing policies led to Telecom offering ADSL at prices 
that were identical across the country and across market segments, despite the different costs 
of providing services in different geographic locations (Alger & Leung, 1999).  Residential 
and business packages differed only in respect of the bundles of data and additional services 
provided (e.g. web hosting, email addresses).   Howell (2003) identifies that throughout the 
period up until the introduction of regulated wholesale products in 2003, even though 
Telecom had a very much larger broadband market share, iHug’s satellite service was the 
price leader.   TelstraClear cable packages appear to have been priced very similarly to the 
Telecom products.  The ‘competitive fringe’ was thus able to impose a very strong price 
discipline on the market via its national availability and technological differentiation.   
 
Howell concludes that, in 2003, there was little evidence of a supply-side market failure in the 
New Zealand broadband market that could plausibly explain New Zealand’s internationally 
low broadband uptake.   Rather, the low uptake was more plausibly explained by factors in 
the residential market, where very low dial-up usage costs, the independent investment by the 
monopoly pay TV company on its own satellite broadcast infrastructure limiting content-and-
infrastructure bundling opportunities, a limited range of applications necessitating the speed 
and quality of broadband (VoIP and peer-to-peer applications were still in their infancy) and 
the very small volumes of data exchange demanded by the vast majority of residential users57 
resulted in a pattern of infrastructure and application substitutes that made it difficult for most 
internet users to justify the small additional costs of broadband access.    
 
1.8 Efficiency: the ‘Light-Handed’ Years 
It is apposite at this point to consider the effectiveness of the ‘light-handed’ regime in respect 
of the benchmark of “long-term benefit to consumers”.  In a small market, or in one where the 
economic characteristics indicate that there will optimally be only a small number of 
participants, the number or market share of entrants may not be a good proxy for either total 
welfare or consumer benefit.  Indeed, Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak (2007:349-50) illustrate that 
in markets characterised by high fixed and sunk costs, more intense price competition results 
in a smaller number of firms at equilibrium than either less intense competition or perfect 
collusion: “a highly concentrated market may be the result of intense price competition rather 
                                                     
57At the time, the average data volume exchanged on broadband connections was 1500 Mb/month, with a median of 700 
Mb/month (p 31); even in 2007, with respect to its bitstream ADSL services, iHug reports “most of our customers use less than 3 
GB (3000MB) over an entire month”  http://www.ihug.co.nz/products/broadband/bband3_detail.html.   
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than a lack thereof”.  Thus, the efficacy of a regulatory regime cannot be reliably measured by 
market share ‘competitiveness’ indicators alone.  It must also be assessed in conjunction with 
other indicators as proxies for changes in static and dynamic efficiency, such as prices and 
availability of services, investment in and timing of service introduction, and consumer 
uptake.  Moreover, the analysis should be undertaken in comparative rather than absolute 
terms, in respect of both historic performance in the same market, and comparative 
performance against other countries where the regime differs.   
 
The preceding discussion illustrates that with respect to the internet market, the New Zealand 
regime delivered benefits demonstrably in excess of those in most other OECD countries at 
the time (recorded by the OECD (2001; 2003) as well as the many ISCR publications on this 
subject, in addition to the evidence above), in respect of both static and dynamic efficiency.  
Dial-up and broadband prices were low, uptake of dial-up internet access and usage was very 
high, substantial investment in new technologies was occurring by both Telecom and its 
rivals, and new services of high quality were introduced early and at low prices by 
international standards, especially compared to the main comparator country, Australia.  
Furthermore, the efficiency gains from privatization were substantial (Boles de Boer & 
Evans, 1996).   
 
1.8.1 Telecommunications Price Indexes 
Ideally, price comparisons provide a measure of relative efficiency of regimes.  All else being 
equal, lower prices for equivalent services imply greater efficiency, with benefits being 
passed on to consumers.  However, direct price comparisons are not good indictors when the 
costs of providing services differ for reasons that cannot be controlled by service providers.   
For example, New Zealand’s small market, low population densities and rugged terrain make 
it comparatively more expensive to deliver telecommunications services there than in more 
benign geographical environments (Alger & Leung, 1999).  Different social characteristics 
(e.g. large migrant populations) and social obligations (e.g. universal service and New 
Zealand’s mandatory flat-rate residential pricing option) results in different calling patterns, 
leading to different demands for different types of services that reflect ultimately in different 
prices.  Whilst standardised baskets can compare the price for a bundle of calls, unless the 
bundles accurately reflect the calling patterns of the respective countries, the outcome of a 
comparison based upon baskets can be highly misleading.  A price index for a standard set of 
products and services used in a given country, when compared with that of another country, 
gives perhaps the most neutral assessment of the long-term relative performance of different 
regimes across time, in that it eliminates the effect of many of the country-specific 
characteristics that make individual price comparisons problematic.    
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 For the purposes of this paper, price indexes will be used as a proxy for the welfare gains 
under each regime.  A falling index indicates that there are gains in welfare (from falling 
prices) that are being shared with consumers.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the residential 
telephone charge indexes for New Zealand 1991-2001 and the OECD average for 1990-2006 
respectively (the relevant portion of this discussion is that up to the end of 2001).    Whilst 
these are not strictly directly comparable, they are broadly illustrative.   If the New Zealand 
regime was delivering substantially different outcomes, the patterns exhibited would be 
substantially different.  A worse performance in respect of consumer benefits would be 
exhibited as a more positive trend in the New Zealand index across time than the comparator 
index.   
 
Despite the high level of dispute in the courts and only a limited amount of competitive entry, 
the bundle of New Zealand line rental and national calling costs fell to 65% of the base level 
(1991) over the 1990s.  By 2001, the OECD index fell to only 83% if its base level (1990).   
Notably, New Zealand fixed line rental charges fell (to 90%), principally because, even 
though it was legal and contractually permissible, Telecom’s residential rental prices were not 
raised in line with increases in the CPI after 1993.  This is in sharp contrast to the rest of the 
OECD, where on average fixed line charges increased over this period (to 124% of base), 
largely as a consequence of regulatory requirements in most countries to rebalance tariffs so 
that per-call costs were no longer used to subsidise line rentals (in the New Zealand pricing, 
line rentals subsidise calling).  The OECD average price for the bundle of residential line 
rental and usage fell by 17%, but the New Zealand residential bundle fell by 35%, largely 
reflecting the substantial real decrease in fixed line rental in New Zealand relative to the 
increase in the OECD average.   
 
Bearing in mind that the threefold increase in local PSTN usage from dial-up internet usage 
over the second half of this period is not captured in the New Zealand index, as it was 
uncharged, but any increase in PSTN usage would presumably be reflected in the OECD 
usage figures where for the vast majority of countries it would have been charged, the New 
Zealand index pictured actually substantially overstates the real index as reflected in 
consumer gains over the period.   The real price per call minute of the New Zealand bundle 
thus would have fallen by considerably more than that exhibited by the ‘average’ OECD 
country over this period.   
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1.8.2 Internet Expansion with no Revenue Growth 
The trends indicated by the price index figures are confirmed by Figure 4, showing 
telecommunications revenues across the OECD between 1991 and 2002.   These prices are 
indexed to expenditure in 1997, to reflect the effect that commercialisation of the internet had 
on telecommunications revenues.   
 
Figure 4 clearly shows that on average across the OECD, telecommunications revenues rose 
steadily relative to 1997 levels, reaching 133% of 1997 levels by 2002, as operators in most 
countries were able to charge for internet-related services.  By contrast, in New Zealand, 
where the vast majority of internet use of the PSTN was unchargeable, telecommunications 
revenues did not exceed 1997 levels until 2002.  Incidentally, 2002 was the year in which 
(chargeable) DSL connections passed the threshold of 5% of all internet accounts, meaning 
that internet data charges would finally start making a measurable impression upon the New 
Zealand revenue index. 
 
Only two countries in the entire OECD (Norway and the United Kingdom) exhibited lower 
revenues relative to 1997 levels than New Zealand.  The choice of 1997 as the base year is 
largely responsible for this effect, as both countries recorded their highest revenues of the 
entire decade in 1997.  Iceland, which exhibited similar levels of internet uptake and 
utilisation to New Zealand in the late 1990s (Howell, 2003) was recording revenue increases 
in excess of 50% over 1997 levels by 2000.  Korea, cited as one of the most successful 
internet-accessing countries over the period, records revenues 250% higher than 1997 levels 
by 2000.  Finland, with similar population, land area, population density, urbanisation, and 
isolation to New Zealand also illustrates consistently higher revenues compared to the 1997 
base.  Even those countries with unmetered dial-up internet access – Australia, Canada and 
the United States – registered revenues between 25% and 50% higher than 1997 levels over 
most of the period.    
 
1.8.3 Net Accrual of Consumer Benefit/No Compelling Evidence of ‘Harm’ 
Figures 2, 3 and 4 confirm that in the period between 1997 and 2002, New Zealand became 
one of the world’s leading internet-using economies without any increase in revenues paid by 
consumers to telecommunications firms relative to 1997.  Combined with the evidence of  
substantial and early investment in new technologies, it appears that the bundle of 
competition and ‘light-handed’ regulation delivered substantial efficiency benefits to New 
Zealand economy (static and dynamic efficiency), most of which were transferred to 
consumers in the form of either lower prices or substantially greater use for the same prices, 
along with the potential to use new technologies at OECD-leading prices.  Almost certainly 
11/15/2007 -34- 34
the benefits to New Zealand consumers exceeded those of the ‘average’ OECD consumer, 
even though individual OECD countries may have performed better in individual assessment 
dimensions.  Arguably, as New Zealanders were consuming substantially more internet-
related services than the only other two countries where total revenues did not rise relative to 
1997, the net benefits transferred to consumers were greater in New Zealand over the 1990s 
than in any other OECD country.  Despite the apparently low levels of competition as 
measured by the market shares of entrants, and despite the inability to deliver either a 
perfectly competitive or perfectly efficient market, the interaction of competitive and 
regulatory forces appeared to have served New Zealanders well, in both the PSTN and 
internet markets.   
 
As nearly all of the other OECD countries had adopted some form of industry-specific 
regulation, it cannot be concluded from this data that the New Zealand ‘light-handed’ regime 
had performed substantially less well than the industry-specific regimes.  Therefore it cannot 
be concluded that the regime had ‘failed’.  Despite the apparent procedural weaknesses of a 
competition law approach, and the inherent tensions between pursuit of competition and 
pursuit of efficiency, on balance the regime appeared to be delivering superior efficiency 
benefits to New Zealand consumers, as anticipated by its designers when it was created in 
1987.   
 
2. Industry-Specific Regulation: 2000-2006 
The ‘light-handed’ regulatory era ended following the election of a Labour Party coalition-led 
government in November 1999.  In part as a response to entrants’ dissatisfaction with the 
outcomes of the 1991-4 court decisions and popular politicized perceptions of the ‘failure’ of 
the ‘light-handed’ regime to result in reductions in Telecom’s market share and degree of 
dominance, and in part to differentiate its approach from both the previous Labour 
government that had introduced ‘light-handed’ regulation from 1984, and the subsequent 
National Party and National-led coalition governments that had endorsed it, the Labour Party 
manifesto for the 1999 election promised reforms to the Commerce Act to tighten controls on 
firms with a dominant position, and an inquiry into the conduct of both the 
telecommunications and electricity industries.  The new government stated its policy 
objective for the telecommunications industry as being “to ensure that the regulatory 
environment delivers cost efficient, timely, and innovative telecommunications services on an 
ongoing, fair and equitable basis to all existing and potential users”58. 
                                                     
58 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____16432.aspx#tor  
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 2.1 Commerce Act Reforms: 2000-1 
On April 5 2000, the government announced its intention to amend Section 36 of the 
Commerce Act, “broadening the range of firms and conduct subject to the prohibition against 
unilateral anti-competitive conduct by prohibiting persons with "a substantial degree of power 
in a market from taking advantage of that power" for the proscribed purposes”59.   The 
intention was to align the New Zealand legislation with that in the Australian Trade Practices 
Act, and to extend its application to “major participants in an oligopolistic market and to a 
leading firm in a less concentrated market” (ibid).   The change of the term ‘use’ to ‘take 
advantage of’ would retain the causal connection between the firm with market power and the 
alleged conduct, but was also to “signal to the courts some dissatisfaction with the focus on 
"use tests" as a basis of interpretation of the section” (ibid).   The changes also altered Section 
47, covering mergers and acquisitions, from the use of a “dominance” test to one of 
“substantially lessening competition”.    
 
The changes illustrate a distinct focus upon the competitive activities of the sector as the 
objective of the Act as opposed to either deterrence of the ‘use of dominance’ or the 
promotion of more efficient outcomes in the presence of dominance.  The discussion papers 
accompanying the proposals contain no discussion of the efficiency issues that had 
underpinned the original Commerce Act and that were raised by the 1995 inquiry, or any 
indication of what proxies would be used to determine either the nature of competitive 
interaction or the degree of ‘competition’ present60.  The changes were enacted on 25 May 
200161.  
 
2.2 The Ministerial Inquiry: 2000 
In February 2000, as promised in the Labour Party manifesto, the new Telecommunications 
Minister established an Inquiry into the operation of the telecommunications industry.  The 
Inquiry was charged with assessing the extent to which the existing arrangements furthered 
the government’s industry objective, and to make detailed recommendations about necessary 
changes.  The Inquiry was specifically instructed in its terms of reference to address (amongst 
other issues): “alternative means of establishing interconnection terms and conditions; pricing 
principles and other terms and conditions (such as service quality standards) for current and 
future forms of interconnection; processes applying to interconnection negotiations, including 
                                                     
59 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____9159.aspx  
60 Subsequent Commerce Commission publications indicate a substantial reliance upon market shares as the primary indicator.  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//Publications/ContentFiles/Documents/MergersandAcquisitionsGuidelines.PDF  
61 For a contemporary discussion of the issues, see Berry and Evans (2003).   
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dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms; local loop unbundling; resale of 
telecommunications services; information disclosure;”62 the Kiwi share obligations, the 
numbering regime, number portability and the development of an information economy, 
including the impact of, and the effect of regulatory regimes on incentives to invest in, new 
technologies. There was specific instruction to consider regulatory developments in other 
countries.   
 
The focus of the Inquiry was thus very much upon processes within the industry and the 
nature of interaction between industry participants against the new government’s objectives, 
rather than an assessment of the light-handed regime’s performance against its original policy 
objectives.  The emphasis upon finding “alternative means” provided a strong indication that 
recommendations supporting change were anticipated.     
 
2.2.1 Tension: Efficiency and Equity 
The Inquiry panel reported back On September 27 2000.  The Final Report is notable for the 
explicit identification of efficiency as the primary criterion for assessment in its analysis, but 
the limited application of efficiency principles in its analyses.  In regard to the new policy 
statement, the panel considered “cost-efficient” to mean that services are produced “at the 
lowest cost and delivered to consumers at the lowest sustainable price” (p 11) (i.e. perfect 
productive and allocative efficiency), ‘timely’ to mean “the absence of barriers that would 
impede the implementation and uptake of innovative services” (dynamic efficiency) and 
‘ongoing’ to mean “that regulation should be forward-looking, robust, durable and consistent 
over time, and not sacrifice long term gains for short-term considerations” (the trade-off 
between dynamic and static efficiency).   
 
No explicit voice was given to the tensions between efficiency and equity63 as they related to 
the government policy objectives, or how, when in contention, they should be prioritised.  
Rather, in respect of the distributional issue of a “fair and equitable” delivery of services to 
“all existing and potential users”, the panel took the statement to mean “ensuring that all 
existing and potential users have affordable access to a minimum level and standard of 
services”.   The interpretation by the Inquiry of “fair and equitable” to also mean “the way in 
which services are provided, the conduct of the industry players and their interactions” 
suggests weight must be given to competitor equity in addition to consumer equity in any 
analysis.  However, this point is not elaborated upon, so no indication of which form of equity 
should take precedence is provided.   Given the extent to which the equity issues embedded in 
                                                     
62 ibid 
63 See Connolly and Munro (1999) for a discussion.  
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the ‘Kiwi Share’ social obligations contributed significantly to both the 1991-94 disputes and 
the ‘ISP Wars’ and ‘0867 package’, the absence of explicit consideration of the tension 
invoked by juxtaposing these objectives in the industry policy statement is puzzling.   
 
The Inquiry thus set up an impossible hurdle for the industry to meet – that of a perfectly 
efficient (both static and dynamic) and equitable (both consumers and competitors) outcome, 
with no guidance given as to how to trade-off the competing issues.  It was therefore 
inevitable that the previous regime would be found to ‘fail’ in at least some dimensions 
against this ‘perfect’ but also ‘perfectly inconsistent and unachievable’ ideal.   
 
The Inquiry found that Telecom’s prices still contained elements of prices above cost, so the 
market was deemed not to be perfectly allocatively efficient.  The recommendation to 
regulate prices for a range of services using TSLRIC methodology, thereby departing from 
the ECPR prices which allowed recovery of ‘Kiwi Share’ costs, signalled that the Inquiry 
deemed Telecom alone to be responsible for the costs of the social obligations, up to the point 
where, in order to survive, it would be required to request permission from the Minister to 
raise its prices to its customers above the level allowed by movement in the CPI.   
 
That is, in order to be deemed not to be exerting its dominance, Telecom would be required to 
charge its competitors TSLRIC-based prices, offering competitors the opportunity to  
undercut Telecom’s retail prices in the lucrative urban areas where Telecom would have to 
charge princes including the Kiwi Share costs in order to remain financially solvent. If 
Telecom matched competitor prices in order to try and retain market share, as any other firm 
would in a competitive market, it would be forced to fund the losses from any retained profits.   
Once any accrued Telecom surpluses had been eliminated, an ever-diminishing number of 
remaining urban customers on the Telecom network paying prices above cost, and thereby 
subsidising the costs of the Kiwi Share incurred by customers paying less than their costs, 
would inevitably face price increases.  Raising retail prices in order to break even would 
further exacerbating the difference between Telecom’s retail prices and the cost of urban 
rentals, providing even greater margins for arbitrage to entrants and increasing the 
acceleration of switching of Telecom urban customers to rivals and even greater risk to 
Telecom’s profitability.  With Telecom needing to charge higher urban rentals, strategic 
pricing amongst entrants would enable them to maintain prices above costs that could rise in 
tandem with Telecom’s prices, but still undercut them.   
 
The implication is that, whilst a competitor could accrue profits from selling services either 
acquired at cost from Telecom or provided at lower cost on its own infrastructure but sold at 
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the market price set by Telecom’s costs, Telecom could not.  Any profits Telecom made must 
be used to offset the social costs.  However, competition from market entry would reduce 
both its profits and the ability to offset the social costs.  In practice, the prices charged by 
Telecom to urban customers in regions where there was no competitive entry would be used 
to cover the social costs, as these will be the only areas where Telecom could realistically 
retain any customers paying a price above a cost excluding the cost of the Kiwi Share.  The 
result would be not the promotion of competitive equality, but explicit regulatory prohibitions 
to Telecom acting as any other firm would in a competitive market.  These provisions appear 
to go far beyond the mere prevention of exertion of a dominant position, instead punishing the 
incumbent for its past dominance, even though there was no guarantee that the dominance 
would continue into the future.  Indeed, the recommendation is reminiscent of the unequal 
treatment applied to Telecom in the 1997 court cases.  Simply because of its dominant 
position, it would face impediments that would prevent it from competing in the manner of a 
normal competitive firm, despite the High Court and Privy Council decisions in 1991-4 
affirming that it could behave as any other firm in a competitive market under competition 
law.   The effect of this recommendation on any of the equity for consumers, equity for 
providers or efficiency either the equity (either consumer or competitor) or efficiency 
objectives set by the terms of reference is not discussed.   
 
Interestingly, however, when benchmarking against comparable international performance 
using an analysis similar to that undertaken in section 1.8 above, the Inquiry failed to find any 
convincing evidence that New Zealand had performed worse than any other regime in respect 
of any of the dimensions of retail pricing, introduction of new products and services and even 
the time taken for disputes to be resolved (pp 23-24).   Whilst not perfect, it appeared to be no 
less imperfect than the alternative regimes that could have been applied.   Nonetheless, the 
Inquiry appears to have disregarded the importance of this finding when choosing in its 
recommendations to prioritise the pursuit of cost-based pricing of Telecom products to 
competitors (but not to consumers – the ‘Kiwi Share’ was to prevail) and the introduction of 
institutional mechanisms designed to ensure that such pricing policies eventuated.   
 
2.2.2 ‘Light-handed’ Regulation with a Stand-Alone Regulator 
Despite its initial acknowledgement of the efficiency principles embedded in its terms of 
reference, the Inquiry’s recommendations ultimately focused upon issues of process.   No 
changes to the Commerce Act were proposed.  A recommendation was made to move to a 
light-handed industry-specific regulatory regime for the electronic communications (as 
opposed to telecommunications) industry, overseen by a stand-alone industry-specific 
regulator, funded by the industry, but based upon the principles of mutual agreement between 
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parties as the first step.  The recommendation was made, despite the admission that the 
members had been unable to fully compare the costs and benefits of each regime, because on 
balance those aspects that could be analysed empirically indicated that the result would be an 
increase in consumer welfare (p 53-55).   It is noted that the Inquiry did not consider any 
dynamic efficiency effects in its analysis, because these were amongst the factors that could 
not be easily quantified.   Hence, despite the assertions of recognition of dynamic efficiency 
in the objectives, in practice dynamic efficiency outcomes were ultimately subjugated to the 
pursuit of perfect static efficiency via cost-based pricing as a consequence of the Inquiry’s 
empirical analytic methodology.   
 
Under the proposals, recourse to the regulator, who could make binding determinations, was 
seen as a last resort in disputes over regulated services.  Two levels of regulated service were 
identified: lower level “specified” services (interconnection between all networks other than 
Telecom’s fixed line network), carrier pre-selection, wholesaling and roaming on mobile 
networks, co-location at mobile sites, and access to Sky TV’s digital system) and higher level 
“designated” services (interconnection on Telecom’s fixed line network and data tail 
(excluding value-added services such as ADSL64 and full local loop unbundling65), 
wholesaling of services on Telecom’s fixed line network, and number allocation and number 
portability.   The test for determining whether a service should be specified or designated was 
based on efficient competition, connectivity and investment, where “efficiency takes into 
account all of its productive, allocative and dynamic contexts” (p42-43).   Cost-based pricing 
principles would apply only to designated services.  Interconnection and data tail services 
prices would be ultimately based on forward-looking costs, using TSLRIC methodology (p 
66).  In the interim, until New Zealand-specific TSLRIC prices could be determined, 
international benchmarking would be used as the guide.   The Inquiry recommended that 
wholesale designated services be based on retail prices less Telecom’s avoidable costs. 
 
                                                     
64 Regulation of ADSL was excluded because the Inquiry “believes Telecom should be allowed the normal competitive incentive 
to develop such new services with above-cost returns” and “that a judgement has to be made when considering regulation about 
the maturity of a market. It is inherently more risky to regulate prices of evolving services than those that are more mature, since 
regulation focussed on efficient pricing would erode rents that are necessary to spur innovation and rapid deployment of a new 
technology” (p 64).   
65 “Other reasons the Inquiry is not recommending full local-loop unbundling are: 
§ it does not seem to offer significant benefits to end users over and above those that could be achieved by requiring Telecom to 
wholesale its local-loop service in the way recommended by the Inquiry; 
§ the objective of local-loop unbundling – competitive delivery of local-loop services – is likely to be achieved in many areas and 
through a variety of technologies without regulatory intervention; 
§ full unbundling may not be exploited in areas where local-loop competition is not likely, given that such investment would 
ikely be unprofitable in the presence of the Kiwi Share and/or technically infeasible. In these areas, wholesaling or data tail 
access (leased lines) would give other providers the ability to offer customers a total service; and 
§ full unbundling is technically complex and would require Telecom to give up control of parts of its network” (p 64-5) 
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The Inquiry also recommended the establishment of an industry forum, comprising all 
network operators, to work with the Commissioner in the preparation of codes for designated 
and specified services.  Codes approved by the Commissioner would be binding on all forum 
members.  The forum was seen as the appropriate body to negotiate network management 
issues, such as the need to manage traffic that contributed to the ‘0867’ debate.   
 
2.2.3 LLU Not To Be Mandated 
As part of its activities, the Inquiry had examined the likely benefits of introducing local loop 
unbundling (LLU) as either a designated or specified service.  A cost-benefit analysis (Ovum, 
2000) indicated that the efficiency gains would be negligible, and in the Inquiry’s opinion, the 
extensive entry into the market by providers of high-speed internet access on competing 
technologies indicated that “New Zealanders living in urban areas will have access to broadband 
services in the near to medium term at affordable prices. However, for people living in rural 
areas, the availability of affordable broadband services is likely to be more problematic in the 
absence of specific initiatives to address this problem” (p 92).  Thus it was recommended that 
LLU not be regulated, but that a watching brief be kept on the situation by the Commissioner 
(p 65).   
 
The LLU recommendation was clearly underpinned by dynamic efficiency considerations: “a 
judgement has to be made when considering regulation about the maturity of a market. It is 
inherently more risky to regulate prices of evolving services than those that are more mature, 
since regulation focussed on efficient pricing would erode rents that are necessary to spur 
innovation and rapid deployment of a new technology” (p 64).  The effect of such regulations 
on the investments already made and incentives for future investment by competing platform 
owners was noted: “any regulatory erosion of producer surplus related to enhanced services 
such as ADSL is likely to have an adverse impact on dynamic efficiency by dampening 
incentives for investment in competing infrastructure. The Inquiry considers this may be a 
factor in Telstra Saturn’s objection to the full unbundling of Telecom’s local loop” (p 64). 
The Inquiry recommended the use of threat of further regulation to discipline Telecom in 
respect of future investment and its actions with respect to wholesale customers (p 65).   
 
2.2.4  ‘Kiwi Share’ Remains, but as Telecom’s Obligation Alone 
With respect to the ‘Kiwi Share’ the Inquiry recommended that “Telecom’s interconnection 
prices should not include a contribution to any losses arising from the Kiwi Share 
obligations” (p 5).  Such an arrangement would remove the need for prices to deviate from 
cost-based principles, so would theoretically remove much of the litigious contention over 
pricing experienced in the preceding decade as a result of the lack of transparency of the 
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‘Kiwi Share’ costs.  The ability for Telecom to deviate from price equalization between rural 
and urban consumers was recommended in order to allow Telecom to compete with new 
entrants in urban areas, but with the 1990 price cap remaining in place for rural consumers (p 
85).  
 
However, the Inquiry also recommended that Telecom continue to bear the cost of the ‘Kiwi 
Share’ uncompensated until such time as it could demonstrate financial impairment sufficient 
to require it to apply to the government to increase its prices, as well as being prevented from 
charging ISPs for calls made on the 0867 numbers (pp 5, 89).   The recommendation was 
supported by the Inquiry’s assessment that there were still substantial rents within Telecom to 
be competed away.    
 
The ‘Kiwi Share’ recommendation is somewhat puzzling, as it reversed the 1994 court 
finding, endorsed by the 1995 Inquiry and the 1996 ICA, that entrants be required to share the 
costs of the social obligation.  In addition to the tension between efficiency and equity in 
regard to customers in areas where entry occurred and those in the unprofitable areas 
discussed above, the recommendation also appears to be at variance with the government’s 
finding just over a year previously that, after three years of substantial disbursements to 
competitor ISPs from the ICA and dial-up internet use, the ‘0867 package’ was justified to 
maintain Telecom’s ongoing financial viability.  Furthermore, echoing the 1997 court cases, it 
invokes an inherent dynamic efficiency tension, whereby Telecom would be required to 
subsidise unprofitable users of existing technologies with revenues accrued from new 
investments whilst its competitors would not.  It also set up a conflict between a 
Commissioner charged with overseeing wholesale market investment and pricing and a 
Minister required to arbitrate on retail prices that have a material effect upon the 
Commissioner’s decisions.  The Inquiry is silent upon these violations of the efficiency and 
equity objectives embedded in its recommendations. 
 
2.3 Telecommunications Act 2001 
The government’s response to the Inquiry was the Telecommunications Act 2001, passed on 
19 December.  Whilst most of the Inquiry recommendations were followed, key differences 
were the creation of a Telecommunications (as opposed to Electronic Communications) 
Commissioner inside the Commerce Commission (as opposed to a stand-alone regulator), and 
the removal of the cost burden of the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations from Telecom alone and their 
replacement with a ‘Telecommunications Service Obligation’ (TSO).  Under the TSO, 
arrangements, the cost of social obligations was effectively ‘ring-fenced’, but still allocated 
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across the industry as determined by the High Court and Privy Council decisions.  Telecom 
would still be required to provide the services as agreed in 1990, but the costs of providing 
unprofitable ‘Kiwi Share’ services would be determined on an annual basis by the 
Commissioner with Telecom being compensated as the Commissioner determined appropriate 
via a levy on other market participants66.  This deviation from the recommendations 
reasserted the legitimacy of the 1991-94 court decisions regarding industry-wide 
responsibility for the social obligation costs, and the principles of competitive equality for 
Telecom in regard to its retail pricing.  In addition, Section 64 of the Act required that the 
Commissioner review the case for LLU and report back with a recommendation by the end of 
2003.   
 
Whilst there was considerable debate about the merits of the Commissioner being within the 
Commerce Commission rather than independent, and the nature of the pricing principles 
recommended, in theory the proposals as enacted appeared to constitute a pragmatic response 
to the contentious processes of contract negotiation and social cost allocation.  The 
reallocation of social obligation costs via the TSO appeared to resolve any residual questions 
about Telecom’s prices to competitors being subject to any distortions from this source, 
although it did not resolve the issue of dynamic efficiency distortions in the retail market 
where prices would still largely be averaged.   Furthermore, Telecom would bear the costs of 
other market participants’ social obligations until such time as the Commissioner could 
retrospectively reallocate the costs.  The emphasis on bilateral negotiation as the first step, 
with recourse to the Commissioner only as a last resort, was consistent with the spirit of the 
‘light-handed’ regime – indeed, the Inquiry report states “that this recommended approach 
would still see New Zealand at very much the light-handed end of the regulatory spectrum, 
arguably the lightest within the OECD” (p 30).   The hope was that the new regime would 
allow rapid resolution of the residual disputes in a way the court processes had been unable to 
achieve, leading to even greater and speedier accrual of benefits by consumers than had 
already been evidenced.   
 
2.4 Telecommunications Commission: The Early Years 2002-6 
A Telecommunications Commissioner was appointed in December 2001 and took up duties in 
March 200267.  The first tasks included establishing the Industry Forum, setting up the terms 
of reference for the TSO obligation ruling, and agreeing the terms for interconnection pricing.  
                                                     
66 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/Page____4166.aspx#P32_2498  
67 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/Print/PrintDocument.aspx?DocumentID=12604  
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By the end of May, applications had been received from both Telecom and TelstraClear68 for 
determinations on interconnection to each other’s network.  By the end of July, conferences 
had been held on the TSO, price benchmarking and TSLRIC methodologies.  The first draft 
determination was released on November 5, on interconnection between Telecom and 
TelstraClear (1.13c per minute backdated to June 1, applicable for 12 months).  The 
Commissioner deemed the exercise “an effective blend of commercial negotiation and 
regulation. The parties can take credit for resolving most of the issues originally raised in the 
application”69 .   
 
On November 29 2002, a draft determination was delivered on TelstraClear’s access to 
Telecom’s wholesale services (discount range 14% to 18%).  The final determination on this 
matter was released on 12 May 2003. The TelstraClear CEO welcomed the November 
determination: “we believe its more industry efficient for TelstraClear to buy from Telecom 
rather than build duplicate networks to reach consumers who are widely spread throughout 
New Zealand”70.  TelstraClear had previously suspended rollout of its fibre-optic cable 
network71, not long after launching in Christchurch, its third geographic region, in July 
200172.   It is noted that at the 2000 Inquiry, TelstraClear’s predecessor company Telstra 
Saturn had advocated against LLU because access to Telecom’s infrastructure would 
undermine the case for ongoing investment in its own fibre-optic network.   
 
2.4.1 2001 Act Accelerates Telecom’s Acquisition of Broadband Market Dominance 
The early evidence under regulation begs the question of whether regulated availability of 
specified wholesale Telecom services under the Telecommunications Act was instrumental in 
triggering a reduction in inter-platform competition relative to the pre-2000 scenario. 
Paradoxically, the presence and likely future development of vibrant inter-platform 
competition was one of the reasons why the 2000 Inquiry refrained from recommending LLU.   
Yet, even at this very early stage, it appears that changes in the regime, and in particular the 
focus upon downstream competition based upon access to services provided on Telecom’s 
network, were leading to reduced, rather than increased competition in the market for 
technology-differentiated internet services (as per Crandall & Sidak, 2007), and critical 
changes in the ways in which fringe competition would be able to exert influence on the 
dominant participant.   
 
                                                     
68 TelstraSaturn purchased Clear Communications on 15 December 2001, renaming the new entity TelstraClear.  
http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/history.cfm  
69 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa1.aspx  
70 http://www.telstraclear.co.nz/companyinfo/media_release_detail.cfm?newsid=81&news_type=tclArchive
71 http://www.wordworx.co.nz/TelecomsReviewBBandCity.htm  
72 http://www.med.govt.nz/templates/MultipageDocumentPage____4850.aspx#P324_40851  
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The TelstraClear CEO’s comments and the 2000 Inquiry report confirm that whereas in 2000 
it was unclear which internet technology would prevail, by 2002, the regulatory arrangements 
in the 2001 Act  had conferred upon Telecom a dominance in the broadband market, simply 
because it altered the investment incentives of new entrants.   By requiring all of Telecom’s 
fixed line services to be subject to regulated access by competitors, including the wholesaling 
of broadband products, entrants had been granted options not present in 2000 (Pindyck, 
2004).  The legislation actually created a self-fulfilling prophecy that Telecom’s network 
would become dominant in the broadband market by actively disincentivising the build-out of 
competing platforms (Jorde, Sidak & Teece, 2000).   
 
With no distinction in the availability of and terms of access to wholesaled products by 
competitors with and without their own networks, the low-risk option available to all new 
broadband market providers was to suspend their own further investment (even to the point of 
letting existing investments run down) and resell Telecom products.  The reselling option was 
even more appealing because of the widespread availability of Telecom’s ADSL product.   
Entrants could service a nationwide market immediately, without incurring any further 
investment risk.   In a market with no alternative infrastructure investment and no immediate 
prospect of duplicate investment, then by the ‘ladder of investment’ (Cave, 2006), such 
arrangements allow new entrants to join the market without having to invest in infrastructure.  
However, Cave cautions that great care must be taken when designing such options that they 
encourage investment by the entrants in their own infrastructures across time (e.g. by raising 
the access price), and do not encourage the entrant to continue using the incumbent’s 
infrastructure when entry on the incumbent’s own infrastructure is economically feasible.   He 
suggests that the presence of competing infrastructure in a given geographic location is a 
strong indication that the assumption of natural monopoly may not be valid, as the entrant has 
already deemed it feasible to invest in some infrastructure.  
 
The danger of erroneously assuming that an incumbent’s infrastructure is a natural monopoly 
is to limit the accrual of dynamic efficiency benefits via delays in investment in and  
availability of access to existing and differentiated products (Bittlingmayer & Hazlett, 2002; 
Hazlett, 2005; Hausman & Sidak, 2005; Crandall & Sidak, 2007).  The risk of delay is 
greatest when the costs of new infrastructure are less than that of the incumbent (i.e. falling 
technology costs, as has occurred in telecommunications over the past two decades) and there 
is uncertainty about future market sizes (as occurred in the broadband market in the early 
2000s).  Under these circumstances, as long as the entrant can make a fair return on reselling 
the incumbent’s products, it is optimal for the entrant to delay its own investment until there 
is greater certainty about the future direction of the market, relative to the point at which it is 
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optimal to invest absent the option granted by regulated access.  The incumbent carries the 
financial risk of the market not growing (including the sunk costs of investment if it fails) and 
entrant has a ‘free option’ to exit if the market fails to develop.  Meanwhile, consumers forfeit 
the benefit of lower prices and higher product quality from services provided on lower-cost 
infrastructures and variety from differentiated technologies that they might otherwise have 
enjoyed because neither the incumbent nor the entrant have invested in the newer 
technologies.  The effect is further exacerbated if the regulated prices do not fully compensate 
the incumbent for the services provided to the entrant, as there are no resources to invest in 
either routine maintenance or replacement of the existing infrastructure (Pindyck, 2004).    
 
The upshot of the presence of such regulated options is that, even if it was not dominant at the 
time the options are made available, the infrastructure on which the options are offered will 
quickly become dominant because of the altered investment incentives.  By presuming that 
Telecom’s monopoly in fixed line voice telephony would automatically be transferred into 
dominance in the broadband market, and regulating accordingly, the Telecommunications Act 
2001 ensured that Telecom’s ADSL did become the dominant product, even in areas where it 
was not at all clear that duplication was economically infeasible (e.g. densely-populated areas, 
such as Christchurch and Auckland).  The TelstraClear decision verifies the use of such 
reasoning in the New Zealand broadband market.  It is also noted that once regulated services 
from Telecom became available, iHug gradually altered and then withdrew the satellite 
services which had provided significant market discipline upon Telecom’s ADSL products 
during the light-handed regime.   
 
2.4.2 Incentives to Bargain and Increases in Determination Volume  
Despite the apparent early successes in resolving the long-standing Telecom and TelstraClear 
ICA issues, a pattern quickly emerged of nearly all potential access contracts sought with 
Telecom ending up at the Commissioner for a determination73.  In 2003 alone, determinations 
were sought by TelstraClear, iHug, CallPlus, Compass and WorldXChange for 
interconnection and wholesale access.  In 2006, Vodafone joined the round of access-seekers 
seeking Commission determinations. Furthermore, as most agreements covered only a 12 
month period, at the conclusion of each contract, the parties were generally back again 
seeking determinations on the superseding agreements.   
 
As each draft determination was subject to consultation with  all concerned parties at both the 
initial investigation and draft ruling stages, the regulatory process was little different to the 
                                                     
73 An examination of the Commission’s media releases provides an interesting snapshot of the pattern of the Commission’s 
activities over this period.  http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/MediaList.aspx  
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much-maligned court process.  However, whereas pre-2002, one contract struck, contested 
and then resolved became the benchmark for all other contracts, under the regulatory regime, 
each contract with every market participant was in effect litigated, subject to an appeal and 
then rapidly re-litigated, even though the terms finally agreed were often very little different 
from other contracts determined.  
 
Whilst it has been suggested that the volume of determination activity under the regulatory 
regime was a consequence of Telecom’s intransigence in negotiations (e.g. TUANZ, 2006), it 
is equally, if not more, plausible that easy access to a regulatory determination removed most 
of the incentives for either party to commit effort to resolving the issue independently (Evans 
& Quigley, 2000).  Industry-wide funding of the Commission also precluded individual 
parties from internalising the full costs and risks of requesting investigations, leading to a 
higher probability of small market participants seeking their own determinations rather than 
utilising the precedents established by other decisions in a contract directly with Telecom, as 
occurred following the resolution of the court case in 1994.   Moreover, any agreement struck 
outside of the regulatory process between any other party and Telecom for the delivery of any 
service precluded the other party from subsequently seeking regulated access to the product at 
terms subsequently granter to other applicants.  In order to preserve the option to access 
equivalent contracts, even if agreement could be reached without mediation in the present, the 
other party had a dominant strategy to seek a regulatory determination as the first step.   Such 
arrangements made it inevitable that nearly all contracts with Telecom for designated or 
specified services, rather than just those where a party perceived Telecom to be exerting its 
position of dominance, would become ‘contentious’ and placed before the Commissioner74.   
 
The consequence of the regulatory system design was therefore a substantially larger-than-
expected burden of work for the Commission, and an increase in the combative tensions 
between Telecom and its competitors, who now had strong incentives to collaborate in actions 
against Telecom in addition to pursuing individual determinations.  The 2000 Inquiry 
indicated an expectation that most contracts would be negotiated bilaterally, as in the previous 
‘light-handed’ regime.  Thus, its cost-benefit analysis supporting the establishment of the 
Commission failed to anticipate the much higher costs associated with the perverse 
procedural incentives of the post-2001 regime.  In addition to the explosion in determination 
workload, in 2003 the Commission was also required to make rulings on the TSO, and 
prepare an investigation into LLU.  It quickly became evident that the 2000 Inquiry estimates 
                                                     
74 One notable exception is iHug’s request for a determination on access to Telecom’s commercial bitstream services.  Initially, 
iHug applied for a determination on 5 November 2004, but subsequently withdrew the request on 24 December 2004, having 
successfully agreed to terms with Telecom in the interim.  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactihugwithdrawsappli.aspx  
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of a budget of 8 to 10 staff and a budget of $1.5 million per annum (Inquiry, p 28) would be 
quite inadequate for the volume of work to be undertaken.  By the 2004/5 financial year, 
expenditure exceeded $3.7 million, made up of $2.1 million in meeting its obligations to the 
Crown and $1.6 million of costs recovered from applicants75.   
 
2.4.3 No Improvements in Time Taken to Make Decisions 
It is therefore far from clear that the post-2001 regulatory regime has resulted in more 
efficient turn-around of decisions than under the court-based system.  The mobile termination 
action, begun in April 2004, was not finally resolved until April 2007 – a time of three years, 
and exactly the same time taken to resolve the original interconnection dispute between 1991 
and 1994.  It is also unlikely that the use of a Commission has reduced the costs of legal and 
economic advice in reaching a decision.  As the volume of Commission-mediated interaction 
has increased, the cost for all market participants in preparing submissions, attending 
conferences and fulfilling other regulatory obligations has also increased in proportion.  The 
major companies are now employers of much larger teams of in-house legal, economics, 
regulatory strategy and political lobbying counsel relative to pre-2000, in addition to 
continuing to hire external consultants.  As is made evident in TelstraClear’s recent threat to 
stop investing in New Zealand unless the regulated prices meet its agreement, the 
Commission has been subject to lobbying from market participants both in the forums 
established for resolving disputes, politically and via the media76 that would likely have been 
less had the decisions been made via court rather than regulatory processes.   Ultimately, 
these extra costs must be passed through to consumers in product prices, along with the 
increases in industry costs from running an expanded Commission.  
 
The Commission, on the other hand, with its limited resources constrained in the short-term 
by government budgets, has struggled to keep up with the demand for its services.  This has 
impacted upon both the timeliness and quality of its determinations and recommendations. 
For example, the final TSO determination for the 6 month period 21 December 2001 to 30 
June 2002, begun in March 2002, was delivered on December 18, 200377.  Whilst it was 
anticipated that the first settlement might take time to execute, as principles that would 
become ongoing precedents had to be established, the second determination, for the period 1 
July 2002 to 30 June 2003, was not finalised until 24 March 2005.  With more competitors, 
the determination of the TSO has become even more fraught with contention, as the concerns 
of multiple parties have to be addressed in coming to both the draft and the final 
                                                     
75 Commerce Commission Annual Report 2004/5 p 24.   
76 http://www.telegeography.com/cu/article.php?article_id=18212&email=html  
77http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi.aspx  
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determinations.  The third TSO determination, for the 2003/4 year, was finally announced on 
March 26, 200778. The 2004/5 and 2005/6 determinations were jointly announced on July 9 
200779, by which stage a review of the entire TSO arrangement, led by the Ministry of 
Economic Development, was in process80.   
 
2.4.4 Regulatory-Induced Delays in the Timing of Competitive Entry 
Without doubt, delays in making TSO and other determinations have had a substantial 
negative effect upon dynamic efficiency, in respect of the incentives for either entry into the 
market or investment in any new technologies.   It is notable that new entry in the market 
since the passing of the 2001 Act has been dominated by alternative infrastructure providers 
(e.g. Woosh Wireless and Wired Country), most of whom were associated with either the 
subsidised provision of rural broadband under the government’s Project Probe and Broadband 
Challenge initiatives, or Fonterra’s contracts to provide broadband to its farmer members. The 
firms who have sought regulated access to Telecom’s services were all present in the market 
prior to the passing of the 2001 Act, as providers of voice, internet and backhaul services.  
Indeed, the most significant market changes post 2001 concern the consolidation of existing 
participants via mergers and takeovers, especially infrastructure-owning firms acquiring ISPs  
(e.g. Vodafone acquiring iHug, Kordia acquiring Orcon; Woosh acquiring Quicksilver).  
 
Under the post-2001 rules, it is quite unclear for any entrant what the potential liabilities for 
the TSO, levied some several years after costs have been incurred and revenues collected, 
would be.  Making any retail pricing decision for either an entrant or existing market 
participant is thus extremely problematic.  The extent of uncertainty created is far more 
substantial than the uncertainties in 1991-2002.  Under the court-based regime, an entrant had 
certainty in relation to Telecom’s current Kiwi Share compensation expectation, irrespective 
of the competitive nature of the ECPR or other pricing principles upon which offers were 
based.   These costs created an ‘upper bound’ on the entry decision – if a business case could 
be made for entry using these costs, then entry could occur, even if the resulting market 
interaction was based upon component prices that were not perfectly efficient, and even if, 
subsequently, litigation might alter the distribution of the gains in favour of the entrant.    
 
Furthermore, the regulatory decision-making process itself imposes delays in the time at 
which services can be provided by Telecom’s competitors, relative to the original regime.  
When Telecom and Clear were disputing both the 1991 and 1996 ICAs, they were competing 
                                                     
78http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi5.aspx  
79 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcommercecommi6.aspx  
80 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=30366  
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simultaneously in both the courtroom and the disputed product market.  This enabled the early 
accrual of at least some of the allocative and dynamic efficiency benefits by consumers 
because an agreement, no matter that it was disputed, had been struck and services were being 
provided by both parties. By contrast, under the 2001 Act, no services can be offered by the 
new parties until the contracts have been investigated and mediated by the Commission, 
ratified by the market participants and the decisions made final.  Thus, consumers are denied 
access to any of the benefits for a longer period than under the counterfactual arrangements.  
For example, it took sixteen months (November 2002 to April 2004) for TelstraClear’s 
residential wholesale access determination request to be successfully progressed81.   During 
this period, all potential consumer benefits were forfeited as no new services covered by the 
disputed contract were being offered by TelstraClear.   
 
Moreover, the services that TelstraClear might have offered by increasing investment in their 
own infrastructure had no mandatory access to Telecom’s infrastructure been available were 
also forfeited almost as soon as it became certain that regulated access would be available.  
By contrast, the uncertainty associated with a court process may have encouraged entrants to 
persist with alternative investment plans as a hedge against losing a court case.  The 
consequences for consumers can be directly compared to the welfare gains enjoyed during the 
‘ISP wars’.  Delays in market entry and technology deployment have replaced early accrual of 
gains.   
 
2.4.5 Other Consumer Benefits 
Higher overheads and transaction costs, delays in the implementation of competitive 
pressures, delays in the introduction of new technologies and sacrifice of dynamic efficiency 
benefits were the principal disadvantages that the designers of the ‘light-handed’ regime 
sought to avoid when they eschewed industry-specific regulation in 1987.   These were also 
the consequences which the 1995 inquiry cautioned against.  The New Zealand experience of 
industry-specific regulation, even in the most ‘light-handed’ form possible, appears to 
confirm that most of the concerns postulated about industry-specific regulatory regimes are 
real, sizeable and predictable, in form if not in magnitude.  The New Zealand experience of 
moving from a light-handed to an industry-specific regime appears to confirm that it is 
impossible to have just a ‘little bit of regulation’.  The mere existence of a set of regulatory 
processes based upon ex ante intervention to preclude the possible, but unproven, exertion of 
dominance appears to have invoked a set of behaviours diametrically opposed to independent 
negotiation.  This is in sharp contrast to the costs of the ‘light-handed’ regime, with its 
                                                     
81http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa17200.aspx  
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emphasis on ex post punishment of dominance actually exerted, and where the parties 
themselves are charged with taking responsibility for managing their strategic interaction.   
 
The most striking feature of the post-2001 period is that the competitive dynamism that 
characterised the latter years of the ‘light-handed’ regime, especially evident during the ‘ISP 
Wars’, appears to have evaporated.  Replacing it has been a static market, with key terms, 
conditions and prices to competitors changing only intermittently, and then only by regulatory 
intervention.  Such measured decision-making is antithetic to typically dynamic processes of 
competitive interaction, marked by parties continuously interacting strategically and 
commercially directly with each other and consumers.    
 
Regulatory decision-making cannot easily incorporate the effects of a constantly changing 
market or strategic interaction occurring outside the decision-maker’s jurisdiction in the 
manner of typical competitive processes.   Interaction lurches episodically from one set of 
static conditions, characterised by the regulator’s last view of how the interaction should look, 
to the next static view, as reassessed through the lens of a new set of underpinning conditions.    
Importantly, the regulator is always working with historic information.  By the time a 
decision is made and ratified, environmental conditions have very likely changed.  Yet the 
decision is binding on the parties.  In the New Zealand context, repeated use of regulatory 
agreements has ensured that all contracts for designated services would struck at no price 
other than TSLRIC cost at the time of decision-making, and the terms would prevail for the 
length of the contract (typically 12 months).  Such a regime ensured that there was minimal 
likelihood of the parties acting innovatively in respect of either exogenous changes or 
contractual imperfections.  It is difficult to see how the vibrant interaction with its consequent 
passing through of benefits to consumers that occurred occurring during the ‘ISP Wars’ could 
have been reproduced under the post-2001 arrangements.   
 
Figure 5 provides a cogent illustration of the effect of the change in regulatory regime on 
market dynamics.  Concomitant with the move to industry-specific regulation, both the 
residential telephone service (rental and installation) index and long distance call index 
flattened.  This is in contrast to the consistent falls in both during the 1990s.  Whilst the 
flattening in usage charges is consistent with that observed in other OECD countries from 
2000, the rental and installation index also flattens, but only from 2002, following a sharp 
decline beginning in 1999.  The OECD average over this period continued to rise.  The period 
between 1999 and 2001 reflects the active period of infrastructure competition between 
Saturn (Telstra Saturn/TelstraClear) and Telecom.  The introduction of regulated access to 
Telecom’s services and the associated removal of the long-run threat of infrastructure 
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competition from TelstraClear has, as predicted, resulted in the removal of all downward 
movement in the local telephone service index.   Furthermore, neither does the position 
appear to have improved under the new telecommunications service index, introduced in 
2005, incorporating wider aspects of mobile and internet communications.  Figure 6 
illustrates that this index has also been static, and indeed rising in recent quarters, despite the 
rapid fall in equipment prices.   
 
Importantly, Figures 5 and 6 also reveal that, even though the prices agreed under the 
contracts for designated services post-2001 were cost-based, there appears to have been no 
passing-through of any benefits to consumers, such as occurred throughout the 1990s, at least 
in respect of fixed-line services.   If, as indicated by the 2000 Inquiry, there were still 
substantial rents in the Telecom interconnection prices at the end of 2001, then the cost-based 
prices regulated in 2002 should have resulted in falls in the indexes as rents were competed 
away and benefits passed on to consumers (noting that the 2c/minute fees from the 1996 ICA 
and ‘bill and keep’ in 2001 were replaced by 1.13c/minute regulated prices in 2002).  That 
none has fallen suggests that either rents were not present in the first place, or that the gains 
from their elimination have not been passed through to consumers in the form of reduced 
prices for services, but rather  have absorbed by competitors (e.g. to compensate for the fixed 
costs of establishing a market presence, or as competitor profits).   If the former is correct, 
then the very much higher costs of the regulatory regime have been incurred when they were 
not necessary; if the latter is correct, competitor welfare appears to have taken precedence 
over consumer welfare in the distribution of the gains under the New Zealand regulatory 
system.  Neither of these scenarios is consistent with the furtherance of the long term benefit 
of consumers.   It is therefore difficult on balance to see how the 2001 arrangements have 
furthered the position of consumers, relative to the regime that they replaced.  Rather, 
competitors and those deriving their incomes from the operation of the regulatory regime 
(consultants, bureaucrats, lawyers, economists and managers engaged in regulatory activity)   
appear to have been the primary beneficiaries.  
 
2.5 The Section 64 LLU Review: 2003-4 
The 2000 Inquiry had found no efficiency-based justification for introducing LLU in New 
Zealand, but had recommended that the issue be kept under review.  The Telecommunications 
Act 2001 required the Commissioner to make a recommendation by the end of 2003 on 
whether to introduce LLU (Section 64). The Commissioner was to make a recommendation to 
the Minister, and if any changes to the schedule of designated or specified services were 
recommended, and the Government agreed, the Minister would proceed to amend the Act.  It 
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is noted that this review was undertaken concomitant to the settlement of the first TSO and 
the flurry of activity prompted by the first round of determination applications by a 
Commission with limited resources and under considerable pressure from politicians and 
industry participants, both entrants and incumbent, to arrive at a recommendation favourable 
to each party’s individual interests.     
 
2.5.1 The Process 
Whereas most of the Commission’s early determination applications had hinged specifically 
upon the agreement of each contract price in isolation, using a framework of legislated pricing 
rules that providing the starting point for investigation of all applications, the LLU inquiry 
required the Commissioner to undertake a thorough analysis of all dimensions of the New 
Zealand market and the outcomes of LLU in other jurisdictions, and make a new set of 
recommendations.  Whilst the Ovum (2000) report offered a process precedent, arguably the 
environment in 2003 was different from that prevailing in 2000, so justified a fresh approach.   
 
The process began with a request for submissions based upon an issues paper released on 
April 10, 2003.  The issues paper reiterated the efficiencies-based criteria used by the 2000 
Inquiry to interpret the government’s policy statement, but identified the key role that high-
speed internet access would play in the future of the market.  New Zealand’s low broadband 
uptake was identified, but no speculation as to its cause was made.  Indeed, the paper 
identified the lack of theoretical and empirical information about the underlying drivers of 
broadband uptake.  Consultants were hired to prepare a cost-benefit analysis (Oxera, 2003), 
and a draft report was released on 18 September 2003.  Using an efficiency-based approach 
and the consultants’ cost-benefit analysis, the Commission’s draft recommendation was to 
proceed with making full LLU a designated service.  Many of the benefits hinged upon a 
projected decrease in the price of broadband connections, with different scenarios considering 
the effects of bitstream unbundling, line-sharing and full LLU.   
 
However, it quickly became evident that there were material base assumptive, computational 
and input errors in the cost-benefit analysis.  A revised draft was reissued on October 14, with 
substantially reduced net benefits, but still recommending unbundling.  At the subsequent 
conference, held between November 10 and 14, robust debate occurred regarding the 
assumptions underpinning the cost-benefit analysis.  These centred predominantly around the 
approach to dynamic efficiency, the effect of investment and competitive entry by alternative 
infrastructure providers (for example, the effect of investment in either Telecom’s or entrants’ 
infrastructures was not considered in the cost-benefit analysis methodology – Hausman & 
Sidak, 2005), and the incentives for Telecom to continue with its planned upgrade to a fibre-
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based Next Generation Network (NGN)82 if LLU was mandated.   Another material point 
related to the degree to which unbundling of itself had been associated, in the international 
experience, with increases in broadband penetration, relative to competition from alternative 
infrastructures and other demographic and country-specific factors83.    
 
On November 13, Telecom presented an offer to the conference of access to an unbundled 
partial circuit (bitstream) service in lieu of full LLU (Covec, 2004).  This offer had 
advantages for entrants as it would allow them more flexibility to deliver ADSL bundles to 
consumers than allowed under the existing wholesale arrangements, and without the risk of 
investing in assets that would become stranded when Telecom deployed the NGN.  The 
disadvantage was that entrants would be reliant upon Telecom technologies in the interim.  
From Telecom’s perspective, the offer preserved the incentives to invest in the NGN.  These 
incentives would be severely diluted if unbundling proceeded, given the uncertainties as to 
whether the new networks would also become subject to open access obligations once LLU 
had become entrenched (Gans & King, 2004).  Given the assumption that Telecom’s network 
had to be replaced due to the pending obsolescence of the existing equipment, and the very 
low likelihood that an alternative nationwide fixed-line network would be built by another 
operator following TelstraClear’s decision to stop its fibre investment, the critical issue facing 
the Commission was the need to ensure that someone would invest in a replacement network 
in order to ensure the ongoing provision of existing services to consumers, whilst 
simultaneously providing incentives for investment in new technologies, both Telecom’s 
NGN and other services, such as wireless, mobile and satellite  broadband services.    
 
2.5.2 The Recommendation 
In the final report presented to the Minister on December 22, 2003 (4 days after the first TSO 
decision), the Commissioner reversed his earlier decision and on efficiency grounds did not 
recommend either the specification or the designation of unbundled local loops: “the overall 
benefits from unbundling are not sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the Commission that a 
regulated solution is warranted”84.  Platform competition (e.g. from wireless networks) was 
considered likely to evolve and reduce the extent of Telecom’s control of the bottleneck to 
access (para 788) – reminiscent of the similar findings by the 2000 Inquiry with respect to 
alternative infrastructures - and the experience of LLU internationally had been mixed in 
                                                     
82 Telecom formed a strategic partnership with Alcatel in 2002 to build what was anticipated to be the first commercially-
deployed network of this type in the world http://www.telecom.co.nz/content/0,2502,200633-1548,00.html  
83 A full record of all transcripts and papers presented is available on   
http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/conferencetranscript
sandsubmissions.aspx  
84 Executive Summary, (v).  
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/LocalLoopUnbundling/ContentFiles/Docu
ments/Finalreportexecutivesummary.PDF  
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respect of increasing broadband penetration (para 792).  The high costs of mandatory 
unbundling were also cited, including the critical point that the incentives for the incumbent 
to invest would be substantially reduced under LLU, and that this would have very significant 
effects upon the potential welfare gains for consumers (para 794).  Line-sharing was not 
recommended for designation either as there was limited interest (vi).   
 
However, the Commissioner did recommend that: 
“access to an asymmetric DSL bitstream service suitable for the residential and SME 
broadband market and related interconnection should be a designated service. 
Additional entry in that market is likely to result in lower prices, act as a spur to 
improvements in Telecom’s productive efficiency, and encourage process innovation 
on the part of entrants. The Commission has weighed the potential impacts on current 
or future alternative technology platform providers.  However, the Commission 
believes that those impacts should not be significant, given the capacity of those 
providers to differentiate their service offerings” (vii).   
 
 
Access to associated backhaul services was also recommended for designation (viii).   
According to a subsequent Commerce Commission media release, “the decision not to 
recommend unbundling of other elements was influenced by Telecom’s announcement of an 
Unbundled Partial Private Circuits services offer that has the potential to provide a 
commercial solution to a competition problem in the supply of high grade data services to 
corporates and other large users”85. 
 
2.5.3 The Reaction 
The recommendation reversal was met with considerable dismay by Telecom’s competitors86.   
From the perspectives of regulatory economics and international precedents, however, the 
decision was notable in that the supporting analysis took account of both total welfare (sum of 
consumer and producer surplus) and dynamic efficiency in coming to its recommendations 
(Hausman & Sidak, 2005).   The Commission appeared to be using as the guiding principle in 
the decision the efficiency mandate underpinning the 1987 Act and apparently embodied in 
the government’s policy statement for the sector as interpreted in discussion but not in 
recommendations, by the 2000 Inquiry.  In following this interpretation, the Commission 
applied the principle of long-term efficiency prevailing over short-term effects, at least as far 
as access to copper-based assets and a replacement network replicating its functionality was 
concerned.  The decision also recognised that, in the thin markets for investment in new large-
scale infrastructures, ongoing reliance upon Telecom’s willingness to invest in an improved 
                                                     
85 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa23200.aspx  
86 See, for example, iHug’s submission to the Minister on the matter http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/5898/tcl-rsp-to-comcom-
llu-rpt-submission040209.pdf  
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nationwide network was critical to ensuring the ongoing delivery of existing and future 
services to all New Zealanders.  In this respect, the equity issues pertaining to long-term 
universal access to a nationwide new infrastructure also appeared to prevail over short-term 
competitive entry, which would almost certainly result in price reductions for some urban 
customers, but increase inequities in access for rural consumers.   
 
The backhaul and limited bitstream service designation recommendation was targeted 
specifically at increasing broadband uptake in the residential market, where there had been 
little evidence of competitive entry compared to the business market (Howell & Obren, 2003).  
The bitstream recommendation partially addressed competitor requests for more extensive 
access to Telecom’s infrastructure, albeit further reinforcing the effect of ADSL becoming a 
more dominant technology as further options were provided to new entrants as substitutes to 
their own investments (Gruber, 2007).   By the ‘ladder of investment’ theory (Cave 
&Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006), bitstream and backhaul services are the next investment 
‘step’ upward for entrants who have already invested in retail and IP network services. 
Allowing entrants access to bitstream recognised Telecom’s control over copper wires, and 
would (arguably) allow entrants to build market share in the DSL business in areas where 
bypass of the ‘last mile’ was less likely to occur.   
 
The designation of backhaul, however, appears a little puzzling, given the extensive 
competition already present in the ISP and long-distance markets.  ISPs other than Xtra had 
approximately 50% of the dial-up market via interconnection and 35% of DSL lines at 
December 2003 via wholesale and resale agreements87, and vibrant competition in long-
distance calling had been evident since the mid 1990s.   Given the evidence of substantial 
historic and anticipated growth in data transmission, significant new investment in backhaul 
would be required.  The case for competitors with existing market shares to begin investing in 
their own backhaul infrastructure appears compelling.   
 
By designating backhaul, the implication is that it too is an ‘essential service’ or ‘bottleneck’ 
that will be provided by no party other than Telecom in the foreseeable future.  Yet 
designation poses disincentives to competitor investment in the ‘next step’ of the ladder.  A 
Commissioner-mediated cost-based price to access Telecom’s existing and future backhaul 
investments provides options to competitors to delay investment in their own infrastructures, 
especially where the costs are falling (Pindyck, 2003).   Meanwhile, Telecom’s incentives to 
invest in maintaining and increasing backhaul capacity to meet growing demand would also 
                                                     
87 Telecom Management Commentary 4 February 2005, p 16.   
Available on http://www.telecom.co.nz/binarys/q204_managementcommentary.pdf  
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be diminished under cost-based pricing and diminishing returns (Bourreau & Dogan, 2005).  
Arguably, access to backhaul was required for the bitstream service to be viable quickly, but 
it is not clear why designation, rather than specification, was the regulatory tool chosen.  
Higher prices under specification might have led to earlier and more substantial entrant 
investment in backhaul, reducing reliance upon Telecom’ s infrastructure and increasing  total 
sector investment.  It is noted that as ADSL speeds and data volumes transacted increase, 
service quality is determined principally not by the capability of the DSLAM but the extent of 
congestion of the backhaul network.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that in some areas of New 
Zealand, such congestion is markedly impairing broadband performance88.   
 
2.5.4 Endorsement and Bitstream Operationalization  
On May 24, 2004 the Minister announced his decision to accept the Commission’s 
recommendations.  The final package was formally accepted on July 13.  On June 25, 
Telecom undertook to have its cost-based unbundled bitstream (UBS) product, as offered at 
the November 2003 conference, available by 30 September. 2004.  This undertaking included 
an agreed national target of 250,000 broadband connections being sold by the end of 2005, of 
which a third would be wholesaled bitstream or resold retail products89.   
 
In the interim, however, Telecom began making available a more limited bitstream service90, 
with the anticipation that both offers would be available to access-seekers from September 
3091.  This caused some debate due to provisions of the Telecommunications Act precluding 
access-seekers with an existing commercial contract seeking a determination from the 
Commissioner.  The Commission moved swiftly to clarify the position92.  On September 3, 
the Commission released a benchmarking report on TSLRIC-based pricing for UBS (Covec, 
2004) in anticipation of the mandated service being available from 30 September93.  The 
designated service was available at the time expected, and on October 8, the Commission 
announced that it was satisfied that Telecom was meeting its commitments, in respect of both 
cost-based prices according to the benchmarking report and non-price terms94.   
 
It is noted, however, that the benchmarking prices in Covec (2004) and accepted by the 
Commission are geographically averaged.  The authors place a caveat on their study that 
geographically averaged prices are likely to lead to distortions in the market, with inefficient 
                                                     
88 http://www.ispanz.org.nz/work_plan#Telecom_UBS_Backhaul_and_Interconnection  
89 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecombroadbandtargetclear.aspx  
90 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/currentubsnottheser1.aspx  
91 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecomclarifiesits1.aspx  
92 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa24.aspx  
93 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa23200.aspx  
94 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa27.aspx  
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over-investment in competing technologies in urban areas and under-investment in rural 
areas, cream-skimming by entrants in high-value areas such as CBDs leaving the incumbent 
bearing the costs of serving more unprofitable customers in less-desirable locations, and 
inappropriate technology choice (p 11).  The second of these effects is likely to ultimately be 
relevant to the TSO, should it be extended to include broadband services in addition to basic 
PSTN access.    
 
On November 4 2004, TelstraClear applied for access determinations in respect of wholesale 
bitstream and backhaul, and retail virtual private network services95.  TelstraClear sought to 
have access to bitstream services with a downstream speed as fast as the DSLAM allowed.  A 
similar bitstream and backhaul request was made by iHug on November 996.  IHug 
subsequently withdrew its application on 23 December 2004, having come to a satisfactory 
agreement with Telecom97.  The TelstraClear final determination on virtual private network 
services was released on December 8 2005 (retail less 16%)98 and the bitstream decision on 
20 December 2005 granting a single nationwide price of $27.87 per month for the best 
available service on the line99.   On January 4 2006, TelstraClear applied to the Commission 
for a pricing review of the December 8 decision100.  Telecom responded with an application 
on January 10101.  Both companies subsequently withdrew their applications on January 17 
2006.  The Commissioner’s press release notes “the Telecommunications Act encourages 
commercial negotiations and settlements between parties, and the Commission welcomes the 
agreement reached by TelstraClear and Telecom in relation to these services”102.   
 
On 29 March 2006, iHug and CallPlus both applied for determination on a nationwide 
contract for higher-speed services.  The determination given on June 22 granted them access 
at $28.04 per line per month, for a 2-year period103.   An updated price of $27.76 was 
announced on October 20104.   IHug requested a reconsideration of the pricing terms on 
December 12105, followed by CallPlus on December 18106.   At the time of writing, a decision 
has yet to be announced, possibly due to the fact that on December 22 2006, the provisions of 
the Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006, discussed subsequently, which largely 
                                                     
95 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telstraclearapplies1200.aspx  
96 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa30.aspx  
97 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactihugwithdrawsappli.aspx  
98 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/decisiononresaleoftelecombroadband.aspx  
99http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Wholesale/WholesaleDeterminatons/ContentFiles/Docu
ments/Bitstream%20Determination%20Decision%20568.pdf  
100 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telstraclearappliestocommissionfor.aspx  
101 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecomappliestocommissionforprici.aspx  
102 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telstraclearandtelecompricingrevie.aspx  
103 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/ihugandcallpluswillhavebitstreamac.aspx  
104 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/commissionapprovesupdatedpriceforw.aspx  
105 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/commissionapprovesupdatedpriceforw.aspx  
106 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/commissionreceivesapplicationforbi1.aspx  
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supersede the previous arrangements, came into force.  This Act enabled (amongst other 
things) the Commission to make standard terms determinations for all parties seeking access.   
 
2.5.5 Processes Under Bitstream Access 
As the preceding description indicates, the addition of more services to those subject to 
regulation did not result in a smoother process to contractual agreements.  Indeed, the 
opposite seems to have occurred.  Whilst the transcripts and reports reveal Telecom utilising 
strategic, legal and procedural arguments to support the company’s cause in regulatory 
proceedings, the same can also be said of access-seekers.  Access-seekers have been applying 
for redeterminations within days of determinations being made public.  Moreover, 
applications for reconsiderations have also been lodged within days of the determinations 
being announced, even when with the resulting re-determinations have been only marginally 
different from the original determinations and reviews.    
 
As cost-based pricing based upon transparent international benchmarking provides the basis 
for bitstream price-setting, and the determination process allows multiple opportunities for 
participants’ views to be voiced, it is difficult to see why the bitstream decisions have been 
subject to so much dispute.  In 1997, the High Court judge declared Clear’s behaviour in 
seeking a contract variation five months after the deal was agreed as acting “before the ink on 
the contract was scarcely dry” (Dammery, 1999).  CallPlus and iHug’s requests for 
reconsiderations slightly more than a month after the Commissioner’s decision appear even 
more precipitate.  It is difficult not to conclude that competing for the regulator’s attention 
under the post-2002 regime has been as, or even more, instrumental in shaping sector 
outcomes than competing for customers in the marketplace.  This is in sharp contrast to the 
post-1997 period.   
 
2.5.6 Market Performance Under Bitstream Access 
Figure 7 illustrates the effect of bitstream access availability upon market performance.  
There is no support for the contention that bitstream unbundling has resulted in the 
stimulation of a more competitive market, in the sense of the regulations facilitating greater 
competitor entry, or even higher broadband uptake, as envisaged by the 2003 
recommendation.  Indeed, increased ADSL penetration is strongly correlated with a decrease 
in competitiveness following the bitstream access decision.  
 
As a consequence of the post-2002 determinations, by quarter 3 2003, whilst the LLU inquiry 
was underway, over 37% of ADSL connections were sold by competitors to Telecom under 
resale and wholesale arrangements.  Using the market share of competitors as a proxy for 
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competition107, quarter 3 2003 marks the point of greatest competition in the New Zealand 
ADSL market.  Throughout 2004, whilst the terms of the bitstream agreements were being 
negotiated, the share of connections sold by Telecom’s competitors actually fell consistently, 
reaching a low of 19% by the end of quarter 1, 2005.  This occurred despite a substantial 
sustained upswing in the number of connections being sold per month beginning in quarter 3 
2004.  This upswing, constant and sustained throughout 2005 and 2006, represents the third-
highest growth rate in broadband penetration per capita in the OECD in 2006, after Denmark 
and the Netherlands 108.   Following the bitstream product being made available, the share of 
connections sold by Telecom’s competitors has increased only marginally, to 25% in quarter 
1 2007, despite a fourfold increase in the number of connections sold.  Whilst there was a 
small competitor market share upswing in 2005 from 19% to 25% of accounts, there has been 
no noticeable change in market shares since quarter 1 2006.   
 
Figure 8 indicates that practically all of the increase in the number of broadband connections 
from quarter 4 2003 can be accounted for by user substitution away from dial-up connections.  
This is confirmed by Figure 9.  Prior to quarter 4 2003, there was a positive correlation 
between the number of broadband connections and the number of dial-up connections, 
consistent with a growing market for internet connections of both types.  Dial-up internet 
accounts were at a peak in the first two quarters of 2004.  Dial-up usage per dial-up ISP 
account also peaked in quarter 2, 2003.  From quarter 4 2003, however, there has been a very 
strong negative correlation between the number of dial-up and broadband accounts as 
consumers substitute broadband for dial-up (for every 100 new broadband accounts, dial-up 
accounts reduce by 76 - the account substitution is not complete as individuals may keep a 
dial-up account for access to the internet from remote locations such as holiday homes, as 
ADSL is location-specific but dial-up access is not).    
 
2.5.7 A Demand-Side Explanation for Observed Broadband Uptake 
Whilst the timing of the significant upswing in broadband connections occurred at the time of 
the LLU inquiry, and continued with the availability of bitstream connections, it is not at all 
clear that this can be attributed to the change in regulatory arrangements, as prices to 
consumers and the range of products before and after the availability of bitstream were very 
similar, and were sold by the same providers who repackaged Telecom wholesale and resale 
products previously.   Rather, the pattern observed in Figure 7 is more consistent with the 
hypothesis that, as average internet consumption reaches a threshold whereby it is more cost-
                                                     
107 Although with the proviso that it is not necessarily clear in either the empirical or theoretical literature that this is always true 
(Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007).  
108 http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_37441_38446855_1_1_1_37441,00.html  
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effective for consumers to migrate from dial-up to DSL technology, then substitution will 
occur based upon the change in demand-side characteristics (Howell & Obren, 2003; Howell, 
2007).   
 
That the increase in broadband connections is associated with a decrease in dial-up accounts 
and average dial-up usage per account confirms that it is the most usage-intensive and 
increasing demand dial-up consumers who are substituting, leaving the less-intensive users on 
dial-up as it is the more cost-effective access method given New Zealand prices and their 
lower demand.   As it is increased use of existing and new applications that causes average 
consumption per account to increase, it is more plausible that learning effects and the 
availability of new, transfer-intensive applications such as YouTube and VoIP around this 
time were responsible for the increase in broadband penetration than regulatory intervention.  
It is noted that, using the model in Howell (2007), a ‘tipping point’ of 35.7 hours per month at 
New Zealand broadband and dial-up prices suggests a marginal value of user time of less than 
$0.70 per hour in respect of the additional value conferred by broadband access.  Whilst 
apparently very low, this value of time is consistent with other experimental evidence about 
the willingness of users to pay for faster internet access, especially where the usage is in 
personal (i.e. leisure) time (Varian, 2002).   
 
As ISPs other than Telecom’s Xtra had approximately 50% market share in the dial-up 
internet market in 2003, so already had established relationships with customers, it is very 
puzzling that despite access to the bitstream products under regulated terms and prices, 
competitors’ share of the ADSL market was so low over a period of such rapid customer 
substitution.     Figures 7, 8 and 9 suggest a net loss of internet market share from competitors 
to Telecom Xtra of around 50% during the period of most rapid growth of the broadband 
market.  The decline in competitor market share in 2004 suggests that there was little 
competitor interest in marketing wholesale and resale ADSL products once the intention to 
offer regulated bitstream became clear.  This would support the contention that access 
regulation interferes with dynamic incentives not just in the delivery of technology platforms 
themselves but also in the timing of service availability based upon technological platforms 
subject to access disputes.  However, it does not explain the persistence of the low competitor 
market share once bitstream access became available.   
 
2.5.8 Strategic and Market Characteristic Explanations for Reduced Competitiveness 
It cannot be discounted that following the disappointment of the reversal of the LLU 
recommendation, the competitors who had lobbied strongly for LLU had few incentives to 
make the bitstream arrangements work successfully.  It was clear in the Minister’s acceptance 
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of the Commission’s recommendation not to fully unbundle that Telecom was ‘on notice’ 
from both politicians and the Commission to meet the broadband account and market share 
targets agreed in June 2004.   Strategic gaming by dissatisfied entrants seeking to frustrate 
Telecom’s ability to meet the Commission’s targets (e.g. low investment in marketing effort) 
in the hope of subsequently gaining more favourable access terms from either regulatory or 
political intervention  (i.e. full LLU) offers a plausible explanation of the market share 
enigma.  An alternative, but apparently less plausible, explanation is that Telecom employed 
non-price tactics to frustrate the ability for competitors to sign up new customers.  The 
plausibility of this explanation is diluted by the fact that Telecom voluntarily made the 
bitstream offer at the November 2003 LLU conference and had very strong incentives to meet 
the targets set, so it is difficult to see why it would deliberately put its ability to meet the 
market share target in jeopardy.    
 
A third possible explanation is that the margins available to entrants at the regulated bitstream 
prices were so small that the business case for competitors was barely viable109.   This 
explanation is particularly plausible if the vast majority of consumers purchased products 
with low data caps, as the retail prices for these products were only very slightly more than 
the regulated bitstream price (around $30 per month for entry-level products compared to 
regulated bitstream prices in the vicinity of $27 to $29).  Empirical evidence (Howell, 2003; 
Statistics New Zealand ISP Surveys; iHug website) indicates that average data consumption 
per New Zealand broadband account is low, confirming that, if rational consumers aware of 
their consumption habits and faced with two-part tariffs purchased packages with low data 
caps consistent with their known usage (as per Miravete, 2003; 2002), the margins available 
to entrants from selling bitstream products to the vast majority of consumers would likely be 
small.   Competitors would face few incentives to aggressively market the bitstream packages, 
especially if margins from bitstream sales were less than those available when retaining 
existing customers as dial-up (accounts were priced in the vicinity of $10 per month) rather 
than broadband customers (it is noted that New Zealand’s already very high internet access 
penetration left few avenues available for growing the total size of the market from non-users, 
and even then, very low-cost dial-up access provided the most cost-effective access method 
for new users).   Thus, Telecom Xtra would face greater incentives to convert its dial-up 
customers to broadband accounts than its competitor ISPs, yielding a plausible explanation 
for the outcome illustrated in Figure 7.   
 
                                                     
109 http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/fry/C047FEC66E9B47B3CC25723900423E2A  
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As cost-based pricing principles and international benchmarking were used to set bitstream 
access prices, if Telecom’s competitors could not make sufficiently high margins to induce 
substantial substitution to broadband amongst their existing customers at regulated access 
prices given the already-low prices at which Telecom was selling its own products, then 
Howell’s (2003) finding of an absence of supply-side ‘problems’ in the broadband market is 
confirmed, at least in respect of pricing.  If competitors faced few entry incentives following 
the availability of cost-based bitstream products, then it is difficult to support the hypothesis 
that Telecom’s retail ADSL prices contained substantial rents, or that bitstream access would 
lead to substantial increases in broadband uptake when there was so little room to engage in 
aggressive price-based competition.  Where bitstream access is introduced in the presence of 
monopoly pricing, the outcome expected would be intense price-based competition, with 
subsequent increases in broadband uptake being driven by lower prices bringing forward the 
point of substitution from dial-up (Gruber, 2007; Howell, 2007) and inducing first-time 
internet users to buy broadband, as opposed to dial-up, accounts (Wallsten, 2006).  With no 
room to create a price war, and little scope for product differentiation, bitstream access has 
therefore likely had minimal effect upon the New Zealand broadband uptake statistics, 
relative to other factors.   Instead, the effect has been a (predictable) reduction in competitive 
intensity in a rapidly-expanding broadband market.   
 
Indeed, that the margins for competitors were so low under TSLRIC-based bitstream access 
pricing suggests that in small markets such as New Zealand, there may also be economies of 
scale in the size of the customer base (e.g. lower marketing and customer management costs 
per customer for larger providers) as well as any natural monopoly characteristics in the 
underlying infrastructure costs that favour a large provider (e.g. Telecom, with 50% of the 
internet market) over many smaller providers (e.g.  ISPs with 10% to 15% each).  Intensive 
price-based competition in such circumstances has been shown to be associated with an 
increase in market concentration as competitors merge to take advantage of further 
economies, and as the removal of rents reduces the optimal number of firms in equilibrium 
(Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak, 2007).  However, if there are no rents present in the first place, 
then price-based competition will not ensue, and there will be no entry based upon retail and 
access price arbitrage opportunities.  An increase in market concentration in the presence of 
cost-based pricing thus would thus be consistent with the absence of rents in Telecom’s retail 
prices and efficient allocation of the majority of substituting customers to the lowest-cost 
producer – in this case, Telecom.   
 
Whilst the explanations offered here are speculative, and must be considered simply 
hypotheses until they can be tested against more substantial data, the evidence from Figure 7 
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is clear.  More extensive regulatory intervention, and specifically the introduction of bitstream 
access, has been correlated with a reduction in competitive intensity in the New Zealand 
broadband market, just as the introduction of industry-specific regulation appears to have 
been similarly correlated with a reduction in competitive intensity in the residential telephony 
market.   
 
2.6 Mobile Termination: 2004-6 
The introduction and development of the mobile telephony market in New Zealand has 
occurred principally since the passing of the Telecommunications Act 1987.  Services were 
provided first in 1987 by Telecom on AMPS analogue technology, subsequently replaced by 
TDMA and CDMA networks.  BellSouth entered in 1992, using a GSM network.  The 
BellSouth network was sold to Vodafone in November 1998.  By 2001, Vodafone had 40% 
market share.  In May 2003 its market share exceeded that of Telecom for the first time, 
reaching a peak of 57% in 2006 before falling to 53.7%110 in March 2007.  The New Zealand 
mobile market is relatively mature, with a 2005 penetration rate of 101.93 per 100 population 
(OECD, 2007).  In a rapidly-growing market with two networks and two relatively equal-
sized participants, it was not clear at any stage that either party could be said to be 
‘dominant’.  The 2000 Inquiry made no recommendations regarding regulation in the mobile 
market.  
 
2.6.1 Mobile Market Performance 
Historically, international comparisons undertaken by the Ministry of Economic Development 
and the Commerce Commission, using standard call baskets, have been used to support 
claims that New Zealand’s mobile market prices are quite high by international standards111.  
However, the most recent OECD statistics suggest that, using the OECD baskets, New 
Zealand prices are now very close to OECD averages (OECD, 2007:217-8)112.  Furthermore, 
at least 15 other OECD countries exhibited higher peak rate mobile termination rates in 2006 
than the current New Zealand peak mobile termination rate of 20c per minute, when 
converted to US dollars PPP (OECD, 2003:31).   
 
Concerns have also been voiced that the dual technologies used (CDMA and GSM) are 
restricting opportunities for sharing of infrastructure between firms.  It is also claimed that 
restricted opportunities for infrastructure sharing is limiting the desirability of entry by third-
                                                     
110 https://www.vodafone.co.nz/personal/about/media-centre/2007-media-releases/q4-financials-release.jsp  
111http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/MonitoringandReporting/ContentFiles/Documents/Tele
communications%20Key%20Statistics%20-%20Quarterly%20Monitoring%20Report%20-%2031%20December%202006.pdf  
112 18th-lowest (of 30) for the low and high user baskets, 19th-lowest for medium user; notably, the low user and high user baskets 
are cheaper than Australia (23rd in each – the high user basket is 23% higher-priced in Australia than in New Zealand).   
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party virtual operators, thereby reducing the possible effects of competition upon prices113.  
However, consumers have benefited from real and early product differentiation relative to 
other countries as the network operators sought to influence market shares by the early 
introduction of new, differentiated technological platforms offering innovative customer 
services.   For example, 3G mobile broadband services became commercially available in 
New Zealand substantially earlier than some comparator European countries such as Finland 
(Howell, 2007a), and New Zealand exhibits the highest penetration of 3G technology per 
capita outside of Asia in the latest statistics reported by the OECD (OECD, 2007:98)114.    
However, recent threats of increased regulation have resulting in Vodafone management 
confirming in September 2007 a suspension in the expansion of investment in its 3G mobile 
network pending decisions by the Commission and Government on how the company would 
be regulated in respect of the compulsory provision of access to its cellsites by third 
parties115. 
 
It would therefore appear that, as with the fixed line market, whilst the mobile market may 
not exhibit ‘perfect competition’ in the sense of many players and perfectly cost-based prices, 
it is delivering services to consumers that are not substantially out-of–line with those offered 
in other OECD countries (allocative efficiency), and benefits potentially higher in terms of 
early availability of better products and services (dynamic efficiency).  However, increased 
access regulation will likely compromise the achievement of both in the future, just as LLU 
impacts upon incumbent investment incentives in the fixed line market. 
 
2.6.2 Commission Instigates Investigation   
On April 29 2004, the Commissioner announced an investigation into mobile termination 
rates.  The investigation was initiated using discretion under Schedule 3 of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001 allowing the Commission to investigate whether or not a new 
telecommunications service should be regulated.  In justifying the decision to investigate, the 
Commissioner cited “features of the mobile termination market that give rise to concerns 
about the exercise of market power by mobile carriers” that had led to “complaints that lack 
of competition in the mobile termination market means charges for fixed-to-mobile calls in 
New Zealand are unreasonably high”116.  An issues paper was issued in June, a draft report 
was released in October, and a conference was held in February 2005.   
                                                     
113 See, for example, Econet’s submission on LLU http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/5898/tcl-rsp-to-comcom-llu-rpt-
submission040209.pdf  
114 Whilst Korea (74.73 per 100) and Japan (37.82 per 100)  have higher penetrations of 3G per capita than New Zealand (24.21 
per 100) , they have lower total penetration of mobile connections overall (Korea 79.39 per 100; Japan 75.51 per 100; New 
Zealand 101.93 per 100)  http://ocde.p4.siteinternet.com/publications/doifiles/932007021P1G22.xls  
115 http://www.stuff.co.nz/4191018a13.html  
116 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsa18200.aspx  
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 The Commission made its recommendation to the Minister on June 9 2005 that mobile 
termination charges for voice calls on 2G networks, but not 3G networks, be regulated.  The 
recommendation was supported by a cost-benefit analysis based upon efficiency 
considerations, albeit using as the criterion for recommendation the net benefit to consumers, 
rather than total surplus as had prevailed in the LLU inquiry.   Regulating the different 
generations of technology differently was justified by the risks to dynamic efficiency from 
dampening incentives on both participants to continue the rollout of their 3G networks.  On 
August 9, the Minister announced that he required the Commission to review its 
recommendation, with reference to the “definitional and implementation issues concerning 
2G and 3G” and in “consideration of commercial offers made by Telecom and Vodafone 
following the Commission’s final report”117. The Commission released a reconsidered 
recommendation on 22 December, and on 21 April 2006, announced its final recommendation 
that all fixed-to-mobile voice calls on all technology types be subject to regulation118.   
 
2.6.3 Commerce Act Clarification 
In the second final decision, the Commission’s cost-benefit analysis demonstrated 
“substantial net benefits to end users were likely to arise from making mobile termination a 
designated access service” (para 32)119.    Whereas the LLU decision had been characterised 
by the use of a total welfare framework, in the mobile termination decision a consumer 
welfare approach prevailed: “where wealth transfers which are sustainable and not themselves 
conducive to inefficiency are likely to result from a measure promoting competition, the 
Commission ought to give weight to such transfers in the cost-benefit analysis” (para 34).  
Submissions had been made to both the Commission and the Minister that the consumer 
welfare approach was inconsistent with decisions made by the Commerce Commission, 
where transfers are considered to be neutral – that is, total welfare and not consumer welfare 
is the appropriate benchmark (paras 37-40).    
 
The Commission argued, however, that the Telecommunications Act created a distinction 
between the Commerce Act as amended in 2001, seeking to promote competition by 
restricting the aggregation of market power and controlling its use (sections 36 and 47), 
whereas the regulation of existing market power, as provided for in Part IV focuses upon the 
net benefit to acquirers – that is, it must take into account “the wealth transfer that occurs in 
                                                     
117http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/ContentFiles/
Documents/Ministers%20letter%20to%20commission.pdf  
118http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/Investigations/MobileTerminationRates/reportsandsub
missions.aspx  
119Paragraph references relate to the final, revised report, which summarises the material in all of the preceding draft and final 
reports.   
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reducing the excessive profits of the regulated party” (para 46).  In addressing the 
fundamental tension between the promotion of competition and the pursuit of efficiency, the 
Commission was in no doubt that the Telecommunications Act gave primacy to competition: 
“where there is a tension between the net public benefits and promotion of competition, the 
statutory context indicates that the primary consideration is the promotion of competition” 
(para 47).  A paragraph later: “the Telecommunications Act is focused on regulating access to 
promote competition. It does not provide a mechanism that specifically allows for efficiency 
considerations to take precedence over the promotion of competition.  Nor is there anything in 
the statutory scheme to suggest that this should be the case”.  Rather, the Commission is 
required to exercise its judgement when making recommendations – with the proviso that in 
the context of investigations: “the role of the Commission is to recommend and it is for the 
Minister to determine” (para 53).   This conclusion is made despite Section 18 (2) of the Act 
stating “in determining whether or not, or the extent to which, any act or omission will result, 
or will be likely to result, in competition in telecommunications markets for the long-term 
benefit of end-users of telecommunications services within New Zealand, the efficiencies that 
will result, or will be likely to result, from that act or omission must be considered”.   
 
2.6.4 Competition Supersedes Efficiency as Pre-Eminent Sector Objective 
The principles in the final revised decision appear to be the first substantive articulation in 
any policy, inquiry or recommendation since 1984 that efficiency is no longer the pre-eminent 
principle governing regulation of the New Zealand telecommunications sector.  The first Final 
Report (June 9, 2005) gave no hints of the sea-change that was to follow nine months later.  
Rather, it asserted the prevalence of the efficiency principle, confirming that the Commission 
when exercising its judgement should give greater weight to dynamic effects in assessing the 
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency: “the Act does not direct the Commission as 
to the weight that it should give to efficiencies, as opposed to other considerations. This is a 
matter for the Commission to consider. Where there are tensions between short-term 
allocative efficiency and long-term dynamic efficiency, the Commission takes the view that 
giving greater weight to the latter will generally better promote competition for the long-term 
benefit of end-users” (para 28).    
 
The Commission’s interpretation of the supremacy of competition over efficiency in the 
hierarchy of statutes expressed in the 2006 Mobile Termination decision raises exactly the 
same tension between institutions interpreting and enforcing legislation favouring competition 
at the expense of efficiency as raised in the aftermath of the 1991-94 court action.  Strict 
legalistic interpretation by the courts and their inability under the Commerce Act to consider 
the wider economic context was a principal justification for setting up the Commission with a 
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wider brief, as expressed in the 2000 Inquiry’s efficiency-based interpretation of the incoming 
government’s 1999 policy.  The 2000 Inquiry’s intent to prioritise efficiency, and dynamic 
efficiency in particular, had clearly been followed by the Commission up to and including the 
first mobile termination decision.  Yet the second mobile termination decision abrogates the 
use of Commission’s discretion to prioritise efficiency, citing as the basis a hierarchy of 
statutes reinforcing the pre-eminence of competition.    
 
2.6.5 Tension: Commission Legitimacy vs Statutory Intentions 
By prioritising efficiency, the Commission was interpreting the legislation in the spirit 
articulated in its 2000 Inquiry genesis.  However, the second mobile termination decision 
implies that in doing so it has apparently been acting contrary to these intentions.  This gives 
rise to many questions.  If the intention of the Telecommunications Act is, as interpreted, is 
primarily to regulate access to promote competition, and Section 18(2)’s statement of the 
requirement to take efficiency into account is strictly secondary, this is a clear violation of the 
intentions for the Commission voiced in the 2000 Inquiry.  If the discretion exercised by the 
Commission in prioritising efficiency was never intended to be granted, then all parties have 
apparently laboured for six years under an uncorrected misapprehension.    If so, why has it 
taken so long for the apparent misapprehension to be corrected?   If it was intended in the 
2001 Act that such discretion be exercised, and for six years the spirit, if not the letter, of the 
law has been followed by a Commission that genuinely believed that it was intended to act in 
such a manner, then what is the justification for the recent reinterpretation?    
 
There is little information available in the Commission’s decisions to shed light on these 
questions.  However, the implications arising from the apparent removal of the Commission’s 
ability to exercise its discretion in favour of efficiency considerations are largely predictable.  
Such tight proscription of Commission activities means its decisions will become little more 
than an extension to the process of court-based decisions based upon literal legalistic statute 
interpretation and historic precedents.  Legal finesse in the definitions of acceptable 
competitive practice will prevail over economic analysis, rendering redundant any 
Commission-generated inquiries into the efficacy on efficiency grounds alone of regulating, 
or removing from regulation, any existing or new products and services.    
 
If access is granted to a previously-closed infrastructure, then ipso facto, competition is 
promoted even though such an action might reduce investment incentives and long-term 
dynamic efficiency.  If regulating a service lowers its price to competitors, then ipso facto, 
competition is increased, because competitors who would not have entered at the higher price 
may now make a positive return sufficient to justify entry, even though such a decision might, 
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too, threaten incumbent investment and hence dynamic efficiency.  Neither is increased 
competition induced by regulated pricing necessarily in the long-term interests of consumers 
if the margins available from regulatory arbitrage induce over-much entry (as per 
monopolistic competition) and in the ensuing intensive price-based competition incumbent 
rents transferred to entrants are in large part lost to the economy via the sunk costs of entry 
that the failed entrants walk away from rather than passing them through to consumers in 
price decreases as would have resulted from efficient entry.   Yet when there is doubt about 
the effects (which is inevitable given the uncertainty associated with future events – i.e. any 
dynamic effect), the Commission is now clear – pursuit of competition must prevail over the 
accrual of both total and consumer welfare.   
 
2.6.6 Subjugation of Efficiency and the Role of Commission  
If neither the courts nor the Commission can prioritise the efficiency consequences of actions 
when making decisions, then it begs the question of what role the Commission fills in a 
market where courts enforce competition law and government Ministries enact political 
intentions.  Without the scope to prioritise efficiency in its investigations, the Commission 
ceases to be a quasi-independent industry-specific arbitrator with discretionary powers that 
free it from the constraints of the Commerce Act-governed court processes prioritising 
competition.  Instead, it simply becomes an instrument carrying out the telecommunications 
competition policy of the government of the day (as can now be directed under Section 19A 
without recourse to any discretion when pursuit of competition conflicts with the pursuit of 
long-term sector welfare.  The role of the Commission as an industry forum is weakened and 
transparency is reduced.   
 
If efficiency-based arguments cannot be given weight by the Commission over competition 
ones, then there will be little incentive for parties to present or debate them via submissions 
and conferences.  The quality of decision-making will be compromised by the reduction in 
information provided and the lower-quality debate that will ensue, and transparency will be 
lost as positions never presented will never be documented in the Commission’s proceedings.  
The only avenue left to give efficiency considerations weight will be the political process.  
However, this process is less transparent, and political decision-makers are less directly 
accountable for decisions made, and arguably less qualified to make judgements as they 
typically lack the expertise available in an industry-specific regulator’s office.   
 
2.6.7 Increased Regulatory Risk  
The likely consequences illustrate the difficulties inherent in making a process (competition – 
the means), rather than a defined metric (efficiency – the end) the primary objective of sector-
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specific regulation.  In legislation, as in any incentive contract, giving force to a proxy will 
further the pursuit of the desired outcome only insofar as the proxy closely matches the 
objective.  The greater the gap between the proxy and the objective, the less satisfactory the 
proxy is as the subject of either an incentive or monitoring (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992: 221-
8).   Prioritising competition as the proxy will be a valid action only if it closely matches the 
efficiency end.  However, competition is a process which can take many different forms (e.g. 
Bertrand, Cournot, monopolistic, dominant firm-competitive fringe), each of which plays out 
in different ways and has different effects upon sector efficiency depending upon underlying 
circumstances.  Unless the appropriate form of competition to maximise efficiency in each 
specific circumstance is selected and applied, the risk is that incentivising and monitoring the 
proxy will militate against achievement of the desired end.   
 
The risk in applying a generic standard of ‘promoting competition’, measured by a 
concentration ratio, as might occur in other industries, to natural monopoly industries, or even 
to industries where high levels of concentration have naturally efficiently ensued (such as 
New Zealand), is that precedents associated with one specific form of competition will be 
inappropriately and indiscriminately applied, making the desired objective less, rather than 
more, likely to occur.   The LLU and first mobile termination inquiries illustrate the strength 
of the Commission-based processes in identifying sector-specific factors and balancing 
competition and efficiency issues in a way that minimises the risk of inappropriate modes of 
competition being indiscriminately applied.  The second mobile termination decision suggests 
that the scope for regulatory error is now substantially greater, as there is no clarity in either 
the statutes or the Commission’s decision as to which form of competition is the one to be 
promoted, or how the Commission might respond where different market circumstances 
suggest different forms of competition are more desirable.  In the absence of an obligation to 
prioritise efficiency considerations, and in the removal of incentives for market participants to 
debate the issues, the risk is that arbitrary selection of an inappropriate set of competition 
standards will occur unchallenged, to the detriment of the New Zealand economy.   
 
3. The Politicisation of Competition: 2005-2007 
The inconsistencies between the revised mobile termination decision and historical 
Commission precedents, combined with the reversal of the initial LLU decision, appear to 
have had a significant effect upon the Commission’s credibility, and contributed to growing 
uncertainty in the sector.  Whilst the absence of a transparent policy debate makes it difficult 
to ascertain the underlying motivation for the sudden change in the Commission’s 
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prioritisation of competition over efficiency, it likely had its origin in a changing political 
landscape.                      
 
Between the delivery of the first and second mobile termination decisions, on September 17 
2005, New Zealand held its triennial general election.  The election resulted in a Labour 
Party-led minority government holding a narrow one-member majority on the basis of one 
coalition partner and supply agreements with two minor parties.  The Labour Party manifesto 
for the election stated “this Labour-led government has ended the destructive period of ultra-
light handed regulation that stifled competition, growth and consumer choice in ICT markets” 
and promised to “closely monitor and enforce commitments made by Telecom New Zealand 
under the local loop unbundling decisions and ensure targets for broadband uptake for the 
next three years as outlined in the Digital Strategy are met” 120.    This statement identified the 
unconditional pursuit of competition as a Labour Party political objective, and signalled the 
party’s intention to focus political attention directly and specifically upon Telecom’s activities 
in isolation from the wider telecommunications market and other market participants.  
Moreover, unlike the sector policy statement guiding the 2000 Inquiry and the policies in the 
1980s and 1990s, it contains no reference to any efficiency or equity considerations.   
Competition is to be pursued as an end in itself, meeting broadband uptake and market share 
targets are to be the relevant performance metrics, and Telecom as the dominant firm is 
identified as the primary political target.   
 
On November 9, in the speech from the throne outlining the new Government’s agenda, the 
Governor General confirmed the shift to a purely competition-based policy based upon 
advancing broadband uptake targets: “with respect to ICT, my government will be advancing 
policies to ensure that the telecommunications sector becomes more competitive and that we 
achieve faster broadband uptake in line with our competitors”121.  On December 2, the 
Ministry of Economic Development began a ‘Stocktake’ of the telecommunications industry, 
with its primary focus “the broadband market and our broadband performance as a factor in 
economic performance” (MED, 2006)122.   On February 14, at the opening of parliament, the 
Prime Minister declared “we want to work with other parties on solutions which not only 
                                                     
120 http://www.labour.org.nz/policy/jobs_and_economy/2005policy/Pol05-Comms/index.html  
121 http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/PA0511/S00104.htm (Despite successive attempts in June 2007 to retrieve the official version 
from http://www.dia.govt.nz/Pubforms.nsf/NZGZT/Speech187Nov05.pdf/$file/Speech187Nov05.pdf , it could not be retrieved.).  
This source appears to have reproduced the text complete, but this fact cannot be verified.    
122 Notably, the Stocktake report makes no attempt to quantify the likely effect of broadband on the New Zealand economy.  
Neither is this issue addressed in the Digital Strategy.  It is simply presumed in both policy exercises that, as a matter of faith, the 
effects will be large and unequivocally positive.   
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enable New Zealand to catch up with the rest of the world, but also enable us to keep up as 
these technologies develop further”123.    
 
The presumption that the quality of New Zealand’s infrastructure lagged OECD comparators 
appears to derive simply from the lower-that-average per-capita broadband uptake, as no 
substantiated empirical policy evidence to support the claim has been produced.  The political 
promulgation of the technology lag impression has occurred despite the substantial body of 
supply-side infrastructure quality and availability evidence indicating that no such lag exists.  
For example, Point Topic data indicates that in 2006, New Zealand sat at the OECD average 
in the number of households capable of connecting to ADSL (95%), and exceeded (with 50%) 
the OECD average number of telephony households capable of connecting to the frontier 
ADSL2+ technology (35%) (Mueller, 2007:3).   Notably, New Zealand substantially exceeds 
other comparator countries in this statistic, for example Luxembourg (0%), Ireland (7%), the 
United Kingdom (10%) and Finland (23%).  Moreover, in 2006, the vast majority of New 
Zealand broadband consumers had connections capable of 2Mbps or faster124, whereas only 
28% of connections in Finland were of this standard125.   The pattern of accrual in the OECD 
Communications Outlook publications in 2001, 2003, 2005 and 2007 confirms that New 
Zealand’s ADSL2+ position is largely a consequence of the investment decisions made  
between 1998 and 2002, when the basic DSLAM speed chosen was 2Mbps, and strategic 
imperatives resulted in widespread and rapid deployment.   
 
On February 2 2006, the Commissioner notified the Minister of Communications that at the 
end of 2005, whilst the number of ADSL broadband connections sold exceeded the target set 
in the 2005 agreement with Telecom by 11.6%, only 24.5%, rather than 33.3% had been sold 
by competitors to Telecom126.  Presuming broadband connections can be taken as a proxy for 
welfare127, efficiency-based targets were exceeded, but competitive ones not met128.  The 
failure to meet the competition target appears to have been pivotal in the ensuing regulatory 
activity.  
 
                                                     
123 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=24905  
124 http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/media-releases/internet-service-provider-survey/internet-service-provider-
survey-mar07-mr.htm
125 http://www.ficora.fi/attachments/englanti/5pmNkXaXg/Files/CurrentFile/MarketReview12007.pdf
126 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/telecommunicationsactcompletionofb.aspx  
127 The efficacy of such a proxy is the subject of much dispute.  For discussion, see Howell (2006) and Crandall & Sidak (2007).   
128 It is noted that in March 2007, despite New Zealand having one of the highest growth rates in DSL connections per capita in 
the OECD in the 2006 year, the percentage of connections sold by Telecom remains approximately 25%.  That this has occurred 
despite aggressive marketing by competitors of bundled products, including broadband, long distance, mobile and pay television, 
the Telecom/Xtra branding still enjoys considerable consumer support.    
http://www.comcom.govt.nz//IndustryRegulation/Telecommunications/MonitoringandReporting/ContentFiles/Documents/Telco
%20Key%20Stats%20-%20Quarterly%20Monitoring%20Report%20-%2031%20March%202007.pdf  
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3.1 The ‘Stocktake’  
On May 1 2006, on the basis of the MED ‘Stocktake’ recommendations, the Cabinet voted to 
proceed with legislating mandatory full local loop unbundling (including ‘naked’ DSL) and 
operational separation of Telecom into network, wholesale and retail companies.  It was 
intended that the decision would be announced by the Minister of Finance as the centerpiece 
of the May 18 Budget.  Given that the Minister of Finance was also the Deputy Prime 
Minister, and that regulation is not a budgetary matter, the decision to use the budget platform 
for a regulatory announcement strongly signaled the extent to which telecommunications 
regulation in New Zealand had become a political, as opposed to an administrative, issue129.   
 
On May 2, an employee of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet acquired a copy 
of the cabinet paper, copied it and gave the copy to a Telecom employee.  On May 3, the 
Telecom employee forwarded the copy to his employer.  Telecom management, aware of 
their continuous disclosure obligations to the NZX as a consequence of being in possession of 
potentially material information that if genuine would affect the company’s share price, 
sought confirmation from the Minister on the legitimacy of the information received.  At 
5.15pm, the Minister announced the policy and publicly released the Stocktake document, 
pre-empting the disclosure of both by Telecom130.  In the aftermath of the announcement131, 
by the end of May the Telecom share price had fallen to $4.39, representing a 23% decline in 
company value in the month and a 5% decline in the NZX capitalization132.  Wilkinson 
(2006) notes “$3-4 billion of shareholder wealth (was) destroyed” by the policy.   
 
The ‘Stocktake’ report (MED, 2006) is notable for the limited nature of the economic analysis 
undertaken, and the rudimentary and unscientific methods used to substantiate the proposals 
made (Howell, 2006).  This is in sharp contrast to the rigorous nature of the investigations 
undertaken by the Commission, where detailed cost-benefit analyses and extensive literature 
reviews were used to identify relevant issues, assess evidence presented and make 
recommendations.   That the Ministry, rather than the Commission undertook the ‘Stocktake’ 
analysis is surprising, given the amount of theoretical and industry-specific knowledge 
resident in the Commission relative to the Ministry.  However, given the requirement in the 
Telecommunications Act that efficiency be considered under a Commission-led process 
                                                     
129 It cannot be discounted that given the small majority held by the Labour-led government, the politicisation of 
telecommunications regulation is driven by wider electoral concerns.   The facilities existed for the same process to be 
undertaken within the Telecommunications Commission and Commerce Commission framework without the need to make the 
issue political.   
130 http://www.seccom.govt.nz/publications/documents/telecommunications/print.shtml  
131 Including statements by the Minister to a media outlet on May 16  regarding Telecom’s dividend policy that could have 
constituted ‘tipping’ under the Securities Act  
http://www.seccom.govt.nz/publications/documents/telecommunications/print.shtml  
132 http://www.nzx.com/market/market_announcements/by_company?id=134522  
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(Section 18(2)), even if not prioritized (second mobile termination inquiry), it cannot be 
discounted that the Ministry was required to take the lead specifically because of the absence 
of a binding statutory requirement under Ministry processes that consideration be given to 
efficiency considerations.   Without any statutory requirement to either conceptualize or 
quantify the efficiency consequences (i.e. a cost-benefit analysis), competition considerations 
would, by default, be given uncontested priority.   
 
The absence of probing inquiry in the Stocktake presages the standard of analysis and debate 
that can be expected when participants anticipate that efficiency considerations will be 
suborned to the pursuit of competition.  It is also not inconsistent with a process of seeking to 
find justification for a policy that it has already been announced will be pursued.  The failure 
to subject the ‘Stocktake’ assumptions to reasonable tests of their credibility in a contestable 
process overseen by individuals with specialist skills and industry knowledge reinforces the 
weakness of a politically-managed process compared to the more independent, transparent, 
accountable and expert regulatory process.   
 
Specifically, the Regulatory Impact Statement attached to the May 1 Cabinet paper states that 
a new cost-benefit analysis is unnecessary. There is no systematic identification, 
quantification or analysis of the factors contributing towards the likely costs and benefits of 
the proposals.  It is presented as a matter of faith that the benefits of the policy will outweigh 
its costs.  The faith is based solely upon the presumption that as a consequence of the 
measures proposed, competition will increase.  The certainty that net benefits will accrue 
appears to hinge solely upon the opinions of OECD and EU policy analysts that unbundling 
unconditionally stimulates increases in both broadband uptake and sector investment, and the 
statements of Telecom’s competitors’ intentions to invest under different policy scenarios.   
No attempts were made to assess the impact of the additional regulatory costs imposed and 
likely benefits using New Zealand-specific data.  New Zealand’s lack of scale increasing the 
threshold of benefits required per account or per capita relative to other jurisdictions in order 
to outweigh the (likely similar) fixed costs was not addressed133.  Instead, faith in the 
presumption that the proposals represented international regulatory best practice, and that 
failure to enact them would be detrimental to New Zealand’s economy, prevailed.   
 
                                                     
133 For example, supporting documentation to the Government’s separation plans (Network Strategies, 2007) indicates that the 
capital cost of separating Openreach from BT was in the vicinity of £70 million, which is in the same order of magnitude as 
Telecom’s estimated cost of $300 million.  On a per-account basis, given that the United Kingdom has 25 million telephony 
households compared to New Zealand’s 1.5 million (Mueller, 2007:3), the benefits per household from separation would have to 
be nearly 17 times higher in New Zealand than in the United Kingdom to justify the fixed costs of separation.   
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3.1.1 The Stocktake Analysis: Broadband Uptake 
The overriding justification given for the Stocktake policies was the pursuit of a higher 
OECD ranking for New Zealand in the broadband connections per capita metric.  The 
Stocktake finds ‘competition problems’ to be responsible for New Zealand’s low position 
(22nd of 30 in December 2006) on the basis of an ordinal ranking of New Zealand against the 
top 8 OECD countries on each of the metrics well-established in the literature as statistically 
significantly correlated with high broadband penetration - GDP per capita, land area, 
population density, degree of urbanization and the price of services – plus the degree of 
competition, as measured by the share of broadband accounts sold by new entrants, the effect 
of which on broadband uptake is at best equivocal.     As New Zealand ranks at the extreme 
(i.e. 1 or 9) in only one of these measures (the percentage of connections sold by new 
entrants) (Network Strategies, 2006), the Stocktake finds a competition problem is 
responsible for New Zealand’s poor performance and recommends unbundling and 
operational separation of Telecom as the solution.     
 
3.1.1.1 Absence of Empirical Analysis 
No endeavour is made in the Stocktake to quantify the effects of the recommended policies on 
the chosen benchmark indicator on the basis of the evidence produced134.  Neither is any 
attempt made to explain why, for example,  Finland, with only a marginally higher percentage 
of connections sold by new entrants than New Zealand (28% versus 25%), and higher prices 
for equivalent services, ranked 6th compared to New Zealand’s 22nd.    
 
The Stocktake is further characterised by its lack of any independent analysis of the New 
Zealand telecommunications infrastructure across time. The report focuses solely upon those 
infrastructures and services provided by Telecom New Zealand at the time of the stocktake.  
No analysis is undertaken of the relative effects of different forms of regulation on broadband 
uptake in New Zealand in the past, as in the foregoing discussion in this paper.  Indeed, had 
such an investigation been undertaken, contrary evidence such as that contained in Figure 7 
indicating increased broadband uptake concomitant with reduction in the market share of 
Telecom’s competitors would have been revealed, and the role of past regulatory intervention 
as an underlying factor could have been added to analysis.  Instead, existing regulatory 
                                                     
134 Howell (2006) shows that, based upon the OECD data, the univariate effect of the percentage of customers served by new 
entrants increasing from 25% to 50% would result in a move from 22nd  to 18th  in the OECD rankings.    Using Wallsten’s (2006)  
multivariate model, only a very small rise in the penetration rate per capita, insufficient to see New Zealand pass the next-highest 
country in the rankings, would occur.  This latter result reconfirms the very limited effect of unbundling compared to inter-
platform competition from Distaso, Lupi & Manenti (2005).  Howell’s result includes both intra- and inter-platform effects, so 
would exceed the likely effect of unbundling in New Zealand, given the limited extent of inter-platform competition following 
TelstraClear’s 2002 decision to cease the rollout of its fibre-optic cable network.    
11/15/2007 -75- 75
interventions were presumed to be unequivocally positive in respect of increasing competition 
and therefore excluded from consideration.    
 
3.1.1.2 Absence of Literature Review 
It is also notable that, in contrast to the extensive literature review undertaken in the 
Commission’s 2003 issues paper and draft and final reports, and which was a feature of the 
1995 Ministry of Commerce and Treasury report, the Stocktake is silent on the extent of 
debate in the academic literature regarding the efficacy of the proposed policies.  The absence 
of a detailed discussion of the relative merits of inter-platform as opposed to intra-platform 
competition on broadband uptake135 is especially puzzling, given the extent to which this 
issue dominated proceedings at the 2003 LLU conference.  Indeed, the solitary academic 
paper cited on broadband uptake and unbundling (Distasio, Lupi & Manenti, 2005) is 
misused.  The Stocktake authors claim the paper provides “tentative” support for unbundling 
because of an observation made in general discussion that unbundling is less problematic to 
implement than inter-platform competition136.  The main finding of this paper, not mentioned 
in the Stocktake, is that unbundling had no statistically significant effect upon broadband 
uptake, and was numerically very much smaller in its effect than the statistically significant 
inter-platform competition factor137.    
 
Had a fuller literature review and more detailed analysis of the New Zealand market been 
undertaken, the Stocktake authors would have become aware of the effect of many factors 
other than competitive entry on broadband uptake.  Those of especial interest in the New 
Zealand environment, such as the very low price of dial-up internet access arising from the 
Kiwi Share ‘free local calling obligation’, low dial-up ISP prices arising from the ‘ISP 
Wars’138, and small margins available in DSL markets given already-low Telecom prices 
favouring competitor marketing of dial-up have a constraining effect on broadband uptake.  
These factors may be substantially more plausible explanators of both New Zealand’s relative 
position in broadband uptake and degree of competitor market share than the absence of full 
LLU access.   The effect of New Zealand’s dial-up pricing has subsequently been attributed 
as a significant factor in OECD-published cross-national research seeking to explain relative 
                                                     
135 For a summary of this literature, see Wallsten (2006).   
136 MED (2006a) states ““Distaso et al suggest tentatively that inter-modal competition more effectively creates competition, 
while noting that stimulating entry into the DSL segment of the market is less problematic than enticing entry into alternative 
platforms”  MED  ‘Promoting Competition’ para 4. 
137 “the econometric evidence confirms … that while inter-platform competition drives broadband adoption, competition in the 
market for DSL services does not play a significant role”;  and “the level of competition within each technological platform … is 
positive but insignificant … the coefficient is numerically much smaller than the one related to the inter-platform competition 
index, and very close to zero …  although competition between DSL firms can potentially play an important role in promoting 
broadband diffusion, this effect seems to be completely overwhelmed by the negative ‘indirect’ effect of increased inter-platform 
competition induced by promoting entry into the DSL segment of the market”  
138 “The price of narrow band internet access constrains the diffusion (through the price) of broadband access, suggesting that, at 
least to a certain extent, narrow band and broadband access services are in the same relevant market” 
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differences in individual countries’ broadband uptake rates  (de Ridder, 2007)139.  The effects 
had been previously identified in Howell (2003) and Howell and Obren (2003), which were 
cited in the Commission’s 2003 LLU issues paper.  
 
3.1.1.3 Reliance on OECD Officials’ Opinions 
Instead of undertaking its own empirical and theoretical analysis, the Stocktake relied instead 
unquestioningly upon OECD and EU opinions (unsupported by empirical evidence) that since 
2003, the relationship between unbundling and broadband uptake had strengthened.  
Consequently, the authors failed to identify that the majority of the growing body of empirical 
literature since 2003 on the nexus between broadband uptake and access regulation fails to 
reveal any consistent statistically significant connection140.  They also failed to identify 
significant inconsistencies between the OECD and EU officials’ statements and these 
advocates’ own data.  For example, a few very simple univariate analyses (Howell, 2006; de 
Ridder, 2007)141 reveal no statistically significant evidence of a positive relationship between 
their proposed policies and higher broadband uptake.  Such credibility checks would have 
been very easy to undertake, and would have raised some extremely relevant questions about 
the reliance that could be placed upon the OECD and EU officials’ opinions had they been 
prepared.   Whilst the univariate regression evidence in Howell (2006) was presented to the 
Select Committee, it does not appear to have affected the final decision.  This is in contrast to 
the 2003 LLU inquiry, where empirical evidence presented on the equivocal effects of LLU 
on broadband uptake (Hausman, 2003) appears to have been a significant factor underpinning 
the assessments of risks and benefits identified in the final recommendation.  
 
3.1.2 The Stocktake Analysis: Investment  
The Stocktake is also notable for the unscientific manner in which it analyses sector 
investment.  New Zealand’s lower-than-average investment per capita by OECD measures 
and slippage from Telecom’s own targets for investment in the NGN presented at the 2003 
unbundling inquiry are the principal evidence offered of an investment problem.   However, 
                                                     
139 De Ridder identifies that New Zealand’s extraordinarily low dial-up prices relative to ADSL prices (which he finds to also be 
below the OECD average) are a key factor in low broadband uptake.  In de Ridder’s model, if New Zealand exhibited the OECD 
average ratio of dial-up to broadband prices (i.e. dial-up was dearer, as it is difficult to envisage even cheaper broadband), New 
Zealand’s broadband penetration rate would have been  between 25% and 50% higher than the 8.1 per 100 recorded in 2005 (p 
30, footnote 18).   
140 See Wallsten (2006) and Crandall & Sidak (2007) for recent reviews.  Whilst de Ridder (2007) finds in his model that ‘years 
since LLU introduced’ is a statistically significant factor, the positive correlation between this variable and ‘years since LLU 
introduced’ (not included by de Ridder) means that it cannot be discounted that the analysis is picking up the time element of the 
diffusion curve that would be expected to be significant in explaining differences in countries’ uptake rates.  As de Ridder 
includes no other variables to proxy for regulation or the time the technology has been available, it cannot be concluded that the 
analysis provides robust support for the contention that LLU is a significant factor in broadband uptake rates.    
141 Indeed, Howell’s univariate analysis shows that the relationship between the market share of new entants and broadband 
uptake in the EU in 2005 was only very weakly positive and not statistically significant.  The relationship between new entrant 
share and DSL uptake was actually negative, but again not statistically significant.  These findings are consistent with the 
findings in the majority of the empirical literature, where the effect of entry on networks other than the incumbent’s has a greater 
effect upon broadband uptake.   
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as fixed line telephony statistics are dominated by household connections, a larger average 
number of individuals per household in New Zealand leads to a naturally smaller number of 
access lines per capita, making investment per-capita comparisons across nations unreliable 
measures of relative investment performance (Ford, Koutsky & Spiwak (2007a) and Wallsten 
(2007) make the same point when comparing per-capita fixed broadband metrics in the 
United States and other OECD countries).    
 
3.1.2.1 Relevant Metrics and Time Period Examined 
Investment per access line and investment as a percentage of revenue provide more directly 
comparable data, as they eliminate potentially distorting location-specific demographic 
characteristics.  Investment also needs to be considered in relation to the size of the market 
and the types of infrastructure deployed.  Using OECD data from 1997 to 2003, Howell 
(2006) illustrates that when comparing similar-sized countries with similar equipment at 
similar timing in the investment cycle, there is no evidence of systematic underinvestment in 
the New Zealand telecommunications sector in respect of investment as a percentage of 
revenue across the period (Figure 10), although there were troughs in occasional years 
(notably, 2001 when TelstraClear ceased its rollout).   A similar conclusion was arrived at by 
the 2000 Inquiry, using earlier OECD data.  The evidence of reductions in investment by 
Telecom post-2003 should therefore be viewed in light of the effects of more stringent access 
regulation upon Telecom’s investment behaviour.  
 
However, no consideration is given in the Stocktake as to how regulatory intervention might 
have contributed to the observed investment patterns.  As the historic investment patterns of 
other market participants are not analysed, the impact upon reduction in spending by other 
firms is not considered as a possible factor in the OECD investment observations.   The only 
investment by Telecom’s competitors that is considered relevant to the Stocktake is possible, 
but uncommitted, future expenditure conditional upon a range of different policy options 
being implemented.  The possible effect of Telecom’s obligations to invest in bitstream 
services requiring diversion of investment away from the NGN as a plausible factor in 
slippage from the NGN investment plan is not discussed.  Neither is the likelihood of 
Telecom’s investment response being influenced by regulatory risk and the higher cost of 
capital under a more stringent regulatory regime, or the costs of delivering the bitstream 
products, raised as possible explanations for the observations.   
 
3.1.2.2 Reliance on OECD Officials’ Unsubstantiated Opinions 
In the absence of any other theoretical or empirical evidence in the Stocktake, the assurances 
of OECD officials that “increased competition at the wholesale level leads to increased 
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investment by incumbents, not less” (para 11) prevails.  This evidence is accepted despite the 
warnings of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade officials that the approach of the OECD 
officials on this point was “somewhat cavalier” and “warranted further testing”142.  A search 
of the contemporaneous literature reveals empirical evidence posing substantial questions 
about the credibility of the OECD officials’ claims in the European context at least (e.g. 
London Economics, 2006; Gruber, 2007; Crandall & Sidak, 2007).   
 
Moreover, even the OECD evidence presented by Network Strategies in the Stocktake 
supporting documents, when critically examined, confirms the fallacy of the OECD officials’ 
claims.  Figure 10 shows investment as a percentage of revenue for New Zealand, the 
aggregate OECD, and a group of other small countries with similar types and vintages of 
infrastructure as in New Zealand over the period 1997-2003.  Not only is New Zealand’s 
investment remarkably similar to the comparable countries, but it is relatively constant, 
indicating that, even though revenues may have fluctuated across time, for example as the 
size of markets have grown with the introduction of new products and services, investment 
has continued at a stable level relative to the revenues that have been collected.  By contrast, 
in the post-2000 period, when wholesale competition was becoming prevalent across the 
OECD, investment as a percentage of revenue in the aggregate OECD has fallen sharply, to 
only half is original level.   
 
3.1.2.3 Competition and Investment in the OECD Post-1997 
Figure 10 suggests that, as competition has intensified across the OECD, investment as a 
percentage of revenues has actually fallen.  In respect of incumbents, whose revenues would 
have fallen as monopoly rents were eroded and customers switched to entrants, to produce the 
negative slope, investment must have fallen even more than revenues have fallen.   In respect 
of entrants, the negative slope confirms that even if they are investing more than incumbents, 
when considered in aggregate there is less investment occurring per dollar of revenue under 
more intense competition than previously.  Whilst this pattern may be partially reflecting 
historic under-utilization of existing incumbent investments and offsetting the costs of 
competitive entry, it is also plausible that in part it is reflecting a reduction in investment as 
new entrants extract revenues off the back of incumbent investments, but refrain from 
investing themselves.  Whilst growing markets from the availability of new products and 
services are leading to more revenues in total being collected, Figures 11 and 12 confirm that 
less is being invested on average across the OECD whilst the higher revenues are being 
accrued.    
                                                     
142 ‘If there is one area where we think the OECD’s thinking needs further testing, it is over the investment incentives associated 
with regulated network access.  We felt the ICCP’s attitude was somewhat cavalier on this point”  (MFAT,  2006 para 19) .    
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 Figures 11 and 12 index investment, revenue and investment as a percentage of revenue at 
1997 levels for New Zealand and the rest of the OECD countries from 1997 to 2005.  
Indexing to 1997 captures relative changes that occurred following the commercialization of 
the internet, the ensuing dot.com bubble in the late 1990s and the dot.com burst in 2001, and 
the post-2000 increase in competition, largely driven by the increase in access regulation 
following mandating of local loop unbundling in most OECD countries. Figure 11 shows that 
New Zealand’s investment as a percentage of revenue stayed relatively constant in nominal 
terms compared to 1997 levels until 2002, when it fell substantially.  This compares to the 
OECD average, which rose relative to 1997 levels as the dot-com bubble expanded, but then 
fell dramatically following the dot.com burst, but in 2005 lay above that of New Zealand.  
However, Figure 12 shows that whilst both OECD revenues and investment rose together 
during the dot.com bubble of the late 1990s, OECD revenues continued to increase steadily, 
but OECD investment fell sharply following the burst and the intensification of competition, 
and had only just returned to 1997 nominal levels (less in real terms) in 2005.  
 
3.1.2.3 Regulation and Revenue Accrual Affecting Investment Levels and Timing 
By contrast, New Zealand revenues and investments were stable across the 1990s, and the 
decline in investment as a percentage of revenues illustrated in Figure 11 is due not to a 
decrease in investment, as has occurred in the rest of the OECD following the dot.com burst 
and increased competition, but because of increases in revenues as chargeable broadband 
services started to become a significant factor in the market.  Indeed, New Zealand 
investments are higher relative to 1997 levels (both nominal and real) than the OECD average 
throughout the entire post-dot.com crash period when increased competition came to 
dominate most other markets.  Examining the nexus between revenues and investment reveals 
that more recent increases in New Zealand investment levels (2002-2005) are occurring most 
likely as a consequence of increased revenues coming available, in a manner reminiscent of 
the beginnings of the dot.com bubble in the rest of the OECD, when investment and revenues 
also rose in concert.  Thus, the ‘free local calling’ Kiwi Share obligation has had a significant 
structural effect upon New Zealand’s investment timing.  
 
Indeed, Figures 11 and 12 appear to confirm that neither incumbent nor entrant infrastructure 
investment is keeping pace with revenue growth across the OECD.  The majority of revenue 
growth appears to be coming from service differentiation that is independent of infrastructure 
investment.  It is thus difficult to find support for the OECD officials’ view that infrastructure 
investment increases as markets become more competitive.  Instead, Figures 11 and 12 (using 
nominal investments and revenues) combined with Figure 3 showing the OECD 
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telecommunications price index over the same period, appear to confirm that, even allowing 
for reductions in capital costs, increased revenues are being distributed amongst competitors 
who, in real terms, are investing less than they were in 1997.  Consumer benefits from 
product variation that underpin the increased revenues recorded are therefore most likely 
based predominantly upon service rather than infrastructure differentiation.   
 
Rather than supporting the OECD officials’ claims, Figures 10-12 appear to confirm Bourreau 
& Dogan’s (2005) hypothesis that wholesale access arrangements impede incumbent 
investment, Dixit’s (2004) hypothesis that wholesale access chills incentives for both 
incumbent and entrant investment, and Gruber’s (2007) hypothesis that wholesale access is a 
substitute for investment in competing networks, and will lead to lower levels non-incumbent 
investment and decreased inter-platform competition as entrants opt for lower-risk access to 
incumbents’ infrastructures rather than investing in their own networks. The EU data in 
London Economics (2006) and discussed in Gruber (2007) supports the contention indicated 
herewith that both incumbent and entrant investment have fallen as access-based competition 
has increased.    
 
3.1.3 The Stocktake Analysis: Separation  
A further key theme of the Stocktake recommendations was the harmonization of New 
Zealand’s regulatory regime with international best practice, as advocated by the OECD.  
Whilst LLU has received conditional support from the OECD where there is no 
infrastructure-based competition, structural separation has never received endorsement from 
the OECD as regulatory best practice143.  Indeed, the OECD’s position on structural 
separation is that it simply one of two different strategic views that telecommunications firms 
have on future industry direction.  In one view, telecommunication firms offer a “wide array 
of value-added services over their last-mile networks”; in the other, they structure their 
business assets in a way that allows “one side to focus on revenues derived simply from 
offering data connectivity over fixed-line or wireless infrastructure” (OECD, 2007:19).  
Importantly, the OECD states “these different views on the future of the telecommunications 
market will lead firms down very different investment and managerial paths.  It is too early to 
say which of the two visions will prove dominant in the industry” (ibid).  
 
3.1.3.1 Separation Reduces Investment Incentives in NZ Economic Environment  
Once again, the separation sections of the Stocktake are conspicuous by their lack of 
consideration given to the literature in the field, and any consideration of the significant 
                                                     
143 Personal communication with Taylor Reynolds, Economist, Information, Computer and Communications Policy Division, 
Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, OECD, May 29, 2007.   
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economies of scale and scope lost by separation or the alteration in investment incentives 
faced by separated firms144.   The absence of a literature review results in the failure of the 
Stocktake to provide a clear justification for the use of the tool.   Separation is proposed in the 
literature as a counter to one specific form of dominance – incumbent favoritism of its own 
downstream firms in the provision of services on its upstream network in order to foreclose 
competitor entry.  However, there is no evidence provided to support the contention that such 
activity is either occurring or is a real risk in the New Zealand context.   
 
Rather, it is quite paradoxical that one of the purposes specified for separation in the ensuing 
legislation is “to facilitate efficient investment in telecommunications infrastructure and 
services” (S69A(c)).  The growing body of literature on separation is characterised by the 
consistent finding of a negative effect on incumbent investment efficiency because the 
instrument prevents the incumbent from internalising the gains from co-ordinated action and 
efficiency-improving price discrimination between applications and network connection, and 
between legacy and frontier technology platforms.  The result is delays in, and higher costs 
of, incumbent investment. This is a significant concern in the New Zealand context, given the 
substantial reliance upon Telecom as the major source of investment funds to upgrade 
existing networks and make future services available.  De Bijl (2005) suggests separation is a 
last resort, to be applied only when all other regulatory tools have been tried and failed to 
curb proven favouritism by a network operator of its downstream activities, and then only if a 
cost-benefit analysis satisfactorily demonstrates that the welfare foregone by separation is 
certain to be recouped from proven undesirable behaviour avoided.  By specifically avoiding 
a cost-benefit analysis, the need to justify New Zealand’s separation proposal on efficiency 
criteria has been sidestepped.   
 
Had such an analysis been undertaken, it might have proved difficult to justify the 
intervention.  The ability to co-ordinate decision-making that vertical integration offers, a 
benefit that will be compulsorily forfeited under separation, may be a substantial cost in a 
small market lacking the ability to lever substantial economies of scale and scope from other 
aspects of the business145.   Even literature cited subsequently by MED in support of the 
separation process warns of long term infrastructure investment disincentives under 
prohibition of discrimination and cost-based access when the regulatory regime chosen has 
chilled investment in competing loops (Cave, 2006:92).  Arguably, these are precisely the 
circumstances prevailing in New Zealand given TelstraClear’s decision to abandon its cable 
                                                     
144 See de Bijl (2005) for a discussion of these issues. 
145 Telecom’s two largest network competitors, Vodafone and TelstraClear have fully-owned downstream ISP affiliates (iHug;  
ClearNet and Paradise; respectively). 
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rollout and focus upon gaining regulated access to Telecom’s infrastructure.  Yet, separation 
is strongly recommended.  
 
3.1.3.2 Other Motivations for Separation 
The absence of a principled analysis of the costs and benefits means that separation is being 
applied ‘blindly’ in New Zealand.   It is difficult to rationalise this action as consistent with 
the adoption of best-practice regulation.  Rather, separation in the New Zealand context 
appears to draw its motivation from the criminal justice practise of preventive detention.  
Despite the costs incurred by society, the ‘criminal’ will be restrained in order to prevent the 
possibility of any future offending occurring.  The distinction is, however, that Telecom has 
never been found beyond the balance of probabilities to have exerted its dominance, and since 
2002 has been subject to strict regulatory constraint on the price and non-price terms of 
practically all its contracts with competitors that has made it difficult for the firm to have 
engaged undetected in the type of offending which separation guards against.   
 
It summary, therefore, operational separation in the New Zealand market is being driven by a 
government seeking to impose its predetermined vision of the future industry strategy upon 
the market, by dint of exercise of its legislative and regulatory powers, thereby overruling the 
strategic view of the market future held by the largest investor.  That the strategy imposed is 
far from universally accepted or endorsed by other regulatory or policy agencies, and carries 
substantial commercial and regulatory risk in that it is by no means certain which business 
model will ultimately prove most successful in a rapidly-changing industry, marks this aspect 
of the recent reforms as remarkably radical by OECD standards.   Whereas in many OECD 
countries, governments are leaving such industry-changing strategic decisions to the market 
participants, the New Zealand government’s intervention in unilaterally imposing such a view 
is uncharacteristically activist.  That such a decision has been made by legislators without 
recourse to any of the strategic analysis that would have been undertaken and presented to the 
board by the management of a firm seeking to voluntarily separate reinforces the political, as 
opposed to economic or strategic, motives underpinning separation.  
 
The incongruity of the government’s own strategic activism must also be considered in light 
of its involvement in the sector as the 100% owner of one of Telecom’s principal competitors.  
Government-owned infrastructure operator Kordia recently became a vertically-integrated 
entity when it purchased ISP Orcon.  Kordia-Orcon’s prominence in the market is underlined 
by it being the company servicing New Zealand’s first fully unbundled access line146, and that 
                                                     
146 http://www.kordia.co.nz/node/1139  
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(to date) it is the only competitor to Telecom to announce an intention to install its equipment 
in every unbundled exchange147.   This investment is, presumably, being underwritten by the 
firm’s government owner.   
 
3.1.4 The Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006 Process 
The 2006 Stocktake process was managed by the Minister, the Ministry of Economic 
Development and the Finance and Expenditure Select Committee under parliamentary 
processes.  Whilst submissions were heard by the committee, unlike the Commission 
processes, there was no obligation upon the committee to account for its decisions or explain 
how it came to its conclusions.  Neither was the process subject to any appeal or review on 
either process or substance.   
 
The statutory changes to the Telecommunications Act were passed into law on December 18, 
2006.  Also included in the revised Act were the requirement for the Commission to take 
account of any economic policies of the government that are communicated by the Minister in 
writing (Section 19A), the provision of additional sector monitoring reports (Section 9A), and 
the ability for the Commissioner to make standard terms determinations covering multiple 
parties seeking access to Telecom’s facilities (Part 2 Subpart 2A).   Whilst the introduction of 
standard terms determinations goes some way to reducing the workload of the Commission 
and thereby likely increases efficiency in the regulatory process, the requirement to take 
account of government economic policies appears grounded in a political, rather than 
efficiency-raising motivation.  As well as breaching regulatory best practice advocated by the 
OECD and the ITU that regulation be as independent of political processes as possible, the 
requirement further reinforces the politicisation of the New Zealand telecommunications 
regulation agenda.   
 
Specifically, the Act gives the Minister the power to direct the Commission in a manner that 
is constitutionally at variance with the separation of powers between the government, as 
represented by the Minister, and the State, as represented by the Governor-General.  In a 
similar manner to that underpinning the independence of the judiciary, the Commissioner is a 
quasi-judicial authority appointed by and accountable to the Governor-General (albeit on a 
recommendation from the Minister)148.  Yet the requirement that the Commission must take 
                                                     
147 http://www.stuff.co.nz/4196742a28.html  
148 Under the Crown Entities Act, the Commerce Commission (in which the Telecommunications Commissioner is based) is an 
Independent Crown Entity, alongside entities including (inter alia) the Law Commission, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner, the Privacy Commissioner, the Police Complaints Authority and the Securities Commission.  The independence 
of such bodies is to specifically distance them from day-to-day political policies – hence the accountability of the commissioners 
to the Governor General and not the Minister.  The Telecommunications Act S19A is an explicit violation of the presumption of 
independence.   
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account of government economic policies when instructed by the Minister is equivalent to the 
judiciary being required to take notice of written instructions from politicians in relation to 
specific policy positions when making judgements in court cases.  The provision is an overt 
constraint upon the independence of the Commissioner, begging the question of whether the 
current administration perceives the role of the Commission to be as an agent of the State, as 
per the judiciary, or as an agent of the government, as per a Ministry such as MED.   
 
3.2 Operational Separation: 2007 
On April 5, 2007, the Minister of Communications released detailed proposals for operational 
separation.  The proposals required Telecom to be separated into an access network, a 
wholesale business and a retail business, owned by one entity and accountable to one CEO 
and board, but obligated not to communicate with each other.  The activities of the three 
entities would be overseen by an Industry Oversight Group, appointed by and accountable to 
the Telecom Board, but acceptable to the Commissioner, “to ensure the letter and intent of the 
Undertakings are faithfully implemented”149.    
 
Telecom responded on April 27, claiming that the government’s proposal was unworkable 
and unlikely to deliver the government’s objectives articulated in the Digital Strategy.  The 
rigidity of the government’s unbundling and separation requirements, as theoretically 
predicted, would be very costly to implement.  If pursued, the additional financial risks 
invoked by the separation would mean Telecom could justify making investments of only 
$500 million of the $1,500 million needed to deliver the network envisaged by the 
government.   The company put up its own proposal to separate the company into two, with a 
sustainable network infrastructure company (Netco) being established to manage bottleneck 
assets, with contractual obligations to the government on services provided and prices 
received, giving certainty to both Netco and access-seekers upon which to base future 
investments.  The proposals were made as part of a package to both guarantee its own 
investment and remove the regulatory bottlenecks and obstacles to investment by other parties 
that had been building since 2002.  The company acknowledged that it had consulted the 
industry in forming its proposal150.     
 
3.2.1 A Missing Market for Sector Investment? 
Telecom provided a credible signal of its intention to reduce investment if the government’s 
separation proposal went ahead when it announced in its third quarter 2006 performance 
                                                     
149 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=28928  
150 http://www.med.govt.nz/upload/45925/11.pdf  
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report on May 3 2007 its intention to return to shareholders $1.1 billion of the proceeds from 
the $2.16 billion sale on April 30 of its Yellow Pages directory business: “after considering 
the relevant interests of all stakeholders, Telecom’s earnings outlook, potential investments 
and appropriate balance sheet structure, the Telecom Board has proposed the return of $1.1b 
to shareholders”151 .   In the same report, it was reiterated that Telecom’s separation proposal 
contained three key elements: separate ownership of the network company; a simpler form of 
operational separation than the government’s proposals; and tighter co-ordination of future 
regulatory activities.  Significantly, “without all three elements, the proposed regulatory 
settings do not create an environment conducive to investments of the scale required”152.   
 
However, on October 26, the Telecom chief executive announced that the company would 
invest $1,400 million in its network over the next five years, with a view to all towns with 
more than 500 lines being able to receive next-generation IP-based network services and 
ADSL services of up to 20Mbps153.   The plans as announced appear to reinstate the level and 
nature of planned investment to around that indicated as Telecom’s future plan at the LLU 
inquiry conference in November 2003, where a fully IP-based NGN was proposed to be 
operational by 2012.  The market response to the investment announcement was an 11c 
(2.5%) reduction in the company’s share price, which fell to $4.31154.  The share price at the 
end of October 2007 was even lower than that at the end of May 2006, following the 
government’s announcement of its intentions to unbundle the network and separate Telecom 
($4.39).  Shareholder sentiment does not appear to support Telecom management’s 
confidence that the proposed investment is positive for the company.   
 
The long-term consequences of declining shareholder value are significant.   Inevitably, the 
cost of capital for Telecom’s investments will now be much higher than in April 2006.  The 
effective opportunity cost for shareholders of the latest investment is not just the $1,400 
million outlaid, but the $3 to $4 billion of shareholder value written off as a consequence of 
the regulatory changes.  Investment is riskier than under the previous regulations, so 
shareholders will expect higher returns from any additional capital they might provide.  
Shareholder equity to underwrite the risks of debt financing has fallen substantially, meaning 
higher risk premiums will be charged if the investment is financed predominantly by debt (a 
likely scenario given the repayment of the Yellow Pages money to shareholders).    It begs the 
question of who, in the long-run, will be prepared to finance future large-scale core network 
investments.  If shareholders and debt-holders can receive a fair return that compensates them 
                                                     
151 http://www.telecom.co.nz/binarys/q3_07_presentation.pdf,  p 3 
152 Ibid, p 4.   
153 http://www.telecom-media.co.nz/releases_detail.asp?id=3497&page=1&pagesize=10  
154 http://www.stuff.co.nz/4251650a13.html  
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for the levels of risk borne, then the market will finance such investments.  But if the 
regulated prices set for access to network services do not adequately compensate these costs, 
including the higher costs of capital that are now faced, and the additional administrative 
costs imposed as a consequence of the regulations (in particular, separation, which Telecom ) 
in particular, separation, the outcome will be a missing market for sector investment.   
 
It might be argued that competitors would use the higher costs of access to Telecom 
infrastructures to accelerate the rate at which they invest in their own technologies.  However, 
this must be juxtaposed against the fact that their shareholders and debt-holders too must 
make a fair return on the capital invested.   Moreover, if any other single firm invests 
substantially, then it may match or even supersede Telecom as the dominant market 
participant, at least in some geographic areas, thereby becoming subject to the same 
regulatory pressures as Telecom (as evidenced by the threat of regulation of both Vodafone’s  
and Telecom’s mobile network infrastructures).  If multiple firms invest, then the co-
ordination costs of managing the investment would be substantially larger than if one single 
company undertook the project.  The cost of such an investment would thus likely be higher 
than if undertaken by Telecom – that is, it would lead to a less-efficient network that would 
result in higher-priced services to consumers, even if sold to them at cost.   
 
Indeed, the high costs of co-ordinating the investment interests of a large number of 
unbundled-access competitors using incumbents’ networks is a significant issue that is 
already delaying the implementation of, and raising the costs of, fibre investment in 
jurisdictions where unbundling is entrenched.  Structural separation of BT’s network into 
separate firm Openreach with limited access to its own capital, and extensive entry via 
unbundling limiting entrants’ willingness to invest in successor technologies, are already 
being invoked as explanations for the United Kingdom’s apparent reluctance to proceed with 
large-scale investment in fibre-based networks relative to its European comparators such as 
the Netherlands and France (Mueller, 2007).   
 
After only a very short period of time has elapsed, politicization of the regulatory process and 
pursuit of competition to the exclusion of efficiency considerations appear to have resulted in 
substantial threats to future network investment.  Even if investment is undertaken, the 
services are provided will almost certainly cost more than under the post-2003 counterfactual.   
It is very difficult to see how these actions have been in the long-term interests of consumers.   
A principled, efficiency-based regulator-led analysis of the 2006 proposals would have 
required some quantification of these effects ex ante.  Overriding of the regulatory principle 
of efficiency prevailing from 1987 to 2005 by the political imperative of pursuit of 
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competition post-2005 is therefore directly responsible for the additional risk of a ‘missing 
market’.  Whereas the typical justification for governments to intervene is when a missing 
market is present, in this instance it appears as though government intervention has been 
instrumental in creating a potential missing market, when it was not at all clear that the 
benefits of intervention were large compared to the additional risks invoked.   
 
In the event of a missing market for investment emerging, it is likely that government 
investment will be required to address a failure induced by government actions.  Such 
investment might be undertaken either via the government’s proprietary Kordia-Orcon or by 
subsidising infrastructure building by other firms (as has occurred in Australia155).  However, 
the additional costs to taxpayers and telecommunications consumers are likely to be 
substantial, both in higher prices to consumers and opportunities foregone in alternative uses 
of tax revenues. 
 
3.2.2 Ministerial Control of Separation 
At a speech given on 31 May to the Telecommunications Users Association of New Zealand, 
the Minister affirmed that despite the greater powers given to the Commission in the 
Telecommunications Amendment Act 2006, the Minister and not the Commission would lead 
the separation process.  This action was seen by Cabinet to reflect “the urgency attached by 
the government to the need to secure a clear outcome on this matter in the shortest possible 
timeframe. Because this is a major structural issue and not a matter of micro regulation, this 
was felt and is still felt to be the appropriate way forward” 156.    
 
The Minister’s statement was interpreted by some commentators as an indication that the 
Government’s separation proposals, rather than the revised Telecom offer, would prevail157.   
It could also be interpreted as political endorsement of a mechanism allowing the Government 
to exercise detailed decision-making control of Telecom’s investments without incurring any 
of the financial risks normally associated with the ownership of such control rights158.   The 
announcement that politicians, and not the Commission, are now overseeing key sector 
strategy confirms a near 360 degree swing of the regulatory pendulum back to the pre-1987 
arrangements, where politicians and government controlled sector structure, investment and 
                                                     
155 http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200706/s1953976.htm  
156 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29595  
157 http://www.stuff.co.nz/4079448a13.html  
158 Gregory Sidak, in his presentation to the Research Chair on Innovation and Regulation in the Digital Economy Workshop on 
Network Neutrality in Paris on May 29 described structural separation as effective renationalisation of telecommunications assets 
as the private sector got to make the investments and the government, via the regulator, got to decide how the investment was 
applied.  The New Zealand case appears to bear this out.  The New Zealand scenario is even more contentious as a politicised 
renationalisation argument given that it is not the arm’s-length regulator, but the politicians themselves, that makes the control 
decisions, via a political process that is neither transparent nor contestable compared to the regulatory processes .via which such 
management might otherwise be exercised.   
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interaction. The only difference is that prior to 1987, taxpayers rather than shareholders 
provided the funds and could be compelled to invest even if the political decisions were not 
based upon sound investment strategies.  In 2007, the investment funds are provided by 
shareholders, who have the discretion not to invest if the proposal is deemed unsound and 
better returns are available in other sectors.      
 
Politicians are unable to compel private sector investors to underwrite government-controlled 
firms.  Decision-making control of investors’ funds is ceded to managers only if the return 
compensates for the additional risks incurred by the separation of ownership and control.  The 
additional risks imposed by government assumption of the decision-making control ordinarily 
exerted by the firm’s managers increases the risks to shareholders, thereby increasing the 
return expected for the use of their funds.  Whilst the risks are increased by regulator control, 
the additional safeguards provided by the legislative safeguards, transparency of process, 
accountability and rights of appeal compared to the less transparent, less accountable and 
less-appealable actions of a Minister mean that the Minister’s actions in assuming control of 
the separation process have further raised both the costs of capital in the sector and the risks 
of a missing market for investment occurring than if the Commission had overseen the 
separation process.   Whilst ministerial leadership might result in a decision being reached 
faster, it increases the likelihood of welfare-reducing actions occurring uncontested, 
especially where political objectives are at variance with the objective of increasing total 
welfare.  This is an especial concern, given the government’s overt articulation of the 
supremacy of the pursuit of competition over the pursuit of efficiency.  
 
3.3 Inconsistencies?  The Mobile Termination Response: 2007 
The Government’s intention to take over direct control of mobile, as well as fixed-line sector 
governance for the foreseeable future was signalled on February 28 2007, when the Economic 
Development Minister announced that “a decision on the possible regulation of fixed-to-
mobile phone fees for carriers has been deferred for a short period, while the Crown engages 
with Vodafone and Telecom on commercial offers they have made as alternatives to 
regulation”159.   The decision pertained to the Commission’s revised recommendation in April 
2006 that fixed-to-mobile termination charges become designated services.  On April 30, the 
same Minister announced that the service would not be regulated: “My decision to reject the 
Commerce Commission’s recommendation in favour of an industry solution has followed a 
process of consultation, review and analysis. I have studied submissions from interested 
parties and briefings from officials. I have also sought advice on Vodafone’s and Telecom’s 
                                                     
159 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DoumentID=28525  
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offers, so that I could make an informed decision under the Telecommunications Act 
2001”160.   The deeds of agreement announced revealed very similar prices and conditions to 
those recommended by the Commissioner in April 2006.   
 
The decision to settle in the mobile market using a ministerially-brokered contractual process 
is apparently contrary given the history of increasingly stringent regulatory intervention in the 
fixed line market under the current government’s jurisdiction.  It is also surprising given the 
similarity of the outcome to that envisaged by the Commissioner’s April 2006 
recommendations.  It begs the questions of what priority could have been given to the accrual 
of consumer benefits if the Commission’s recommendation had been implemented when it 
was recommended in April 2006.  It also begs the question why, given the extensive 
investigations into the matter that had already been held, it took a further twelve months for 
the Minister to broker an approximately identical agreement.   Whilst lack of transparency 
precludes finding an answer to these questions161, it is noted that the use of a Ministerial, as 
opposed to a Commission, processes appears to confirm that politicians, and not the 
Commission, now control the regulatory process and key sector decision-making as a matter 
of course, rather than as a specific exception.   
 
3.3.1 Cabinet-Level Control  
The process used to arrive at the mobile termination decision is also notable for the fact that, 
although the Commission reports to the Communications Minister, the Economic 
Development Minister appears to have led the mobile termination contractual negotiations.  
Keown (2007) reports that the Telecommunications Minister “ruled himself out because of 
claims he had a conflict of interest”, as a consequence of a dispute with Vodafone on a matter 
of process.   The consequence is that the degree of government involvement in determining 
the direction of the telecommunications sector goes far wider than the Communications 
portfolio, to include other members of Cabinet.  It is noted that the Minister of Economic 
Development was, at the time, one of the front-bench (highest-ranked) ministers in the 
Cabinet.  
 
Combined with the intended strategic use of the 2006 Budget by the Deputy Prime Minister 
for the announcement of unbundling and separation decision, the involvement of the Minister 
of Economic Development in mobile termination signifies an unprecedented degree of high-
                                                     
160 http://www.beehive.govt.nz/ViewDocument.aspx?DocumentID=29126  
161 Although subsequent requests under the Official Information Act have revealed that the Minister ignored the advice of 
officials to regulate, and in the form and process of the negotiations undertaken with Vodafone and Telecom.  Keown (2007) 
interprets the papers provided under the request to reveal “Mallard was strongly advised to stay out of commercial negotiations to 
avoid ‘regulatory gaming’ by Vodafone and Telecom and harm to the integrity of the Commission’s review”.  papers provided,   
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level political attention given to an industry where nearly one hundred percent of investment 
comes from the private sector.  The desires of the 1984 reformers, subsequently endorsed by 
the OECD162, the ITU163 and the majority of academic observers of the sector, to remove key 
infrastructure investment decisions from the purview of politicians in order to enable sound 
long-term decisions to be made unaffected by short-term political considerations, appear to no 
longer apply in New Zealand.  Such processes stand in sharp contrast yet again to the claims 
made by the 2006 Stocktake to be implementing international best-practice regulatory 
standards.    
 
3.3.2 Credibility and Independence of the Commission and the Commissioner 
The May 31 announcement by the Communications Minister that he would assume the lead in 
structural separation was accompanied by the announcement of the appointment of a new 
Commissioner.  The previous Commissioner announced his intention not to seek 
reappointment in July 2006164, not long after the release of the final mobile termination 
recommendation, where the Commission’s position regarding the superiority of competition 
over efficiency was enunciated.   
 
Repeated ministerial intervention in the sector draws into s question both the independence of 
the Commission and the credibility of its decisions.  The mobile termination process reveals 
that even when a matter has been discussed and the Commission has made a recommendation 
not once but twice, the matter is still up for renegotiation at the Ministerial level, with 
ministers other than the Minister of Communications mandated to take an interest in sector 
activities. The separation case indicates that for the foreseeable future, the Commissioner’s 
role has effectively been subordinated to that of politicians.   This reinforces the view in 
section 3.1.4 above that under the current administration, regulation is seen to be an extension 
of core government activities in that its role is the development and delivery of government 
policies165, rather than in the quasi-judicial sense operating as an arbitrator independent of the 
political process.   
 
The signal sent to market participants is that the Commission is part of core government 
activity, and that any party dissatisfied with a Commission decision or recommendation can 
now seek redress at the political level, where any one of a number of Cabinet Ministers can 
                                                     
162 Ref OECD 
163 Ref Kelly ITU  
164 http://www.comcom.govt.nz/MediaCentre/MediaReleases/200607/telecommunicationscommissionernott.aspx  
165 The Minister, when announcing his role in the separation process, identified that “by conferring upon the commission a 
proactive, monitoring and strategic (sic.) role, Cabinet has indicated its desire to see the commission play a greater role in 
telecommunications policy going forward.”   
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have influence. Recourse to political appeal severely restricts the Commission from making a 
decision that may be at variance with the political objectives of the governing political 
alliance, no matter how literally the relevant legislation is interpreted, or how the decision 
affects either consumer welfare or total efficiency.  However, the political decision-making 
process is neither transparent nor accountable, in the manner of the Commission’s decisions.   
It is particularly unclear what rights of review or appeal exist for parties dissatisfied with 
Affected parties may have no knowledge of proceedings unless informed by the relevant 
political or public servant actors, and no legitimate right of response or comment unless they 
are invited to offer one.  Such a process, as Ministry of Economic Development officials 
cautioned their Minister during the mobile termination process, severely compromises the 
Commission’s integrity and increases uncertainty in the sector (Keown, 2007).   
 
The politicization of the regulatory process also raises the question of what procedures must 
be followed by parties disaffected with Ministerial decisions or Ministerially-brokered 
agreements, or when economic circumstances change, warranting a reconsideration of the 
terms and conditions.   Under the Ministerial agreement on mobile termination, it appears that 
variations will require political approval.  Political involvement in the sector would therefore 
appear to be not simply a short-term measure to address the immediate issue of investment in 
fixed broadband access networks with eventual devolution of responsibility back to the 
Commissioner as suggested by the Minister of Communications’ May 31 speech, but a five-
year plan, as determined by the length of the mobile termination agreement brokered by the 
Minister of Economic Development.   
 
In 2007, therefore, the return to political control of the telecommunications sector appears 
complete.  
 
4. Implications 
Some twenty years after the passing of the Telecommunications Act 1987, the pendulum of 
regulatory control of the New Zealand telecommunications sector has returned almost to the 
point where it started in 1984, with politicians firmly in control of sector regulatory decision-
making and substantial operational strategizing.  Following the sharp 180 degree pull away 
from government ownership and control to private ownership and court-based arbitration of 
competition law principles in 1987, the pendulum has swung back through successively more 
stringent forms of industry-specific regulation mediated by a quasi-judicial regulatory 
authority to the point where, in 2007, whilst private ownership remains, political control of 
sector structure and market interaction prevails.   
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 4.1 Increasing Regulatory Intensity: Reducing Efficiency, Competitiveness 
Each step in the progression from the ‘light-handed’ regime of the 1987 to the politically-
controlled regime of 2007 has occurred despite a lack of convincing evidence that the 
outcomes under more stringent regulation would result in substantial long-term increases in 
either total or consumer welfare relative to the counterfactual.  Each successive tightening of 
the regulatory ratchet has singularly failed to result in substantially improved performance in 
the metrics which triggered tightening of the wrench, whilst proving detrimental to other 
metrics.  Specifically, failure to improve in competition metrics (principally the number of 
and increased market share of participants other than Telecom), even when there has been 
little evidence of inferior efficiency-related performance relative to other regimes, has led to 
even more stringent regulation, and increasing deterioration in sector performance, in a 
perversely reinforcing downward spiral.    
 
As confirmed in the foregoing analysis and the 2000 Inquiry, whilst not delivering a perfectly 
statically competitive market across all dimensions of telecommunications products and 
services, there was clear evidence of substantial benefits being conferred on consumers in 
terms of both static (low prices) and dynamic (timely availability of new products and 
services widely and at low prices) efficiencies under the ‘light-handed’ regime.  The 
introduction of designated services and the Commission-based processes in 2002 
unequivocally impaired progress towards dynamic efficiency gains relative to the ‘light-
handed regime’.  Prices regulated at cost chilled entrant incentives to invest in competing 
platforms.  Delays were introduced in the time taken to bring competitor products and 
services to market.  The regulatory processes adopted added to the costs of delays through the 
increase in regulatory workload and the removal of incentives for parties to come to 
agreements outside of the Commission’s ambit.  Uncertainty was increased by the time taken 
to allocate TSO costs, and the costs to firms of engaging in the process likely exceed those 
under the preceding regime.  Gains passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices 
ceased.   The transaction costs of regulation increased, but there was little evidence of either 
dynamic or static efficiency gains. 
 
Whilst the Commission-led regime initially resulted in more consumers being served by 
providers other than Telecom via wholesaling, there was no significant new entry into the 
fixed-line and broadband marketplace.  Instead, a decrease in competing platform investment 
ensued as existing participants expanded their market shares principally by selling new 
services (e.g. broadband) provided by Telecom at the expense of investment in their own 
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platforms.  Consolidation amongst competitors dominated in this period, as would be 
expected when intense price-based competition dominates sector interaction.  Static efficiency 
was also impacted, as the flow of benefits (lower prices) through to consumers ceased.    
 
The introduction of bitstream unbundling was promulgated as a means of increasing 
broadband uptake by making the broadband market more competitive.  However, the market 
share of Telecom’s competitors fell as broadband uptake burgeoned.  A combination of 
already-low Telecom prices in both the dial-up and broadband markets and strategic 
behaviour by competitors fuelled by perverse regulatory incentives reinforced Telecom’s 
already dominant position.  In respect of the percentage of customers served by Telecom’s 
rivals, the market became less competitive.   
 
Whilst there were clear gains in static and dynamic efficiency initially following the bitstream 
decision, (higher broadband penetration and certainty in Telecom’s commitment to invest in 
the NGN), the failure to achieve a defined competition metric resulted in even more stringent 
regulation in 2006 the form of full unbundling and structural separation.  Whilst the effect of 
this regulation on competitive entry is still unclear, the unequivocal consequence is the 
reduction in dynamic efficiency with inevitably higher costs of investment, and uncertainty 
about the future prospects for private sector investment in core infrastructures.  Whilst in the 
short-term, agreement has been secured for Telecom to invest in a next-generation IP 
network, the core infrastructure is still copper-based.  Significant questions remain about the 
incentives for any party to invest in New Zealand in the fibre-based networks which are 
starting to supplant copper-based ADSL networks in many other OECD countries166.   The 
experiences of Telecom and Vodafone paint a cogent lesson for any network owner whose 
investment, due to economies of scale, could become dominant in its local geographic market.  
The New Zealand approach in fixed and mobile telephony suggests that even when such 
assets are fully privately owned, and may even have been developed in an unregulated 
market, the acquisition of dominance, or even the effects of a merger that substantially 
reduces competition, will result in exposure to regulatory provisions mandating 
uncompensated ceding at least some of the rights of control normally associated with 
ownership to the government, even though there may be no evidence that beyond the balance 
of probabilities that dominance has been exerted.   
 
                                                     
166 See Mueller (2007) for a discussion of fibre-optic network deployment in Asia and the European Union.  
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4.2 Pursuit of Competition Replaces Pursuit of Efficiency 
For eighteen of the twenty years since the passing of the Telecommunications Act 1987, 
sector decision-making has ostensibly been governed by the pursuit of efficiency.  The 1995 
review, the 2000 Inquiry, the 2003 LLU Inquiry and the two Commission-led mobile 
termination inquiries were characterised by the priority given in principle to efficiency 
considerations.    However, despite being given primacy in principle, in practice since 1999, 
whenever there has been a tension between them, political pragmatism has resulted in the 
pursuit of efficiency becoming increasingly subjugated to promotion of competition.   
 
As a largely politically-motivated exercise, the 2000 Inquiry compromised upon efficiency-
based principles in its final recommendation in moving away from a regime predicated upon 
ex post enforcement of competition law principles to an ex ante regulatory regime.  This 
decision was made despite the Inquiry’s finding that New Zealand’s light-handed regime had 
not performed poorly in respect of any of allocative, productive or dynamic efficiency 
compared to other regimes, and despite its apparent endorsement of efficiency-based motive.  
Nonetheless, the LLU Inquiry and the two mobile termination inquiries were steadfast in the 
use of efficiency criteria in the process of their assessments.   Both were notable in the 
attention given to dynamic efficiency, with specific emphasis upon the particular challenges 
of the New Zealand economy in encouraging the necessary investment in new technologies.    
 
4.2.1 Political Motivation for Primacy of Competition 
However, neither the LLU recommendation nor the first mobile termination decision was 
greeted with unanimous political support.  The clear prioritisation of competition over 
efficiency in the presence of conflict, as articulated in the second mobile termination decision, 
almost certainly echoes a change in political priorities following the 2005 election, and 
presages the apparent abandonment of efficiency considerations in telecommunications 
regulatory matters in the post-2005 era.   
 
The politically-led processes post 2005 appear to have paid little heed to the inherent tension 
between competition-predicated static efficiency, measured as the market share of entrants in 
a market based upon selling existing technologies at cost-based prices, and dynamic 
efficiency measured as successive investment in new technologies, based upon the ability for 
private investors to garner a fair economic return for the risks associated with their 
investments.   Despite the Stocktake and its ensuing legislation articulating an objective of 
encouraging investment, the effect of the regulatory changes and political intervention has 
been unequivocally to compromise investment incentives for the dominant participants 
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providing the bulk of sector investment (Telecom and Vodafone) in favour of enabling fringe 
investment by their competitors.  Whilst the theory of encouraging fringe investment in 
existing infrastructures is appealing from a static competitive perspective, the lack of detailed 
analyses empirically trading off the respective costs and benefits appears to have enabled 
short-term fringe-competitor welfare considerations to prevail over long-term investment, 
dynamic efficiency and consumer welfare considerations.   The reliance upon foreign 
assessments of the efficacy of chosen policies predominantly because of their effects upon 
competition, to the exclusion of the assessment of their potential effects upon efficiency in the 
context of the New Zealand economy (in particular, its scale) has become possible principally 
because of the exclusivity given to the pursuit of competition in existing markets (scale is not 
an explicit consideration in competition assessments).  
 
4.2.2 Commission Processes as Compensation for Competition Law Weakness 
When the tension between pursuit of competition and pursuit of efficiency was first addressed 
in 1995, Blanchard noted the inability of competition law as enforced by the courts to make 
allowances for actions that increased efficiency but violated established competition 
principles.  His proposal was for an additional arbitration process to address these issues.  
Despite the failure of its structures and regulatory determination processes to generate 
efficiency-raising outcomes, the Commission established by the 2000 Inquiry appears to have 
genuinely attempted to give voice and priority to efficiency issues when given discretion in its 
sector analyses.    This is evidenced in the repeated use of cost-benefit analyses in making its 
recommendations.    
 
The failure of the Telecommunications Commission to deliver improvements in efficiency 
cannot be held to be a direct consequence of discretion exercised.  Rather, its failure to deliver 
greater efficiency derives principally from the areas where as a consequence of legislative 
restraint it had no discretion to address the tension between competition and efficiency, such 
as the range of services originally designated, and the requirement to deliver pricing 
determinations based upon cost-based TSLRIC pricing methodology, even though it has been 
demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that under certain circumstances this leads to 
reductions in efficiency (Guthrie, 2006).   Indeed, by recommending against LLU in 2003, the 
Commission clearly adjudicated in favour of efficiency gains in the long run over increased 
short-term increases in competitive intensity, as mandated by the 2000 in its identification of 
the principles to be used when determining which services should be subject to designation.   
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4.2.3 Return to Dominance of Competition Law Principles Post-2005 
It is in the second mobile termination decision that the role of the Commission as an 
instrument to balance the tensions between efficiency and competition is (by interpretation) 
subjugated to the role of the Commission as an instrument to promote competition over 
efficiency consequences.   In light of the policy deliberations in the 1980s and 1990s, and the 
exercise of the Commission’s discretion in the 2000s, this change in approach is puzzling.  If 
trict legalistic interpretation of the Commerce and Telecommunications Acts supports the 
precedence of competition over efficiency, it begs the question of why in the New Zealand 
context competition should always prevail, and why it should be given legal force to prevail.  
Such prevalence is inconsistent competition as a process, with its end objective being to 
increase total welfare (efficiency).  It also fails to recognise that different forms of 
competition have different efficiency outcomes, some of which, given the underlying 
circumstances, may lead to lower, rather than higher, long-run total welfare.   
 
If the means is merely a route to the end, then why put at risk achievement of the desired end 
by strict adherence to the pursuit of only one of a range of alternative means?  The crucial risk 
that the narrow political pursuit of ‘competition’ in its current New Zealand manifestation 
invokes is that selection and enshrinement in legislation of the ‘wrong’ competitive process 
may result in pursuit of a faulty proxy (‘perfect competition’) at the expense of the desired 
end (increased welfare).   
 
4.2.4 Which Form of the Competition Process Will Prevail? 
It is far from clear that ‘perfect competition’, predicated upon many participants engaging in 
least-cost production of a homogeneous product for which demand is reasonably certain is 
optimal in small markets characterised by a small number of participants, large sunk costs and 
where substantial investment in new technologies is essential in the medium term to meet 
consumers’ demands for widely-differentiated higher-quality products in the future, and for 
which the extent and timing of that future demand is also uncertain.   It is also unclear that, in 
embryonic or rapidly developing technological markets, open access to legacy investments, 
even if they provide initial advantages to the firms owning them, is necessarily the most 
efficient course of action.  Such rules presume that perfect competition is optimal in the 
downstream market, and that opening access to the upstream input will facilitate its 
development.  However, if this assumption is inappropriate, the consequences of legislating as 
if it is so may be costly. 
 
Open access, LLU, structural separation and TSLRIC pricing are all manifestations of the 
pursuit of perfect competition.  The ‘ladder of investment’ model of inducing entrants to 
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move to infrastructure-based competition is unproven, and the costs of co-ordinating 
investment by many players to enable completely new technological platforms to be built are 
vast.  The presence of a small number of alternative technological platforms competing with 
differentiated products in monopolistically competitive markets is a current reality in most 
telecommunications markets.  The question of the current New Zealand regulatory regime is 
whether it is flexible enough to adapt the form of competition pursued to match that which 
will deliver the best outcome for New Zealand’s specific underlying economic, geographic 
and demographic circumstances.   
 
The key determinant of the appropriate form of competitive interaction to maximise 
efficiency is the underlying economic circumstances.  The benefit offered by an entity with 
discretion to prioritise efficiency over legislatively-enforced competition is the ability to 
respond flexibly to changes in underlying economic circumstances that render the legislated 
or political policy priority of a specified form of the competitive process inappropriate.  The 
removal of that discretion from the Commission and its replacement with a set of strictly 
enforceable legislative obligations enables a potentially wrong means to become the driving 
force of strategy, leaving the only recourse to apply the brakes or change direction in political 
intervention.  But when political processes both set the legislative framework prioritising the 
chosen competitive form and control the agenda for review and reassessment, with no explicit 
mandate to consider the efficiency consequences, there is no place for consideration of any 
factors other than those underpinning the legislated, political view of the competition model 
to be imposed.   
 
The effect of the post-2005 arrangements is to return the New Zealand telecommunications 
market to the same position it was pre-1987, when efficiency considerations played no part in 
setting sector objectives, strategy or operation.  The position is demonstrably inferior to both 
the efficiency-mandated Commission and the court-based processes prevailing from 1989 to 
2001.  Whilst the court-based process was also subject to the possibility that presumptions of 
competitive form could overrule efficiency concerns, to the detriment of long-term welfare, 
the difference post 2005 is it is Cabinet, rather than the Courts deciding what constitutes 
acceptable competitive behaviour in the sector.  Whereas the court-based and Commission-
based processes required clearly-defined standards of transparency and accountability to be 
adhered to, and offered rights of appeal, the Cabinet-based processes offer no such 
assurances.  From the perspective of institutional integrity, the current arrangements leave the 
market in a greater position of uncertainty, and with a greater likelihood of an inappropriate 
set of competitive objectives being applied, than at any other time since 1987.  Rather than 
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improving upon the flaws of the ‘light-handed’ regime, the most recent institutional changes 
appear to have exacerbated them.   
 
4.3 Equity, Efficiency and the ‘Kiwi Share’ 
Whilst the last twenty years have seen substantial changes to the institutions and methods of 
sector regulation, it is apposite to consider the role of the only element of the regulatory 
regime that has not altered.  Despite the clarity provided in 2001 that the ‘Kiwi Share’ costs 
would be an explicit charge on the whole industry and not just Telecom customers and 
shareholders, the ‘universal service’ and ‘free local calling’ principles remain in force.  That 
there has been no explicit examination of these provisions until 2007 is surprising, not least 
because the ‘Kiwi Share’ terms have been pivotal, by their effects upon efficiency, equity and 
competition, to the circumstances underpinning each successive turning of the regulatory 
ratchet.  It is apposite at this point to consider the effects of each obligation on market 
performance.  
 
The ‘price cap’ obligation has clearly been complicit in the extent of welfare gains transferred 
to consumers in the 1990s.  As a constraint against the dominant firm exerting its market 
power in prices to consumers, it was both extremely cheap to monitor and enforce, and 
apparently extremely effective in constraining residential prices charged by Telecom.  Despite 
having the ability to raise line rental prices to residential consumers, apart from some initial 
rebalancing of rates in the early 1990s and responses to localised competition, Telecom’s line 
rentals stayed constant in nominal terms (reducing in real terms) until 2007167.  The ‘free-
calling’ obligation enabled New Zealand consumers to accrue very early and very substantial 
gains from the use of dial-up internet access.  The value of the ‘free local calling’ plan to New 
Zealand consumers is evidenced in the fact that, despite being offered the opportunity to 
switch to plans with two-part tariffs, the overwhelming majority of subscribers opted to 
continue paying a higher line rental and have ‘free local calling’.  This preference can be 
attributed to the substantially higher volume of local calls of longer length being made in New 
Zealand than in other OECD countries, much of which relates to internet access.   
 
However, the ‘free local calling’ and ‘universal service’ obligations have also had negative 
effects.  Both of these obligations, broadly speaking, address equity concerns.  ‘Free local 
calling’ disconnects the volume and length of calls made from the price paid, in effect 
removing the cost of usage as a barrier for individuals with different incomes (presuming that 
a connection is affordable in the first place).  Likewise, the ‘universal service’ obligation 
                                                     
167 Residential rentals were increased nationwide in 2007.  
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equalises rural and urban line rentals.  However, each creates an obligation for Telecom to 
subsidise from other sources the extent of connection and usage occurring that exceed their 
costs.  Of necessity, this requires some services to be priced above cost to some consumers, 
with consequences for efficiency.   
 
4.3.1 Trading Equity and Efficiency: Universal Service 
With respect to line rentals, the ‘universal service’ obligation requires urban subscribers pay 
above cost, creating a margin for competitors with higher costs than Telecom to enter when it 
is not efficient for them to do so, lowering prices to consumers but eliminating the ability for 
Telecom to subsidise the rural loss-causing consumers.  Such pricing also deters efficient 
entry in rural areas where providers with lower-cost technologies cannot make a fair return 
because they are competing for customers paying rentals less than cost (i.e. are subsidised).    
 
Whilst compensating Telecom for the costs of unprofitable users under the TSO/Kiwi Share 
arrangements addresses Telecom’s financial viability, it does not fully address the distortions 
in entry incentives.  Whilst the TSO, if carefully calculated, can be imposed in such a manner 
that a greater proportion of the costs are borne by entrants in urban markets, the fact that they 
are levied ex post makes the entry decision highly uncertain.  Inefficient entry may occur, 
leaving higher-cost entrants in loss-making positions when the TSO tax is levied, or 
otherwise-profitable entry may be foregone due to the uncertainty about the size of the tax 
and uncertainty about other participants’ actions.   
 
In a monopolistically competitive market, one party’s entry decisions will affect the market 
share available to others, and therefore the allocation of the TSO obligations amongst all 
parties.  As it is difficult to determine ex ante what the market’s response to entry will be, 
additional risk is created not just from the ex post levying of the TSO based upon uncertain 
customer switching behaviour, but also the concomitant uncertainty about the entry plans of 
other entrants.  The uncertainty thus relates not just to substitution of customers between 
providers based upon price, but also substitution based on heterogeneous quality differences 
amongst the new providers.  TSO uncertainty adds to the already-manifest uncertainties about 
competitor actions in monopolistically competitive markets, increasing the likelihood of 
inefficient entry and pricing decisions being made.  The typical reaction to uncertainty is to 
wait for more information (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).  However, if otherwise-efficient entry 
does not occur because of the delay, welfare is lost through insufficient product variety.  If 
entry occurs when the costs and effects on other participants have been underestimated, 
competition will increase, but welfare will decrease as a consequence of too much product 
variety.  In either case, the effects of the TSO in its current form jeopardise efficiency gains. 
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 Moreover, under the TSO and universal service obligations, rural entry will be highly unlikely 
to occur, unless subsidised explicitly.  The government has underwritten Project Probe and 
Broadband Challenge funds in order to stimulate rural entry in competition to Telecom.  
However, this creates further distortions in the other markets which must be taxed in order to 
fund the explicit taxation-based subsidies.  
 
4.3.2 Trading Equity and Efficiency: Tying and Two-Part Tariffs 
The ‘free local calling’ obligation imposes a restriction upon tariff structure.  The tariff is a 
two-part one, with a fixed component for connection to the network, and a zero usage charge.   
Typical two-part telephony tariffs are predicated upon linked consumer valuations for each of 
access to and utilisation of the network.  If connection and utilisation are charged separately, 
the demand elasticity (customer valuation) for each can be evaluated separately, and optimal 
price structures determined accordingly.  As call purchase is ‘tied’ to connection purchase (a 
connection must be first purchased in order to make calls), it is possible to utilise individual 
differences in consumer valuations of each of connection, calls and the bundle of calls and 
connection to increase the number of individuals purchasing connections.  
 
‘Tied’ pricing is a method of price discrimination where consumer demands for the tied 
products are interrelated.  The price charged for the first good is set first, and a price above 
cost charged for the second good.  As both goods must be used together, such charging can be 
used to increase firm profitability by extracting consumer surplus, but without reducing 
efficiency.  The second good must be purchased above cost in order to obtain any benefits 
from the first good, but both goods are valued sufficiently highly to justify the purchase of the 
second at a price above cost.  Those valuing the second good higher (e.g. multiple purchases 
of it are made) thus pay a higher effective price for the first good (Carlton and Perloff, 
2000:302-319).   
 
Tied sales can also be used as a form of ‘progressive tax’ whereby the additional revenues 
from charging above cost for the second good can be used to offset (subsidise) the cost of 
providing the first good.  Where connections are the first good and calls the second, a portion 
of each charged call minute becomes a contribution towards connection costs: those 
consuming more call minutes effectively pay more for their connection than those consuming 
fewer call minutes (or calls where the charge is made per call).   The price charged for a 
connection can now be reduced below cost, enabling individuals whose valuation of 
connection lies between the subsidised price and cost (for example those on limited incomes 
such as the elderly and the indigent) to purchase a connection whereas they would have 
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foregone purchase if they had been required to pay for it at cost.  This is a welfare gain in the 
connection market.  The ‘tax’ on calling thus partially addresses social equity concerns, albeit 
at the loss of some calls that would otherwise have been made at cost-based call pricing.   
Where network effects accrue from a larger number of connections being sold, such pricing 
also facilitates the realisation of social benefits which would not otherwise be internalised by 
the individuals purchasing connections - specifically, the value to other connectors of the 
connection being purchased).   
 
However, as those making calls are those valuing them most (i.e. their demand is more 
inelastic), the welfare lost as a consequence of calls not made will be minimised because the 
calls not made are forfeited by those whose demand is most elastic (value them least).  As 
long as the welfare gained from more connections being sold (including the uninternalised 
social benefits of additional connections) exceeds the loss of welfare from fewer calls made, 
the result is a net gain.   
 
Two-part tariffs, where calling revenues subsidise connections, have been used extensively 
across the OECD to increase the diffusion of both fixed and mobile telephony connections 
(Laffont & Tirole, 2002: chapters 3 and 6).  As a consequence of the network effects of 
connection, the ‘tied’ two-part tariff can also be considered as a ‘two-sided market’ (Rochet 
& Tirole, 2004; 2005; Evans & Schmalansee, 2005; Wright, 2004), where calling can be 
considered the ‘money side’ and connections the ‘subsidy side’ (Parker & Van Alstyne, 2005; 
Eisenmann, Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006).   Prepaid mobile connections are an extreme case, 
where no charge is made for connections, but calls are charged substantially above cost.  Such 
pricing plans have been extremely successful in encouraging the diffusion of mobile 
telephony amongst lower-valuing users in countries as diverse as New Zealand (Howell & 
Obren, 2003) and India (Sridhar, 2007). 
 
4.3.3 Trading Equity and Efficiency: Perverse Effects of “Free Local Calling’ 
The mandatory ‘free local calling’ tariff in the New Zealand regulatory regime, however, 
reverses the effect of the subsidy.  As identified in section 1.3.1, its adoption was motivated 
not by equity or consumer welfare concerns, but by bureaucratic convenience.  Calling is 
subsidised from connections.  As consumer valuation of connections and calling is largely 
positively correlated, those placing a lower value on the call and connection bundle 
effectively subsidise those with higher valuations.  Unlike the tax from calling to 
consumptions, the effect of the ‘tax’ from connections to consumption is regressive.  Those 
valuing calling and connection least subsidise increased usage by those who value calls most.   
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The subsidy to those valuing calls most has a profound effect on the volume of calls made. 
Whilst all local callers purchasing a subscription at the higher price face no marginal price for 
calling, so will make more calls than if charged the marginal cost, the effect is greatest for 
those valuing calls the most.  Far more and longer calls will be made than under marginal cost 
call pricing, increasing the size of the subsidy that has to be recouped from the connection 
charge.  The connection charge must rise far above what it would have been under marginal 
cost pricing of both connection and calling, thereby depriving those individuals valuing the 
bundle between marginal cost and the price including the subsidy required to underpin the 
higher volume of call minutes of the opportunity to connect.  Welfare in the connection 
market is foregone, including the network effects that accrue from more connections, but are 
not perfectly internalised in the connection purchase decision.   
 
The total number of connections under the New Zealand ‘free local calling’ tariff is therefore 
less than efficient, and the volume of calls more than efficient, with those valuing the bundle 
least subsidising those who value it most.  If it is presumed that the valuations of calling and 
connection are distributed similarly in New Zealand and other OECD countries, the tariff 
substantially explains why, on a per capita and a per-household basis, New Zealand ranks 
lowly in OECD fixed line connection density.  It also explains in large part why New Zealand 
ranks lowly on price comparisons between countries using the OECD baskets, as the number 
of calls made is substantially larger than usually used in the baskets.  Using the basket 
approach, the high fixed component is spread over a much smaller volume of call minutes 
than actually is the case, biasing New Zealand’s ranking downward.    
 
The New Zealand pricing arrangement does not appear to meet any clearly-identified equity 
criteria, except possibly that all callers pay the same price (zero) for making calls, albeit with 
fewer individuals being able to afford the connections that enable them make the equally-
priced calls.  The rationale for retaining it therefore appears weak, even on equity grounds.  
Whilst it was perhaps justifiable in the initial days of telephony services in the 1880s and 
1890s, when an explicit policy prioritised commercial connections and therefore commercial 
calls, over residential ones (presumably because these calls were more valuable – i.e. 
generated higher welfare), its retention subsequently is questionable.  Bureaucratic and 
political reasons, and an aversion to change have led to its preservation.  Indeed, in 1999 the 
Minister’s satisfaction with Telecom’s 0867 package was conditional that consumers faced no 
charge for dial-up internet calls made.   
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4.3.3 ‘Kiwi Share’ Increases Internet Use But Delays Broadband Uptake 
The emergence of the internet, however, poses some questions about optimal tariffs, given 
that the single connection now enables access to two distinct applications – voice telephony 
and internet transactions.  One connection can (but does not have to) be bundled with two 
different uses.  There are two effects to be considered – a bundling effect from one connection 
serving two purposes and a usage effect because connection and usage are tied.  The 
optimality of the tariff depends now upon user valuations for each of connection and 
utilisation of each of voice telephony and the internet.  Whereas the tying of voice connection 
and utilisation charges relied upon the valuations of both being positively correlated for users, 
it does not necessarily follow that the demand for internet connection and utilisation, whilst 
likely positively correlated with each other, are positively correlated with users’ valuations of 
voice telephony.  As dial-up internet access ‘bundled’ internet connection with telephone 
connection, telephony tariffs have influenced the extent of welfare accrued from internet 
access and use, and also how that welfare has been allocated.  The tariff structure will also 
have an influence upon substitution of internet users from the legacy dial-up technology to the 
frontier broadband technology.   
 
Specifically whilst New Zealand dial-up internet use has been high due to subsidised usage, 
the high price of telephony connections required to subsidise the cost of use has likely 
disadvantaged individuals with low telephony connection and usage valuation but high 
internet connection and usage valuation, who have been required to pay above cost for a 
telephony connection not highly valued in order to access the internet.  It has also meant New 
Zealand internet users must have higher valuations of both connection to and utilisation of the 
internet in order to justify substituting to broadband connections.   
 
4.3.3.1 The ‘Bundled Connection’ Effect 
The first effect is the ‘bundled connection’ effect.  Dial-up internet access bundles the 
telephony-based element of connection to the internet with connection to voice telephony 
services.  As the telephony component of dial-up internet telephony has in effect been 
‘bundled in’ with voice telephony purchase, those who value telephony highly enough to 
purchase a telephony connection are ‘gifted’ the ability to connect to the internet, irrespective 
of how they value it.   An individual who does not value a telephony connection sufficiently 
to purchase one must pay for one in order to connect to the internet (i.e. does not get 
subsidised access).  If dial-up access is all that is available, the higher the price of a telephone 
connection, the higher the individual must value the combined internet access and utilisation 
bundle to justify purchase in the first place.   
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Connection bundling creates an inequity, as high-valuing voice telephony connectors with 
lower values of internet connection receive subsidised internet connection, whereas higher-
valuing internet users with low values for voice connection must pay the unsubsidised price.  
The extent of the ‘bundling inequity’ is greater the higher the connection price is above cost: 
the threshold for internet-only connection purchase value is raised, whilst the value held by 
the lowest-valuing internet connector receiving the bundle subsidy is reduced.  Compulsory 
bundling and tying under the New Zealand tariffs thus reduce both efficiency and equity in 
respect of dial-up internet connection purchase, at the same time as it has enabled higher 
levels of utilisation by connectors who value voice telephony high enough to pay the usage-
subsidising price.   
 
The ‘bundled connection’ effect also affects the value of internet connection at which an 
internet user will substitute from dial-up internet access to broadband access.  The greater the 
telephony connection fee paid, the greater the ‘connection gift’ offered to those with a 
positive valuation of internet connection and use.  Where an alternative internet connection is 
available (e.g. broadband), in order to justify substitution from the subsidised dial-up 
connection to the alternative technology, a subsidised dial-up user must receive sufficient 
additional benefit from the alternative technology to warrant foregoing the subsidy from the 
dial-up bundle and paying a positive price for the alternative connection, relative to the 
benefit required when dial-up connection is charged at cost.  All other things being equal, the 
higher the extent of the connection bundling subsidy, the higher the user must value the 
internet connection to justify substituting.  As the New Zealand voice tariff sets the price of 
subsidised internet connection substantially above cost, the marginal value of internet 
connection for a New Zealand internet user substituting to broadband will be higher than the 
marginal substituter in an equivalent regime where telephony-based internet access is priced 
at cost.   
 
It is also noted that, under the ‘bundled connection’ effect, the value of internet connection at 
which the marginal internet user will substitute to broadband will be less than the cost-based 
value where under typical ‘tied’ price discrimination usage subsidises connection.  Thus, 
irrespective of the level or valuation of usage, the value of internet connection at which 
internet users will substitute to broadband will be substantially lower in countries where 
typical two-part tariffs for telephony services have prevailed than where either cost-based 
pricing or New Zealand-type tariffs prevail, simply because the size of the subsidy from the 
‘bundled connection’ is less.   
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Moreover, the New Zealand ‘universal service’ obligation places the locus of internet 
connection subsidy obligation on urban customers.  This raises the threshold, relative to cost, 
at which an urban consumer will substitute to broadband compared to a rural consumer.  
Thus, substitution to broadband requires a higher benefit threshold to be reached before urban 
consumers substitute when universal service-based prices prevail, than when cost-based 
prices prevail.   As urban populations are larger than rural ones, and broadband availability 
tends to be greater in urban areas, geographic de-averaging may partially explain the greater 
levels of substitution to broadband in Canada, one of the four OECD countries with ‘free 
local calling’, than in Australia and New Zealand, where retail dial-up connection charges are 
still largely geographically averaged.  
 
4.3.3.2 The ‘Tied Usage’ Effect 
The second effect relates to the value of internet usage.  Just as with voice calling, ‘free local 
calling’ results in internet usage being subsidised by the bundled voice and internet 
connection charge.  For those individuals valuing connection to either the internet or voice or 
both sufficiently to pay for a connection, usage is subsidised.  All internet users will consume 
up to their maximum value, as usage is unpriced, with those valuing internet usage most (i.e. 
most inelastic demands) consuming most.  Those valuing internet usage least (i.e. have the 
most elastic demands) receive least from the connection subsidy.  The average price paid per 
internet minute consumed is least for the highest users/valuers.  Low internet usage valuers 
and all voice connection valuers thus subsidise high internet use valuers, with the subsidy 
being greatest to those valuing internet use most.  As minutes of local voice traffic trebled 
between 1997 and 2003 because of increased internet usage (Figure 1), the extent of this 
subsidy has been substantial.  The consequence of the subsidy has likely been the forfeiting of 
benefits that might otherwise have been delivered to voice telephony users (e.g. lower 
connection prices, better service quality, routine maintenance on lines and switches) in order 
to cover the additional costs of the increased usage.   
 
Moreover, ‘tied usage’ has also raised the marginal value of usage at which a subsidised dial-
up internet user will substitute to broadband.  Those who value internet usage most will use 
most minutes of dial-up internet access.  Assuming a fixed price is charged for broadband, 
holding all other factors equal, the minutes of usage at which a subsidised user will substitute 
to broadband will be higher than for a user paying for usage at cost.  Thus, the valuation of 
internet usage at which substitution to broadband will occur is higher under New Zealand’s 
tariff structure than under a neutral pricing arrangement.  The greater the extent of the usage 
subsidy provided, the greater the difference in internet usage valuation at which substitution 
occurs.  New Zealand’s ‘free’ usage creates the maximum possible difference.  The marginal 
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value of usage at which a New Zealand dial-up internet user will substitute to broadband is 
thus higher than when even a partial contribution to usage costs is paid, and substantially 
higher than if usage is priced at cost.    
 
It is noted that under typical two-part tariffs where usage subsidises connection, the volume of 
usage at which a dial-up internet user will substitute to broadband will be less than if cost-
based pricing applies.  Thus, substitution to broadband occurs at lower values of internet 
usage under connection-subsidised tariffs than either cost-based tariffs, or usage-subsidised 
prices such as those in New Zealand.   
 
4.3.3.3 Dial-Up Pricing and New Zealand Broadband Substitution 
Assuming that the distributions of user valuations for internet connection and utilisation are 
similar across the OECD countries, New Zealand’s tariff structure for voice telephony has 
thus had a profound effect upon the rate of substitution from dial-up to broadband 
technologies.  Indeed, the extent of the usage subsidies suggests that, all other things being 
equal, New Zealand dial-up internet users must have the highest values of both connection 
and usage in the OECD to substitute from dial-up to broadband.  The ‘Kiwi Share’ ‘universal 
service’ and ‘free local calling’ obligations have thus unequivocally contributed to New 
Zealand’s lower-than-expected broadband uptake relative to other countries.     
 
The New Zealand broadband uptake data illustrate the role of connection and usage subsidy 
in substitution effects.  As identified above, Telecom has offered its DSL products at low 
prices in order to induce early substitution.  Indeed, in order to counter the effects of ‘bundled 
connection’, DSL has been offered at a range of two-part tariffs, enabling users to self-select 
the bundle of connection and usage that renders them most surplus.  In effect, this lowers the 
threshold at which substitution would have occurred in the analysis above, as it allows for 
cross-subsidy from those valuing broadband connection and usage most to those who have 
lower valuations, as in the standard voice telephony two-part tariffs.   Entry level packages 
have been priced low, in order to encourage even modest users to substitute.  Yet uptake has 
been slow.  High-valuing users appear to have preferred to remain using subsidised dial-up, 
rather than substitute to pay-per-use DSL.  This suggests that the demand for internet usage in 
New Zealand is very elastic (confirmed by empirical analyses such as Rappoport, 2003; 
Varian, 2002; and Horrigan, 2005 in the United States).  It appears to be only at very high 
levels of usage valuation (proxied by hours of dial-up use) that individuals are prepared to 
forgo the bundled connection and usage subsidies and substitute to DSL.  Thus, it appears 
that, at the current point in time, the volume of usage by consumers with on average quite 
elastic demands is responsible for a time lag relative to other countries in substitution to 
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broadband in New Zealand.  If valuation of internet connection is positively correlated to 
valuation of usage, this suggests that overall, demand for broadband connections is also quite 
elastic.   
 
Figures 8, 9 and 13 clearly illustrate New Zealand substitution patterns. Whilst it is 
acknowledged that individuals will vary in their valuations of both internet connection and 
usage, Figure 8 indicates that at the prevailing prices and price structures, the ‘average’ New 
Zealand internet user substitutes to broadband when dial-up usage reaches 35 hours per 
month.  As more applications are used and usage intensity of specific applications increases, 
average usage increases, but substitution to DSL does not appear to be significant until 
average usage reaches this level.  Figure 9 shows that once this level has been reached, 
substitution becomes marked.  Higher-using consumers substitute, leaving lower-using ones 
on dial-up.  Over 99% of the increase in DSL accounts is explained by the decrease in dial-up 
accounts (Figure 9), with 85% of the decrease in dial-up accounts being explained by the 
reduction in average usage per account (Figure 13).  This suggests that usage volume is the 
dominant effect explaining substitution to DSL in New Zealand (although it is likely that high 
usage valuation is linked to connection valuation, usage is the dominant effect). 
 
4.3.4.4 Bundling, Tariff Levels, Tariff Form and Competition in New Zealand 
 De Ridder (2007:28) finds New Zealand has one of the highest relative prices of DSL to dial-
up in the OECD for a standard basket of services, even though the New Zealand DSL price is 
less than the OECD average.  The low dial-up price in part reflects the extent of the subsidy 
provided for both connection and utilisation in New Zealand.  Low levels of substitution to 
DSL despite low prices would appear to confirm that, overall, either New Zealand internet 
connection and usage valuation is not especially high, or the benefits of broadband are not 
considered substantial for the vast majority of New Zealand internet users.   
 
By offering a range of two-part tariffs, New Zealand broadband pricing structures have 
enabled individuals to pick the internet tariff (dial-up or one of a range of broadband tariffs) 
that offers them the highest surplus for their level of usage.  If connection has been priced low 
(or even below cost) to induce substitution, but the vast majority of broadband users consume 
little bandwidth (less than 3GB/month, according to iHug), then a low valuation of internet 
usage appears confirmed.  As the large amounts of dial-up internet usage recorded in Figure 8 
have been accrued by low-valuing individuals who are reluctant to pay positive usage prices 
(even if these are cost-based), then competition for broadband customers is unlikely to yield 
substantial profits for Telecom’s competitors, given the competition is against an existing 
internet usage pattern that includes both subsidised connection and subsidised usage.  
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However, use of two-part tariffs has denied high-valuing users comparable subsidies provided 
from low-valuing users that have occurred in regimes where flat-rate broadband tariffs have 
been offered.   If usage tariffs are cost-based, then the arrangement has reduced the amount of 
inefficient over-consumption by a very small percentage of high valuers.  If usage has been 
priced higher than cost, then the current broadband uptake levels are actually higher than 
could have been expected had flat-rate broadband tariffs prevailed, as the higher costs of 
subsidised usage would have had to be recovered from higher connection charges, raising the 
substitution thresholds even further.   
 
The New Zealand tariff patterns thus cast some light upon strategic interaction occurring 
between Telecom and its competitors in the market for DSL customers.  Telecom has had to 
price DSL connections low in order to induce substitution.  However, it has also been able to 
internalise savings from reductions in dial-up usage occurring as dial-up internet consumers 
switch to broadband, as long as the customers continue to purchase dial-up services at the 
same price.  Substituting DSL customers revert to becoming voice-only telephony customers, 
paying a higher effective price per minute for calls than when they used dial-up internet, but 
thereby effectively making a contribution (subsidy) towards their own DSL connection cost.  
As long as Telecom receives both voice calling and ADSL revenue, it becomes feasible to 
drop the ADSL connection price below cost.  Such an action is not necessarily anti-
competitive.  If the costs of delivery on ADSL are lower than on the dial-up network, or if 
there are other social benefits (e.g. network effects associated with applications that cannot be 
used on dial-up) which are not captured by consumers, welfare is increased by such pricing 
(and is lost under structural separation or other regulatory instruments that might prevent such 
cross-subsidy from occurring).   However, competing providers selling only DSL services 
cannot offer DSL at prices to match Telecom’s.  In order to at least break even at the prices 
charged by Telecom, they must be able to access the margins paid above cost by voice 
telephony customers.   
 
Hence competition in the New Zealand telecommunications market is focused not upon 
capturing new broadband customers for the value of the broadband custom that they bring, 
but upon capturing the voice telephony margins above cost that broadband substituters are 
paying.  Service providers can encourage these consumers to identify themselves by using 
low prices for DSL services to attract those who have already substituted or are intending to 
do so.  The higher margins for voice services are captured by both Telecom and its 
competitors tying discounted DSL to mandatory purchase of fixed line voice services.  This 
avoids the ‘problem’ of selling a customer only low-margin DSL services whilst the higher 
margins from voice connection go to another provider.  Both Telecom and its competitors are 
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offering tied packages where DSL is discounted by $10 per month when the bundle is 
purchased.  DSL is thus the product on the ‘subsidy side’ of the two-sided platform, with dial-
up voice connection being the ‘money side’ (as per Parker & Van Alstyne, 2006).    
 
Making ‘naked DSL’ – a DSL connection sold without the concomitant requirement to 
purchase a voice connection – eliminates all transfer of margins from voice to DSL services.  
The price set for this service must adequately compensate not only the price of providing the 
service, but also the opportunity cost of the lost option to utilise such subsidies to advance 
investment in and uptake of new technologies.   If the price for this service is set too low, it 
jeopardises not only Telecom’s investment plans and business case, but also the business 
cases of Telecom’s competitors who are relying upon voice margins alone to underwrite their 
market entry.   
 
The New Zealand tariff structures imposed by the Kiwi Share have thus resulted in a pattern 
of broadband bundling that is underpinned by different economics to that in other countries, 
where low or negative margins on voice telephony services and even the broadband 
connection itself are likely subsidised by revenues collected on highly-valued services 
delivered using broadband and sold at prices above cost (e.g. anti-spam filter services; pay-
per-use proprietary movies and music purchased; premiums paid for copyright material (e.g. 
sports channels) distributed by television service providers via ‘triple play’ bundles).    It is 
notable that none of the New Zealand service providers is offering metered local calling in its 
voice and DSL bundles.    
 
4.4 ‘Kiwi Share’ Consequences 
It is now possible to interpret local loop unbundling in New Zealand as having a very 
different set of motivations than in other jurisdictions.  The scarce resource is not simply the 
copper loop for the provision of cost-priced or mildly-differentiated DSL services168, but the 
ability to ‘capture’ voice telephony customers inured to paying prices substantially above 
cost.  The voice telephony connection margins are the ‘profits on the table’ in the New 
Zealand market.  This contrasts with other jurisdictions, where margins from arbitrage on 
differences between the incumbent’s DSL retail and unbundled loop prices have underpinned 
competition.  The New Zealand voice telephony margins would not have been available in 
other jurisdictions where two-part tariffs subsidising connections rather than usage have 
                                                     
168 Whilst potential exists from product differentiation in the DSL market, such differentiation will require substantial investment 
in a market where the demand for internet services is likely very elastic (as has been illustrated in other countries – e.g. Goolsbee, 
2006; Goolsbee & Klenow, 2006), and made more so by the extent to which dial-up internet access has been subsidised. 
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prevailed, and where substantial tariff rebalancing has resulted in prices for each of voice 
connection and utilisation moving closer to their marginal costs.   
 
The margins being contested in New Zealand are therefore principally an artefact of the ‘Kiwi 
Share’ requirements forcing mandatory subsidy of dial-up usage at the time that such usage 
became highly-valued for an additional use brought about by serendipitous ‘bundling’.   
 
4.4.1 Implications for Investment and Dynamic Efficiency 
Whereas Telecom has historically been able to use margins from voice telephony services to 
partially underwrite DSL infrastructure investment, increased competition in fixed line 
services under LLU and operational separation will fragment access to these margins amongst 
a number of competitors.  It is possible that in some cases Telecom’s competitors will use the 
margins to invest in new services (or indeed, even to offset potentially higher costs of 
providing broadband services on their own proprietary networks, whereas the margins would 
have been more efficiently utilised if applied to Telecom’s own network investment).  
However, the scale of these investments will likely be very much smaller than the network 
envisaged in the Digital Strategy or Telecom’s NGN.  It cannot be discounted that the 
margins will simply be absorbed by Telecom’s competitors to offset their setup costs or to 
increase their own profits, with minimal additional infrastructure investment, as cannot be 
discounted as occurring across the OECD, on the basis of Figures 10, 11 and 12.   
 
Where competing platforms are continually providing pressure upon each other to stimulate 
investment in new technologies, fragmentation of the profits and consequent investment 
delays in the local loop may be less problematic.  Indeed, commercial purchasers of 
unbundled connections have strong incentives to collaborate together and with the incumbent 
to jointly combat the challenge of competing infrastructures, in order to avoid the stranding of 
investments made (albeit with some transaction cost consequences).  But where there is only 
one network, the fragmentation is most likely to be exacerbated by the absence of competition 
from other networks (full facilities-based competition).  The likely result in this circumstance 
is that new network investment will be delayed even further, as there is no compelling 
motivation for otherwise competing parties to collaborate in supporting the incumbent’s 
future investments.   The latter, rather than the former, scenario appears more likely in the 
New Zealand circumstances.   
 
4.4.2 Separation, ‘Net Neutrality’ and Decreased Dynamic Efficiency 
The effects of mandatory separation can now be seen as especially problematic for future 
network investment. Separation as prescribed for New Zealand prevents any price 
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discrimination from occurring in the sale of network elements.  Pricing that has been 
demonstrated to increase dynamic efficiency by enabling production of a good with high 
fixed costs that would otherwise not be produced at a single price because the firm does not 
obtain the entire social benefit even though it pays the full social cost (Carlton & Perloff, 
2000:211-2) is prevented.  With no possibility of charging selected end users of legacy 
applications prices above cost to subsidise the building of new networks, these networks may 
not be built at all, or will be built at a later date than the counterfactual of discriminatory 
pricing.  Whereas discriminatory pricing for infrastructure access was feasible when Telecom 
could integrate its retail and network activities, and likely contributed via the use of dial-up 
revenues to subsidise early DSL network development, such pricing cannot occur under 
separation and equalised pricing to all commercial customers.   
 
Indeed, operational separation of the network from application service provision, with 
identical prices charged to each commercial customer is precisely the arrangement sought by 
proponents of ‘network neutrality’, who require that all applications be charged equally for 
internet use, regardless of the differences in value placed upon them by their users (Sidak, 
2006; Hahn, Litan & Singer, 2007).  Whilst such arrangements have some appeal to those 
favouring equity, such proposals fail to take into account the different valuations and volumes 
of use by end-users, and the cost structures of telecommunications networks and the 
concomitant effects upon incentives for investment.  Whereas the use of price discrimination 
based upon differences in consumer valuations is routine in many other markets with similar 
high levels of fixed and sunk costs and low marginal costs (e.g. airlines and other 
transportation), and has undoubtedly led to increases in the volume of use and the number of 
services offered, its explicit prevention under operational separation debars consumers of 
information transportation from the same opportunities.    
 
Indeed, the strong advocacy for network neutrality and structural separation tends to be led by 
those whose valuations of network use are highest, as under two-part tariffs it is they who are 
‘taxed’ in the short run to provide the resources to generate the greater levels of total welfare 
in the long run.   Acquiescing to their demands for equal terms and conditions for all users, 
irrespective of the different valuations of users will almost certainly lead to slower 
development of network assets, likely disadvantaging New Zealand relative to other countries 
where separation has not been mandated, and where inter-platform rather than intra-platform 
competition dictates the pace of investment.   
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5. Conclusion 
Three significant factors have shaped the regulatory environment in New Zealand’s 
telecommunications market over the past twenty years.  The first has been the gradual 
retraction from the ‘light-handed’ regulatory regime of the 1980s back towards the imposition 
of centralised political control of sector direction in 2007.  The second has been the 
movement away from the principles of a regulatory regime pursuing increased efficiency as 
the end and competition as a means toward that end towards one where competition is the 
overriding objective and where there is no apparent scope to take account of efficiency 
considerations.  The third is the strict adherence to the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations of universal 
pricing of voice telephony connections and free local calling.   
 
Sector outcomes, as indicated in this paper, do not appear to have improved as a consequence 
of increased regulatory intervention.  Rather, each intervention appears to have worsened 
outcomes in at least one dimension, without leading to the improvements sought.  The core of 
most of the disputes appears to be the ‘Kiwi Share’.  Yet the underpinning assumptions of this 
element of the regulatory regime appear not to have been questioned.  The question of who 
should bear the cost of the obligations and how Telecom’s prices could (or should not) 
include these costs underpinned the High Court and Court of Appeal cases in 1991-4.  The 
focus upon Telecom’s prices as a measure of market power thus created the framework for 
the regulatory regime following the 2000 Inquiry.  Low levels of broadband uptake which 
underpinned the 2003 LLU inquiry, the 2006 Stocktake and the subsequent imposition of 
LLU and operational separation were again directly a consequence of the tariff structures 
imposed in the Kiwi Share.    
 
The bundle of ‘light-handed’ regulatory obligations has thus been both a facilitator of the 
transfer of substantial surplus to consumers in the 1990s, but its sole remaining element has 
been the origin of the obstacles to improved performance in the 2000s.  The regulatory 
response has been to tighten controls upon Telecom in order to reduce the extent of its 
dominance.  However, it is far from clear that exertion of dominance has been the biggest 
obstacle to the development of the New Zealand market.  It is not the existence of dominance 
that is problematic, but its exertion.  Indeed, in a technologically volatile industry where scale 
matters, dominance has advantages in respect of incentivising timely investment in new 
infrastructures. The unfortunate consequence of the focus upon Telecom’s dominance has 
been the apparent overlooking of elements of the regulatory regime that have been 
substantially greater impediments to market development.  Nowhere has this been more 
apparent than in the search for an explanation for New Zealand’s low broadband uptake.  
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Despite the evidence of an absence of supply-side factors deterring uptake, the search for a 
problem amenable to regulatory intervention was confined to supply-side participants.  The 
role of the regulatory regime as a potential factor was not addressed in the 2006 Stocktake.  
The 2007 review of the “Kiwi Share’ is occurring too late and in isolation from the decisions 
to introduce LLU and operational separation.   
 
5.1 The Questions 
Returning to the questions posed at the outset of this paper, it is now possible to provide if not 
answers, then at least some insights from which other regimes can learn.  Firstly, it is now 
evident that the ‘light-handed regime’ did appear to perform better than comparator regimes 
across the 1990s in terms of benefits to consumers.  Part of that performance was related to 
the Kiwi Share obligations.  However, much of it was a consequence of a combination of 
factors including the serendipitous emergence of the internet at the same time as an imperfect 
interconnection agreement intertwined with the ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations to create a near 
unique set of factors that led to rapid and low-priced deployment of broadband.  The major 
shortcoming of the competition law-focused regime was not so much its inability to enable 
the detection and prosecution in the event of exertion of market power, but rather the inability 
of such a regime to give sufficient voice to the principles of economic efficiency over 
adherence to competitive principles.  Yet the regulatory response has been to increase the 
strength of adherence to a predetermined set of competitive principles, even though there are 
many ways in which such interaction can play out, some of which will lead to increased 
efficiency, and some of which will not.   
 
That the New Zealand regulatory approach has failed to improve overall outcomes is not 
surprising, however, when considered in light of the alternative hypothesis that the return to 
industry-specific regulation has failed to address the underlying problem of regulatory 
making.  The ‘Kiwi Share’ obligations imposed mandatory cross-subsidisation in a market 
which was being judged upon its performance against competitive benchmarks.  Yet Farrell 
(1996) states “competition is the enemy of cross-subsidies”.   Persistence with socially-
inspired subsidies embedded within telephony service prices whilst simultaneously 
endeavouring to introduce a competitive market cannot be anything but distortionary.  That 
the New Zealand subsidies were not just of a geographic nature, but also applied in the 
reverse direction to most other regimes with respect to connection subsidising usage may 
have made the detection of their effects more problematic.  But it does not excuse their 
oversight in the regulatory reforms undertaken.  The rules under which competitive 
interaction occurs are fundamental to the systemic operation of the market.  The inability to 
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achieve an objective may equally be a consequence of the rules themselves as a function of 
wilful disobedience of the rules by the players.   
 
In the terms of Russo and Schoemaker (1989), policy-makers and legislators appear to have 
succumbed to the ‘availability bias’ (p81-7) in presuming that it was the move to a 
competition law approach and the eschewing of industry-specific regulation in 1987, and its 
difference from the regimes in other jurisdictions, that were responsible for any deviation 
from desired outcomes.  ‘Anchoring’ on this ‘convenient fact’ led to the ‘short-sighted 
decision’ (p95) to omit the legacy factors in the ‘Kiwi Share’ from the analytical frames used 
to analyse the sources of any problems and to propose solutions.  The resulting ‘frame-
blindness’ (p16) led to the wrong questions being asked, and a lack of ‘disconfirming 
questions’ (p103-5) being posed to test the efficacy of the conclusions reached, thereby 
exacerbating the errors underpinning past analyses.  Consequently, the 2000 Inquiry 
recommended changes to the regulatory regime to emulate those in other countries, even 
though there was no compelling evidence of superior performance in other regimes.  
Subsequently, international ‘groupthink’ (p147) expressed as faith in pursuing international 
best practice has precluded asking questions about what other New Zealand-specific factors 
might be impacting upon market performance, and has contributed to an unjustified sense of 
‘overconfidence’ (p70-80) in the efficacy of the decisions made.   Yet simultaneously, 
differences in the form of New Zealand’s universal service and near-unique tariff obligations, 
applied at a time when the international practice has been to de-average both geographically 
and between connection and utilisation, have been maintained unquestioned.   
 
By putting many of the past assumptions to the test, this paper has illustrated New Zealand’s 
return to some of the most stringent regulatory actions possible at a time when most other 
countries are debating the merits of reduced reliance upon ex ante regulation is not because of 
the inability of a competition law-governed approach to facilitate improved outcomes for 
consumers measured as efficiency gains, but because the market that has ensued is not 
deemed sufficiently ‘competitive’ (measured as the market share of competitors to Telecom) 
and that ‘too few’ New Zealanders are purchasing broadband connections (determined by the 
uptake in the top 8 countries in the OECD in this statistic).  In the search for an explanation 
for the current state of affairs, the policy-makers appear to have restricted their attention to 
matters of competition and dominance, to the exclusion of the efficacy of the regulatory 
instruments employed.   
 
That operational separation is being pursued in the New Zealand context when consolidation 
prevails in other markets would appear, from the foregoing analysis to be a function of a 
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declared political intention to determine sector strategy as part of an objective to break 
Telecom’s dominance irrespective of the efficiency consequences.  Given that New Zealand’s 
small market size makes pursuit of scale problematic at the best of times, the apparently 
perverse pursuit of fragmentation just as investment in a replacement nationwide network is 
imminent has little rational economic foundation.  Once again, an apparent absence of 
consideration of the ways in which cross-subsidy has already influenced the development of 
the existing infrastructures and market interactions, and the pursuit of competition at the 
expense of efficiency, would at least partially explain the New Zealand approach. 
 
5.2 The Lessons 
The principal lesson from the New Zealand experience from which other regimes can learn is 
that that both competition law and regulatory approaches can be problematic if the objectives 
are measured in terms other than improvements in efficiency.  Under competition law, it is 
important that the institutions and processes have the capacity to consider the efficiency-
related consequences of actions undertaken, and that the enforcement of competition-related 
outcomes takes account of the distinctions applying when pursuit of scale and scope 
economies may lead to reduction in competition but increases in efficiency.  The legislative 
design of regulatory regimes must take cognisance of the role of efficiency in the powers 
delegated to the regulatory authority and in the setting of the regulatory objectives 
themselves.   
 
A second lesson is that the economic circumstances and legislative and regulatory history 
prevailing when a piece of legislation or regulatory tool is introduced will affect the outcome.  
Simply imposing identical rules is no guarantee of achieving an identical outcome, if the 
underlying circumstances, actors and historical interactions are different.  New Zealand’s 
historic pricing regimes have established a set of expectations amongst all of providers, 
consumers and politicians that affect their responses to the legislation and regulation, and 
therefore the outcome.  These are necessarily different to other regimes.  Also, the timing of 
introduction matters.  A set of rules applied in a mature technology environment will 
encompass a very different set of incentives and lead to a very different set of behaviours than 
if the same rules are applied just as the technology begins to be diffused, or even before it is 
made available.  
 
Thirdly, and importantly for countries contemplating the removal of regulation and 
replacement by competition law, the New Zealand experience does not provide evidence that 
‘light-handed’ regulation has failed.  It is unfortunate, however, that its reign was so brief.  
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Much could have been learned about its comparative performance during the complete 
diffusion and deployment of broadband, and investment and deployment of next-generation 
fibre-based technologies, had the regime not been curtailed in 2001.   As the rest of the OECD 
grapples with how to regulate oligopolies competing using differentiated platforms, and 
where a legacy of LLU has created competitors on one of those technologies who now face 
incentives to create cartels to compete with other infrastructures, much could have been 
learned from New Zealand.   
 
5.3 The Future for New Zealand 
As for the New Zealand regime, it is difficult to see how the current arrangements will 
support timely investment in advanced networks.  Neither separation nor LLU are consistent 
with strong investment incentives in the medium to long term.  Moreover, separation is costly, 
with Telecom estimating the one-off cost at around $300 million and annual operating costs 
in the vicinity of $40 million.  If New Zealand achieves 1 million broadband connections (that 
is, a diffusion level of 25 per 100 population, sufficient to make the current top 8 of the 
OECD), the cost of separation at the current level of investment is a one-off social cost per 
broadband account equivalent to one year’s connection and an annual cost of one month’s 
connection at current retail rates.  Scale means the benefits will have to be of the order of 15 
times greater per account in New Zealand than in the United Kingdom to justify the 
regulation.  “Faster, cheaper broadband” as promised by the politicians seems unlikely if the 
industry is to fully recover the costs of separation and other regulatory changes ultimately 
from consumers (which will inevitably occur in the long run, in either overt payments, or 
consumer welfare foregone).   
 
New investment will require returns from chargeable applications other than those currently 
being sold by providers.  Telecom’s incentives to invest in infrastructure can now no longer 
be linked to proprietary applications or underwritten by discriminatory prices charged to its 
competitors or their retail customers.  Investment by Telecom’s competitors is likely to be 
local or fringe-based at best.   Whilst the current arrangements may have created the 
incentives for competition in the short term, the long-term scenario for a vibrant 
telecommunications sector appears bleak.  It is difficult to see how the investment necessary 
to meet the Digital Strategy objectives can be justified without substantial subsidy from either 
applications or explicit input (e.g. local or central government).  As application-based subsidy 
is impossible under the separation arrangements, then explicit subsidy appears to be the only 
alternative.   It may well come to pass that not only sector control, but also core infrastructure 
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investment and ownership, eventually returns to government hands in the New Zealand 
market.   
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Figure 1.  New Zealand Telephony Network Traffic 1996-2003 
Source: Howell & Obren (2003:33) 
Figure 2.  NZ REAL RESIDENTIAL TELEPHONE PRICE INDEX 1991-2001 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 3.    OECD TELEPHONE CHARGE TIME SERIES 1990-2006 
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Figure 4.  TELECOMMUNICATIONS REVENUES 1991-2002: OECD, NZ AND SELECTED 
COUNTRIES 
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Figure 5 
Source: Statistics New Zealand 
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Figure 7 
New Zealand ADSL Market 2003-2007
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Figure 8 
NZ Internet Market 2000-2006
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Figure 9 
Correlatation: NZ DSL and Dial-Up 
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Figure 10: Investment as a Percentage of Revenues: NZ, OECD and Selected Countries 
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Figure 11:  Investment as a Percentage of Revenues: NZ and OECD Regions          
(Index 1997) 
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Figure 12: Investments and Revenues: NZ and OECD (Index 1997) 
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Figure 13   
Correlation: Dial-up Accounts and Usage
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